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THE SUPERFLUOUS FIFTEENTH AMENDMENT? 
Travis Crum 
ABSTRACT—This Article starts a conversation about reorienting voting 
rights doctrine toward the Fifteenth Amendment. In advancing this claim, I 
explore an unappreciated debate—the “Article V debate”—in the Fortieth 
Congress about whether nationwide black suffrage could and should be 
achieved through a statute, a constitutional amendment, or both. As the first 
significant post-ratification discussion of the Fourteenth Amendment, the 
Article V debate provides valuable insights about the original public 
understandings of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments and the 
distinction between civil and political rights. 
The Article V debate reveals that the Radical Republicans’ initial 
proposal for nationwide black suffrage included both a statute and an 
amendment. Moderate Republicans rejected the statutory option because 
they believed that Congress lacked enforcement authority under the 
Fourteenth Amendment to impose voting qualifications on the states and that 
an amendment was the only politically viable option. 
Given this historical evidence, this Article argues that the Fifteenth 
Amendment was a significant expansion of congressional authority to 
regulate voting rights in the states and that Congress’s Fifteenth Amendment 
enforcement authority is distinct from—and broader under current doctrine 
than—its Fourteenth Amendment enforcement authority. The Article V 
debate offers a persuasive reason for overturning Boerne’s congruence and 
proportionality test or, at a minimum, cabining it to the Fourteenth 
Amendment. Accordingly, laws enacted under Congress’s Fifteenth 
Amendment enforcement authority should be reviewed under Katzenbach’s 
rationality standard and the Voting Rights Act (VRA) would be on firmer 
constitutional ground. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The Fifteenth Amendment lives in the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
shadow. The Supreme Court expansively interprets the Fourteenth 
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Amendment to prohibit a wide range of racial discrimination in voting.1 By 
contrast, the Court has failed to clarify the Fifteenth Amendment’s scope in 
voting rights cases.2 Contemporary doctrine thus treats the Fourteenth 
Amendment as the font for voting rights, whereas the Fifteenth Amendment 
is a constitutional afterthought—a superfluous amendment. 
There is an irony here. Despite its broad language, the Fourteenth 
Amendment was originally understood by the Reconstruction generation to 
not encompass the right to vote.3 As the second Justice Harlan once 
remarked, the Fifteenth Amendment’s existence “alone is evidence that 
[Congress] did not understand the Fourteenth Amendment to have” 
“extend[ed] the suffrage.”4 
Passed by the lame-duck Fortieth Congress in 1869 and ratified by the 
states in 1870, the Fifteenth Amendment was the final act in the trilogy of 
Reconstruction Amendments.5 Its broad prohibition of racial discrimination 
in voting6 and its clause empowering “Congress . . . to enforce [its 
provisions] by appropriate legislation”7 represent the crowning achievement 
of Reconstruction. In less than a decade, the United States fought a bloody 
Civil War to preserve the Union and transformed itself from a slaveholding 
nation to a multiracial democracy.8 
This Article aims to bring the Fifteenth Amendment out of the 
shadows—an endeavor particularly appropriate given that this year marks 
 
 1 See Cooper v. Harris, 137 S. Ct. 1455, 1463 (2017) (racial gerrymanders); White v. Regester, 
412 U.S. 755, 765–67 (1973) (vote dilution); Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536, 540–41 (1927) (vote 
denial). 
 2 See Voinovich v. Quilter, 507 U.S. 146, 159 (1993) (“This Court has not decided whether the 
Fifteenth Amendment applies to vote-dilution claims.”); City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 65 (1980) 
(plurality opinion) (concluding that the Fifteenth Amendment “prohibits only purposefully discriminatory 
denial or abridgment by government of the freedom to vote ‘on account of race, color, or previous 
condition of servitude’” (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1)). 
 3 See infra Part II.  
 4 Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 166 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 5 Proposing an Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, Joint Res. 14, 40th Cong., 
15 Stat. 346 (1869) (sent to the states for ratification); 16 Stat. 1131–32 (1870) (ratification); see also 
CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 3d Sess. 1563 (1869) (passage in the House); id. at 1641 (passage in the 
Senate). 
 6 U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1 (“The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied 
or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous condition of 
servitude.”). 
 7 Id. § 2. 
 8 See ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA’S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION, 1863–1877, at xxiii, 
448 (Henry Steele Commager & Richard B. Harris eds., updated ed. 2014) (1988). Although this 
experiment was tragically cut short by the rise of Jim Crow in the late 1800s, it was a remarkable 
accomplishment. 
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the Amendment’s 150th anniversary. This Article argues that the 
Reconstruction Framers’ deliberate decision to pass the Fifteenth 
Amendment as an amendment—as opposed to a statute—provides a 
powerful reason for differentiating between the Reconstruction 
Amendments. In particular, this decision sheds light on the scope of 
Congress’s Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendment enforcement authorities 
and provides a historical and textual basis for differentiating between them, 
namely, the civil versus political rights divide. 
In making this claim, this Article highlights an unappreciated debate—
which I call the Article V debate—in the lame-duck Fortieth Congress about 
whether nationwide black suffrage could and should be achieved through a 
statute, a constitutional amendment, or both. To underscore that debate’s 
importance, this Article asks a deceptively complicated question: Why did 
Congress pass the Fifteenth Amendment instead of the Voting Rights Act of 
1869? 
Given our contemporary understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment, 
this is a difficult question. By the time the Fifteenth Amendment was sent to 
the states for ratification, Congress had already passed legislation 
enfranchising Blacks in the District of Columbia, the federal territories, and 
the Reconstructed South.9 Blacks, however, remained disenfranchised in 
several Northern and Border States. The Reconstruction Framers—all of 
whom were Republicans—backed nationwide black suffrage as both morally 
imperative and politically expedient given the expected support of newly 
enfranchised black voters.10 If the Court’s current doctrine accurately reflects 
the Reconstruction Framers’ understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment, 
the Fortieth Congress would have been well within its newly established 
enforcement authority to enact a nationwide black suffrage statute. 
One potential answer is that the Fifteenth Amendment is an 
entrenchment device. Given the Fourteenth Amendment’s lack of explicit 
language protecting the right to vote, and the possibility that a nationwide 
suffrage statute could be repealed by a future Congress or struck down by a 
hostile Supreme Court, a suffrage amendment makes perfect sense. An 
amendment would also prevent the readmitted Southern States from 
disenfranchising Blacks at the first opportunity.11 
But this narrative only explains why there is a Fifteenth Amendment. A 
suffrage statute would have needed only two-thirds of both houses of 
 
 9 See infra Section III.B. 
 10 See infra Section III.C. 
 11 See WILLIAM GILLETTE, THE RIGHT TO VOTE: POLITICS AND THE PASSAGE OF THE FIFTEENTH 
AMENDMENT 49–50 (1965). 
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Congress to overcome the inevitable veto by President Andrew Johnson,12 
and would not have needed to overcome Article V’s additional requirement 
of ratification by three-fourths of the states. Thus, the Reconstruction 
Congress could have first passed legislation enfranchising Blacks in the 
Border States and the North and then relied on this newly empowered and 
loyal voter base to help ratify the Fifteenth Amendment. Moreover, the 
statute–amendment two-step had already proven successful during 
Reconstruction: the Civil Rights Act of 1866 is rightly viewed as the 
statutory predecessor of the Fourteenth Amendment.13 Given these political 
realities, why did Congress not follow the path already taken by the passage 
of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and the subsequent ratification of the 
Fourteenth Amendment? 
This inquiry is not merely hypothetical. The first substantive 
discussions about nationwide black suffrage in the lame-duck Fortieth 
Congress explicitly addressed whether Congress could and should enact a 
statute regulating voting rights in the states. In fact, the Radical Republicans’ 
initial proposal included both a suffrage statute and an amendment. 
Congress, however, ultimately rejected the statutory option and chose to pass 
a constitutional amendment via Article V.14 
An examination of the motives and actions of the Reconstruction 
Framers reveals two explanations for that choice: one constitutional, one 
political. Turning first to the Constitution, moderate Republicans believed 
that Congress lacked authority to impose voting qualifications on the states 
under the Fourteenth Amendment.15 Put simply, the Fortieth Congress did 
not believe it had the power to enforce civil rights by expanding the right to 
vote. This logic may seem alien today, but the Fortieth Congress’s actions 
comport with Reconstruction-era views of citizenship and the hierarchy of 
rights. Under prevailing Republican ideology, civil and political rights were 
conceptualized as distinct spheres and the Fourteenth Amendment 
guaranteed civil rights but not political rights. Given this understanding of 
the Fourteenth Amendment, it is unsurprising that, prior to the Fifteenth 
 
 12 President Johnson vetoed numerous civil rights and voting rights bills during Reconstruction. See 
FONER, supra note 8, at 247–50 (discussing Johnson’s vetoes of the Freedmen’s Bureau Bill and the Civil 
Rights Act of 1866); EARL M. MALTZ, CIVIL RIGHTS, THE CONSTITUTION, AND CONGRESS, 1863–1869, 
at 131 (1990) (discussing Johnson’s veto of the First Reconstruction Act of 1867). 
 13 See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 775 (2010) (“Today, it is generally accepted that 
the Fourteenth Amendment was understood to provide a constitutional basis for protecting the rights set 
out in the Civil Rights Act of 1866.”). 
 14 See infra Section III.D. 
 15 See infra Section III.D. 
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Amendment, Congress limited suffrage legislation to areas of federal control 
and never imposed suffrage requirements on the states. 
On the political front, Republicans were constrained by their prior 
positions. During the Fourteenth Amendment ratification debates, 
“[m]oderate Republicans feared they could not sell the equal-suffrage idea 
in the North, where white bigotry remained a stubborn fact of life.”16 The 
Republicans’ campaign to ratify the Fourteenth Amendment thus contained 
a crucial promise: the Amendment would not mandate voting rights for 
Blacks. Despite this pledge, Radical Republicans—most prominently 
Representative George Boutwell and Senator Charles Sumner—later 
advocated for a suffrage statute. The moderate wing of the party, however, 
concluded that an amendment was the only politically viable option and 
scuttled the Radicals’ attempt to pass a suffrage statute.17 
Unfortunately, this history has been virtually forgotten. Partly because 
of this constitutional amnesia, the Fifteenth Amendment is missing from 
current doctrine. One could read the U.S. Reports and conclude that the 
Fifteenth Amendment was superfluous; the Fourteenth Amendment provides 
the same—indeed, even greater and more defined—protections against racial 
discrimination in voting than the Fifteenth Amendment.18 
But there is risk in relying solely on the Fourteenth Amendment as the 
guarantor of minority voting rights. While the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
scope was expanded to encompass voting rights during the twentieth century, 
its protections have been weakened in recent decades. The Court’s penchant 
for a colorblind Fourteenth Amendment, for example, has drawn into 
question the constitutionality of majority-minority districts.19 Moreover, in 
City of Boerne v. Flores, the Court substantially curbed Congress’s 
Fourteenth Amendment enforcement authority.20 These doctrinal shifts have 
 
 16 AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 392–93 (2005) [hereinafter 
AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION]. 
 17 See infra Section III.D. 
 18 See infra Section I.A. 
 19 See Bartlett v. Strickland, 556 U.S. 1, 21 (2009) (plurality opinion) (“If § 2 were interpreted to 
require crossover districts throughout the Nation, ‘it would unnecessarily infuse race into virtually every 
redistricting, raising serious constitutional questions.’” (quoting League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. 
Perry (LULAC), 548 U.S. 399, 446 (2006) (opinion of Kennedy, J.))); Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 642 
(1993) (recognizing a cause of action to challenge racial gerrymanders under the Equal Protection 
Clause). 
 20 521 U.S. 507, 530 (1997). 
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contributed to the invalidation of the VRA’s coverage formula21 and could 
spell trouble for the constitutionality of Sections 2 and 3(c) of the VRA.22 
As the Court established a colorblindness regime in antidiscrimination 
law and cut back on Congress’s Fourteenth Amendment enforcement 
authority, it neglected the Fifteenth Amendment. That neglect, in some ways, 
is benign, as it has left undefined an area of doctrine upon which courts can 
now expand. Reinvigorating the constitutional legacy and protections of the 
Fifteenth Amendment could thus provide a powerful response to the Court’s 
recent Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence and help preserve the VRA. 
By showing that the Fifteenth Amendment is not superfluous, this 
Article starts a conversation about reorienting voting rights doctrine toward 
the Fifteenth Amendment. Indeed, the Reconstruction-era distinction 
between civil and political rights continues to have relevance today, 
particularly for Congress’s enforcement authority. As a first step in this new 
conversation, this Article claims that Congress’s Fifteenth Amendment 
enforcement authority is distinct from—and broader under current doctrine 
than—its Fourteenth Amendment authority. The Article V debate further 
provides a persuasive reason for overturning Boerne’s congruence and 
proportionality test or, at a minimum, cabining it to the Fourteenth 
Amendment. This doctrinal change would give Congress far more leeway in 
passing voting rights legislation. 
 
 21 Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 557 (2013). Section 5 of the VRA required certain covered 
jurisdictions to preclear all voting changes with federal authorities. See id. at 537. In 2006, Congress 
reauthorized Section 4(b)’s formula for determining which jurisdictions were subject to Section 5’s 
preclearance requirement. See id. at 539. When the Court invalidated Section 4(b), coverage was based 
on data from the 1964, 1968, and 1972 elections. See id. at 537–39. The Court did not invalidate Section 
5 itself. See id. at 557. 
 22 Section 2 is a “permanent, nationwide ban on racial discrimination in voting.” Id.; see 52 U.S.C. 
§ 10301 (2012). Section 2 covers both vote-denial and vote-dilution claims and imposes liability based 
on a finding of discriminatory intent or effect. See Veasey v. Abbott, 830 F.3d 216, 243–44 (5th Cir. 
2016) (en banc). Section 2’s discriminatory-effects standard is broader than the Fourteenth and Fifteenth 
Amendments’ standards and normally easier to prove in litigation than a constitutional claim. See infra 
Section I.A.5. 
 Also known as the bail-in provision, Section 3(c) authorizes federal courts to require states and 
political subdivisions that have violated the Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendments to preclear all voting 
changes with federal authorities. 52 U.S.C. § 10302(c); see also Travis Crum, Note, The Voting Rights 
Act’s Secret Weapon: Pocket Trigger Litigation and Dynamic Preclearance, 119 YALE L.J. 1992, 2006–
10 (2010) [hereinafter Crum, The Voting Rights Act’s Secret Weapon] (discussing Section 3(c)). Since 
Shelby County, numerous lawsuits have been filed seeking to bail-in jurisdictions. See Travis Crum, The 
Prospect of Bailing-in Texas: Recent Bail-in Litigation, ELECTION L. BLOG (Sept. 14, 2018, 9:39 AM), 
https://electionlawblog.org/?p=101137 [https://perma.cc/88Y4-ZVGJ] [hereinafter Crum, Recent Bail-in 
Litigation] (discussing lawsuits against North Carolina and Texas and bail-ins of municipalities in 
Alabama and Texas). 
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This Article makes several contributions to the field.23 First, it provides 
an unprecedented account of the Article V debate over the Fifteenth 
Amendment, which, unlike the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and the Fourteenth 
Amendment, has received scant attention in the literature.24 Second, as one 
of the first opportunities for Congress to interpret the Fourteenth Amendment 
after its ratification, the Article V debate provides valuable insights into the 
Reconstruction-era understanding of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth 
Amendments. Third, and relatedly, the Article V debate shows that the 
substantive scopes and enforcement authorities of the Reconstruction 
Amendments can be analytically distinguished: the Fourteenth Amendment 
safeguards civil rights and the Fifteenth Amendment preserves political 
rights. Finally, this Article argues that Congress’s Fifteenth Amendment 
enforcement authority should be governed by the deferential standard 
articulated in McCulloch v. Maryland25 and South Carolina v. Katzenbach.26 
If the Court were to follow the original understanding of Congress’s 
Fifteenth Amendment enforcement authority, the VRA would be on far 
firmer constitutional ground. 
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I provides an overview of current 
doctrine on the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments’ substantive scopes 
as well as their enforcement authorities. Part II canvasses the 
Reconstruction-era understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
application to voting rights. Part III examines the expansion of black suffrage 
from 1865 to 1869 and then analyzes the Article V debate in the lame-duck 
Fortieth Congress. Part IV discusses the historical, normative, and doctrinal 
significance of the Article V debate and shows how these insights help 
insulate the VRA from constitutional challenge.27 
 
 23 As part of a larger project to revitalize the Fifteenth Amendment, this Article starts—
unsurprisingly—at the beginning. This Article, however, ends its historical journey at the conclusion of 
the Article V debate—that is, when Congress rejected the suffrage statute and decided to pursue a 
constitutional amendment to enfranchise Blacks nationwide. This Article does not purport to provide an 
exhaustive account of the Fifteenth Amendment’s drafting and ratification. Accordingly, this Article does 
not claim to identify the precise metes and bounds of the Fifteenth Amendment’s substantive scope. 
 24 See infra note 469 and accompanying text. 
 25 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819). 
 26 383 U.S. 301, 326 (1966). 
 27 Two points about language. First, the Fifteenth Amendment prohibits all racial discrimination in 
voting, but this Article focuses on racial discrimination against Blacks. Although the rights of other 
minorities were discussed during the Fifteenth Amendment’s ratification, the struggle for black suffrage 
was at the center of the debate. See GILLETTE, supra note 11, at 58 (discussing moderate Republican 
opposition to enfranchising “naturalized citizens of Chinese or Irish descent”); id. at 46 (“[T]hroughout 
the congressional debate there was little question that the enfranchisement of the Negro was the object of 
[the] proposed constitutional amendment . . . .”). Second, this Article focuses on questions of race—not 
sex—even though the struggle for black suffrage shattered the longstanding coalition between the 
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I. THE CONFLATION OF THE FOURTEENTH AND FIFTEENTH AMENDMENTS 
The Fifteenth Amendment has been reduced to a vestigial organ. It is a 
constitutional appendix, not an amendment. To provide useful background 
information, this Part establishes that the Fifteenth Amendment is 
superfluous under current doctrine by examining how the Court has 
repeatedly relied on the Fourteenth Amendment—rather than the Fifteenth—
to scrutinize racially discriminatory election laws. As the remainder of this 
Article demonstrates, current doctrine ignores the Reconstruction Framers’ 
original intent. 
This Part first establishes that the Court views the Fourteenth 
Amendment as the principal protector of voting rights. It then addresses how 
the Court treats Congress’s Reconstruction Amendment enforcement 
authority. 
A. The Substantive Scopes of the Reconstruction Amendments 
Today, the Equal Protection Clause is interpreted to prohibit racial 
discrimination in voting whereas the Fifteenth Amendment is largely 
overlooked. Because the Fourteenth Amendment’s substantive scope is 
settled, a massive shift in the doctrine would require expressly overturning, 
severely cabining, or outright ignoring numerous Supreme Court decisions.28 
It would also require changes across the entire landscape of contemporary 
civil rights jurisprudence. By contrast, the doctrine on the Fifteenth 
Amendment’s substantive scope is littered with unanswered questions. This 
gap in the doctrine creates possibilities for reframing voting rights doctrine 
under the Fifteenth Amendment. 
1. The Fourteenth Amendment and Racial Discrimination in Voting 
The Court first interpreted the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal 
Protection Clause to prohibit racial discrimination in voting in its 1927 
decision in Nixon v. Herndon.29 Striking down a Texas law that barred Blacks 
from voting in the Democratic Party primary, the Court “f[ou]nd it 
 
women’s suffrage movement and the (former) abolitionist community. See Reva B. Siegel, She the 
People: The Nineteenth Amendment, Sex Equality, Federalism, and the Family, 115 HARV. L. REV. 947, 
968–70 (2002). Although the Fifteenth Amendment enfranchised only men of color and left women of 
color without the right to vote, I will generally avoid using gendered terms for ease of reading. 
 28 For a helpful menu of options available to Supreme Court Justices who are interested in changing 
precedent, see generally Richard L. Hasen, Anticipatory Overrulings, Invitations, Time Bombs, and 
Inadvertence: How Supreme Court Justices Move the Law, 61 EMORY L.J. 779 (2012). 
 29 273 U.S. 536, 541 (1927); see also David A. Strauss, Does the Constitution Mean What It Says?, 
129 HARV. L. REV. 1, 37 (2015) [hereinafter Strauss, Constitution] (noting Nixon’s unprecedented 
holding). 
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unnecessary to consider the Fifteenth Amendment, because it seem[ed] . . . 
hard to imagine a more direct and obvious infringement of the Fourteenth.”30 
Without specifically addressing whether the Equal Protection Clause 
protects political rights, the Court noted that the Fourteenth Amendment 
“was passed . . . with a special intent to protect . . . blacks from 
discrimination.”31 Building off this premise, the Court held that the statute 
irrationally “discriminat[ed] . . . by the distinction of color alone” and was 
therefore invalid.32 Since Nixon, the Court has continued to interpret the 
Equal Protection Clause to prohibit racial discrimination in vote-denial 
cases.33 
In addition to covering “first generation” barriers like racially 
discriminatory voter-qualification laws, the Court has construed the 
Fourteenth Amendment to encompass “second generation” claims, such as 
vote dilution.34 Second generation claims involve “packing” or “cracking” 
minority voters, which dilutes their voting strength and effectively prevents 
them from electing the candidates of their choice.35 At its core, “[d]ilution 
doctrine is designed to ensure that a group cannot obtain an unfair share of 
political power by manipulating district lines.”36 
Since the early 1970s, the Court has recognized that intentional racial 
vote dilution violates the Equal Protection Clause.37 But despite this 
constitutional imprimatur, the Court has narrowed the VRA’s statutory 
protections and voiced apprehension about the role of race in the purposeful 
creation of majority-minority districts.38 As Professor Heather Gerken has 
 
 30 Nixon, 273 U.S. at 540–41. 
 31 Id. at 541. 
 32 Id. The Court’s decision in Nixon was the first of the White Primary Cases. See Terry v. Adams, 
345 U.S. 461 (1953); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944); Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73 (1932). 
 33 See, e.g., Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 233 (1985) (invalidating the felon-
disenfranchisement provision of the Alabama Constitution on intentional discrimination grounds under 
the Equal Protection Clause). 
 34 Here, I borrow Professor Lani Guinier’s oft-used first- and second-generation terminology. LANI 
GUINIER, THE TYRANNY OF THE MAJORITY: FUNDAMENTAL FAIRNESS IN REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY 
49 (1994). Throughout this Article, I use the term “vote dilution” to refer to racial vote dilution, unless 
the context indicates otherwise. 
 35 See Heather K. Gerken, Understanding the Right to an Undiluted Vote, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1663, 
1672 (2001) [hereinafter Gerken, Undiluted Vote]. 
 36 Id. at 1680. 
 37 See White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 765–67 (1973); see also LULAC, 548 U.S. 399, 440 (2006) 
(suggesting that a congressional district bore “the mark of intentional discrimination that could give rise 
to an equal protection violation”). 
 38 See Bartlett v. Strickland, 556 U.S. 1, 21 (2009) (plurality opinion) (“If § 2 were interpreted to 
require crossover districts throughout the Nation, ‘it would unnecessarily infuse race into virtually every 
redistricting, raising serious constitutional questions.’” (quoting LULAC, 548 U.S. at 446)); Georgia v. 
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remarked, these cases reflect “a concern that the VRA not dissolve into a 
system of racial spoils, [and] a worry that voting rights protections will 
entrench rather than undermine racial divisions.”39 
These concerns have found their most prominent expression in Shaw v. 
Reno40 and its progeny. In Shaw, the Court interpreted the Equal Protection 
Clause to prohibit racial gerrymandering, that is, “separating . . . citizens into 
different voting districts on the basis of race.”41 Under Shaw, courts first look 
to whether “race was the predominant factor motivating the legislature’s 
decision to place a significant number of voters within or without a particular 
district.”42 If race predominated, the state must show that “the design of the 
district . . . withstand[s] strict scrutiny.”43 Because the VRA is frequently 
cited by states to justify the creation of majority-minority districts and the 
Shaw cause of action has been invoked by plaintiffs to challenge those 
districts, Shaw’s requirement that these districts satisfy strict scrutiny puts 
the Equal Protection Clause on a collision course with the VRA.44 
To be sure, the Court’s anxieties about race are not limited to voting 
rights cases and are found throughout contemporary equal protection 
doctrine—perhaps most prominently in cases concerning Congress’s 
authority to impose disparate impact liability.45 Indeed, Shaw’s hostility to 
 
Ashcroft, 539 U.S. 461, 482–83 (2003) (allowing influence and coalition districts to count as majority-
minority districts under Section 5’s retrogression test); Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 885 (1994) (plurality 
opinion) (concluding that Section 2 suits could not challenge the size of a governing body); Presley v. 
Etowah Cty. Comm’n, 502 U.S. 491, 506–08 (1992) (holding that rules altering the allocation of power 
within an elected body are not subject to preclearance). 
 Here, I use the term “majority-minority district” as a shorthand to “mean a district in which the 
minority population is large enough . . . to exercise electoral control by voting cohesively.” Gerken, 
Undiluted Vote, supra note 35, at 1667 n.3. This broad definition encompasses influence or crossover 
districts, even though minority voters are not a numerical majority in such districts and even though such 
districts are not mandatory under Section 2. See id.; see also Bartlett, 556 U.S. at 13 (plurality opinion) 
(citing LULAC, 548 U.S. at 445). As the above-recited cases in this footnote demonstrate, the Court’s 
skepticism toward such districts is not necessarily tied to a minority group being a numerical majority. 
 39 Heather K. Gerken, A Third Way for the Voting Rights Act: Section 5 and the Opt-in Approach, 
106 COLUM. L. REV. 708, 745 (2006). 
 40 509 U.S. 630 (1993). 
 41 Cooper v. Harris, 137 S. Ct. 1455, 1463 (2017) (quoting Bethune-Hill v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 
137 S. Ct. 788, 797 (2017)); see also 509 U.S. at 649. 
 42 Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 916 (1995). 
 43 Cooper, 137 S. Ct. at 1464. 
 44 See Gerken, Undiluted Vote, supra note 35, at 1697–98. 
 45 See, e.g., Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507, 
2512 (2015) (“Courts should avoid interpreting disparate-impact liability to be so expansive as to inject 
racial considerations into every housing decision.”); Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 594 (2009) 
(Scalia, J., concurring) (“[T]he Court will have to confront the question: Whether, or to what extent, are 
the disparate-impact provisions of [antidiscrimination statutes] consistent with the Constitution’s 
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race-conscious redistricting epitomizes the Court’s move toward a 
colorblind Equal Protection Clause. Viewed from this perspective, the 
Court’s decisions cutting back on the VRA’s protections and creating the 
Shaw cause of action are attributable to its treatment of voting rights under 
the Equal Protection Clause. 
2. The Fifteenth Amendment’s Unclear Scope 
The Court has long held that the Fifteenth Amendment forbids racially 
discriminatory laws that limit access to the ballot.46 But whereas the Court 
has squarely held that the Equal Protection Clause prohibits racial 
discrimination in both vote-denial and vote-dilution cases, the Court has 
declined to decide whether the Fifteenth Amendment forbids vote dilution. 
Under the Court’s plurality opinion in City of Mobile v. Bolden,47 the 
Fifteenth Amendment prohibits racial discrimination only in vote-denial 
cases.48 In other words, the Fifteenth Amendment is solely concerned with 
whether citizens can “register and vote without hindrance” regardless of 
race.49 Thus, the Fifteenth Amendment—unlike the Fourteenth 
Amendment—does not protect against vote dilution under current doctrine.50 
To be sure, the Court’s 1960 decision in Gomillion v. Lightfoot could 
be read for the proposition that the Fifteenth Amendment encompasses vote-
dilution claims.51 In Gomillion, the State of Alabama infamously redrew the 
City of Tuskegee’s boundaries from a square to a “strangely irregular 
twenty-eight-sided figure,” an act that had the “inevitable effect of . . . 
remov[ing] from the city all save four or five of its 400 Negro voters while 
 
guarantee of equal protection?”); Richard A. Primus, Equal Protection and Disparate Impact: Round 
Three, 117 HARV. L. REV. 493, 495 (2003) (predicting that the Court will one day address “whether equal 
protection could prohibit the passage of [disparate impact] statutes because of their overt concern with 
race”). 
 46 See Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495, 523–24 (2000) (striking down a law that restricted suffrage 
to citizens of Hawaiian descent); Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347, 356, 367–68 (1915) (invalidating 
a grandfather clause that exempted from a mandatory literacy test any individual or their “lineal 
descendant” who could vote prior to January 1, 1866). 
 47 446 U.S. 55 (1980). 
 48 Id. at 65. 
 49 Id. 
 50 See Reno v. Bossier Par. Sch. Bd. (Bossier Parish II), 528 U.S. 320, 334 n.3 (2000) (“[W]e have 
never held that vote dilution violates the Fifteenth Amendment.”); Voinovich v. Quilter, 507 U.S. 146, 
159 (1993) (“This Court has not decided whether the Fifteenth Amendment applies to vote-dilution 
claims; in fact, we never have held any legislative apportionment inconsistent with the Fifteenth 
Amendment. Nonetheless, we need not decide the precise scope of the Fifteenth Amendment’s 
prohibition in this case.” (citation omitted)). 
 51 See 364 U.S. 339, 341, 347–48 (1960). 
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not removing a single white voter or resident.”52 In response to this egregious 
gerrymander, the Court held that the plaintiffs had stated a claim that the law 
violated the Fifteenth Amendment.53 
On the one hand, Gomillion resembles more recent vote-dilution cases. 
Although Gomillion does not involve the archetypal vote-dilution scenario 
where a jurisdiction packs or cracks minority voters in a redistricting plan, 
Alabama effectively diluted the voting power of Tuskegee’s black residents 
by redrawing the city’s boundaries. As Justice Souter later explained, 
“Gomillion shows that the physical image evoked by the term ‘dilution’ does 
not encompass all the ways in which participation in the political process can 
be made unequal.”54 According to Justice Souter, Gomillion fits comfortably 
within the Court’s vote-dilution cases because “[c]hanging political 
boundaries to affect minority voting power would be called dilution today.”55 
On the other hand, the Gomillion Court focused on the near total denial 
of Blacks’ right to vote in Tuskegee elections.56 Furthermore, the Court 
explicitly distinguished its result from Colegrove v. Green, where it had 
declined to entertain a one-person, one-vote claim.57 The Court 
conceptualized Colegrove as a malapportionment case whereas Gomillion 
was a racial vote-denial case.58 And in subsequent decisions, the Court has 
expressly declined to read Gomillion as a vote-dilution case.59 
 
 52 Id. at 341. 
 53 See id. at 347–48. 
 54 Bossier Parish II, 528 U.S. at 360 n.11 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 55 Id. 
 56 See 364 U.S. at 341 (“The result of the Act is to deprive the Negro petitioners discriminatorily of 
the benefits of residence in Tuskegee, including, inter alia, the right to vote in municipal elections.”). 
 57 See 328 U.S. 549, 556 (1946) (plurality opinion) (stating that the Court would not “enter th[e] 
political thicket”). 
 58 According to the Gomillion Court, the Colegrove and Gomillion plaintiffs alleged distinct forms 
of discrimination: population-based and race-based, respectively. Compare Gomillion, 364 U.S. at 346 
(“The complaint [in Colegrove] rested upon the disparity of population between the different districts 
which rendered the effectiveness of each individual’s vote in some districts far less than in others.”), with 
id. (“When a legislature thus singles out a readily isolated segment of a racial minority for special 
discriminatory treatment, it violates the Fifteenth Amendment.”). The Court, moreover, explained that 
the Colegrove plaintiffs “complained only of a dilution of the strength of their votes,” whereas the 
Gomillion plaintiffs asserted that Alabama had “deprive[d] them of their votes and the consequent 
advantages that the ballot affords.” Id. 
 59 See Bossier Parish II, 528 U.S. at 334 n.3 (rejecting Justice Souter’s interpretation of Gomillion 
as a vote-dilution case); Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130, 142 n.14 (1976) (“There is no decision in 
this Court holding a legislative apportionment or reapportionment violative of the Fifteenth Amendment. 
The case closest to so holding is Gomillion v. Lightfoot, in which the Court found that allegations of 
racially motivated gerrymandering of a municipality’s political boundaries stated a claim under that 
Amendment.” (citations omitted)). 
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3. Methods of Proof Under the Reconstruction Amendments 
It is well established that a plaintiff must prove intentional 
discrimination to state a claim under the Equal Protection Clause.60 The 
intent requirement stems from the Court’s 1976 decision in Washington v. 
Davis, which rejected an equal protection challenge to the use of a written 
personnel test that had a disparate racial impact on black police officers.61 In 
that decision, the Court openly engaged in results-oriented reasoning, stating 
that a constitutional discriminatory-effects standard “would raise serious 
questions about, and perhaps invalidate, a whole range of tax, welfare, public 
service, regulatory, and licensing statutes.”62 Although “[d]isproportionate 
impact is not irrelevant” under Washington, it does not, “[s]tanding alone,” 
trigger strict scrutiny.63 
The discriminatory intent requirement has profoundly impacted how 
statutes are written and cases are litigated. After racial classifications became 
subject to strict scrutiny, jurisdictions started enacting laws that used proxies 
for race as a means of perpetuating Jim Crow.64 Today, explicit racial 
classifications are rare and largely relegated to affirmative action programs.65 
In the absence of an explicit racial classification, proving discriminatory 
intent often involves time- and resource-intensive discovery.66 The 
discriminatory intent requirement has thus made it more problematic to enact 
race-conscious laws that are intended to benefit minorities. Moreover, 
requiring a showing of discriminatory intent makes it far more difficult for 
plaintiffs to trigger strict scrutiny in cases challenging facially neutral laws 
that were motivated by discriminatory intent or have a disparate impact on 
minorities. 
 
 60 See, e.g., Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265 (1977) 
(“Proof of racially discriminatory intent or purpose is required to show a violation of the Equal Protection 
Clause.”). 
 61 426 U.S. 229, 232 (1976). 
 62 Id. at 248; see also Aziz Z. Huq, What Is Discriminatory Intent?, 103 CORNELL L. REV. 1211, 
1228 (2018) (“Washington explicitly rested on a concern about the destabilizing effects of a constitutional 
effects rule.”). 
 63 426 U.S. at 242; see also id. (“[A]n invidious discriminatory purpose may often be inferred from 
the totality of the relevant facts, including the fact, if it is true, that the law bears more heavily on one 
race than another.”). 
 64 See Daniel R. Ortiz, The Myth of Intent in Equal Protection, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1105, 1117–18 
(1989). 
 65 See, e.g., Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 136 S. Ct. 2198, 2207 (2016) (upholding a public 
university’s use of race in college admissions). 
 66 See Pamela S. Karlan, Two Section Twos and Two Section Fives: Voting Rights and Remedies 
After Flores, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 725, 735–36 (1998) [hereinafter Karlan, Two Section Twos] 
(discussing the cost-, time-, and fact-intensive nature of proving intentional discrimination in a voting 
rights case). 
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Although the Court has plainly held that discriminatory intent is a 
necessary ingredient of an equal protection claim, it has been far less clear 
about whether the intent requirement applies to the Fifteenth Amendment. 
Once again, Bolden is instructive. In the Court’s plurality decision, four 
Justices concluded that discriminatory intent is necessary to establish a 
violation under the Fifteenth Amendment.67 Therefore, the Bolden plurality 
is an extension of Washington v. Davis and its requirement that plaintiffs 
prove discriminatory intent to trigger strict scrutiny.68 
The Court’s most recent discussion of the Fifteenth Amendment’s 
substantive scope is its 2000 decision in Rice v. Cayetano.69 There, the Court 
invalidated a provision of the Hawaii Constitution that limited the right to 
vote for trustees of the Office of Hawaiian Affairs to “Hawaiians,” i.e., 
“those persons who are descendants of people inhabiting the Hawaiian 
Islands in 1778.”70 Concluding that the Hawaii Constitution used ancestry as 
a proxy for race,71 the Court held that this “explicit, race-based voting 
qualification”72 was “a clear violation of the Fifteenth Amendment.”73 
Because the Hawaii Constitution included an explicit racial classification, 
the Rice Court had no need to address the analytically distinct question of 
whether and how a plaintiff could challenge a facially neutral law on 
Fifteenth Amendment grounds. 
Under current doctrine, Congress must rely on its enforcement authority 
to justify Section 2 of the VRA’s discriminatory-effects test because both the 
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments prohibit only intentionally 
discriminatory conduct.74 
4. The Fourteenth Amendment’s Application to Non-Race Voting 
Cases 
In addition to prohibiting racial discrimination in voting, the Fourteenth 
Amendment is now construed to protect voting rights in non-race situations. 
 
 67 City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 62 (1980) (plurality opinion) (“[R]acially discriminatory 
motivation is a necessary ingredient of a Fifteenth Amendment violation.”). 
 68 See id. at 63 n.10 (citing Washington favorably). 
 69 528 U.S. 495 (2000). 
 70 Id. at 499. 
 71 See id. at 514 (“Ancestry can be a proxy for race. It is that proxy here.”). 
 72 Id. at 498. 
 73 Id. at 499; see also Davis v. Guam, 932 F.3d 822, 843 (9th Cir. 2019) (holding that “Guam’s 
limitation on the right to vote in its political status plebiscite to ‘Native Inhabitants of Guam’ violates the 
Fifteenth Amendment”). 
 74 See, e.g., Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos, Disparate Impact, Unified Law, 128 YALE L.J. 1566, 1593 
(2019) (Section 2 “prohibits a broad swath of conduct that is constitutionally innocuous: government 
activity that lacks a discriminatory purpose but produces a disparate impact”). 
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Perhaps most famously, the Court has imposed a one-person, one-vote 
requirement on state legislative districts.75 The Court has also relied on the 
Equal Protection Clause to invalidate several laws and regulations—from 
ballot-recount standards to the poll tax—on non-race-based grounds.76 And 
the Court has entertained challenges to numerous election laws on the 
grounds that they infringe the fundamental right to vote under the Fourteenth 
Amendment, even though it has frequently upheld those laws.77 The Equal 
Protection Clause was also at the heart of recent attempts to recognize 
partisan gerrymandering as a justiciable question, though the Court 
ultimately declined to wade into that political thicket.78 Because these cases 
all involve non-race-based voting rights claims, they fall outside the 
Fifteenth Amendment’s scope. 
5. The Problem with Conflating the Reconstruction Amendments 
As the foregoing discussion demonstrates, the Fourteenth Amendment 
has eclipsed the Fifteenth Amendment in shaping modern election law 
doctrine. These doctrinal developments have gone relatively unnoticed 
because the Court expanded the Fourteenth Amendment’s ambit to prohibit 
racial discrimination in voting while neglecting the Fifteenth Amendment. 
In other words, the Fourteenth Amendment subsumed the types of cases that 
could have been decided on Fifteenth Amendment grounds and eventually 
became the one-size-fits-all constitutional prohibition on racial 
discrimination—no matter the sphere of public life. 
The VRA is another reason this doctrinal development has flown under 
the radar. Specifically, Section 5 of the VRA blocked and deterred numerous 
 
 75 See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 583 (1964) (“[T]he Equal Protection Clause requires 
that both houses of a state legislature be apportioned on a population basis . . . .”). Although the Court 
relied on the Equal Protection Clause to impose an equi-population requirement on state legislative 
districts, it invoked Article I, Section Two for the same requirement for congressional districts. See U.S. 
CONST. art. I, § 2 (“The House of Representatives shall be composed of Members chosen every second 
Year by the People of the several States . . . .” (emphasis added)); Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 7–8 
(1964) (construing this provision to mean that “one man’s vote in a congressional election is to be worth 
as much as another’s”). 
 76 See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 109–10 (2000) (ballot-recount standards); Harper v. Va. State Bd. 
of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 666, 670 (1966) (poll tax); see also J. MORGAN KOUSSER, COLORBLIND 
INJUSTICE: MINORITY VOTING RIGHTS AND THE UNDOING OF THE SECOND RECONSTRUCTION 35 (1999) 
(discussing the racist origins of poll taxes in the South). 
 77 See, e.g., Crawford v. Marion Cty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 204 (2008) (plurality opinion) 
(upholding voter ID law); Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 441–42 (1992) (rejecting a challenge to a 
ban on write-in candidates); Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 805–06 (1983) (invalidating an early 
filing deadline for independent candidates). 
 78 See Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2491, 2506–07 (2019). Plaintiffs also cited the 
First Amendment, the Elections Clause, and Section Two of Article I in their attempt to combat partisan 
gerrymandering, but the Court similarly rejected those arguments. See id. at 2491. 
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election law changes that would have violated the Fifteenth Amendment.79 
In 1982, Congress amended Section 2 to prohibit vote dilution and to 
encompass a discriminatory-effects standard, overturning the Court’s 
plurality decision in Bolden.80 This revision allowed plaintiffs to bring 
statutory rather than constitutional claims in most voting rights cases. In 
particular, Section 2’s discriminatory-effects standard is broader than the 
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendment standards and thus easier to prove in 
litigation.81 
The primacy of both the Fourteenth Amendment and the VRA in 
election law is so deeply engrained in our jurisprudence that it produces odd 
ideological inconsistencies. Staunch originalists like Justice Thomas are 
consistent defenders of Shaw’s interpretation of the Equal Protection 
Clause,82 even though the Fourteenth Amendment was originally understood 
to not protect political rights.83 And defenders of minority voting rights 
frequently fail to ground their theories in the Fifteenth Amendment.84 But if 
the Fourteenth Amendment and the VRA now protect against racial 
discrimination in voting, the obvious question arises: does it matter that the 
Fifteenth Amendment is now superfluous? 
One response is that our Constitution should not be construed to render 
an amendment redundant. In the statutory realm, it is well established that a 
 
 79 See Peyton McCrary, Christopher Seaman & Richard Valelly, The End of Preclearance as We 
Knew It: How the Supreme Court Transformed Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, 11 MICH. J. RACE & 
L. 275, 278–79 (2006) (surveying objections and showing that federal oversight deters discriminatory 
changes). 
 80 See Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-205, § 2(b)(4), 96 Stat. 131, 131; 
Stephanopoulos, supra note 74, at 1576 (explaining that Congress “amended section 2 in 1982 to make 
clear the provision could be violated even in the absence of discriminatory intent”). 
 81 See Karlan, Two Section Twos, supra note 66, at 735. 
 82 See, e.g., Bethune-Hill v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 137 S. Ct. 788, 803 (2017) (Thomas, J., 
concurring in the judgment) (“[The State] concede[s] that the legislature intentionally drew all 12 districts 
as majority-black districts. That concession, in my view, mandates strict scrutiny as to each district.” 
(citation omitted)); Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 1000 (1996) (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment) 
(stating that strict scrutiny applies to race-based redistricting). 
 83 See infra Part II. 
 84 See Heather K. Gerken, Second-Order Diversity, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1099, 1118–21 (2005) 
(discussing the VRA); Gerken, Undiluted Vote, supra note 35, at 1671 & n.9 (discussing Section 2’s 
standard for vote dilution); Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes, Politics as Markets: Partisan 
Lockups of the Democratic Process, 50 STAN. L. REV. 643, 646 (1998) (drawing on insights from 
economics to argue in favor of a pro-competition approach to election law); Michael S. Kang, Race and 
Democratic Contestation, 117 YALE L.J. 734, 736–38 (2008) (discussing the concept of democratic 
contestation in relation to the VRA rather than the Constitution); Franita Tolson, What Is Abridgment?: 
A Critique of Two Section Twos, 67 ALA. L. REV. 433, 458 (2015) [hereinafter Tolson, Abridgment] 
(arguing that Section Two of the Fourteenth Amendment is the touchstone for Congress’s authority over 
voting rights). 
 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
1566 
word, phrase, or provision should be interpreted to avoid superfluities.85 
Courts generally assume Congress selected multiple words “because it 
intended each term to have a particular, nonsuperfluous meaning.”86 In 
addition, statutory amendments are read against background understandings 
of the law’s ambit and interpreted to accomplish an objective in light of that 
background.87 These principles are equally applicable to constitutional 
interpretation. The Court explained as early as Marbury v. Madison88 that 
“[i]t cannot be presumed that any clause in the constitution is intended to be 
without effect.”89 
Furthermore, even assuming that the Fourteenth Amendment’s broad 
terms encompass racial discrimination in voting, the Court’s voting rights 
jurisprudence runs counter to the principle that “the specific governs the 
general.”90 If the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause adopts a 
different doctrinal framework—namely, a colorblind approach—than the 
Fifteenth Amendment, the latter should control over the former. 
The conflation of the Reconstruction Amendments has resulted in 
mechanical application of Fourteenth Amendment principles to what would 
otherwise be considered Fifteenth Amendment cases.91 While the Court 
began interpreting the Fourteenth Amendment to cover racial discrimination 
in voting in the early twentieth century, it has shown hostility to race-based 
redistricting and the application of the VRA’s discriminatory-effects 
standard in recent decades. In other words, even though the Court now 
interprets the Fourteenth Amendment to prohibit racial discrimination in 
voting, it has been steadily cutting back on those substantive protections. 
These doctrinal shifts have already contributed to the invalidation of the 
 
 85 See, e.g., Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 174 (2001) (“It is our duty ‘to give effect, if possible, 
to every clause and word of a statute.’” (quoting United States v. Menasche, 348 U.S. 528, 538–39 
(1955))). 
 86 Bailey v. United States, 51 U.S. 137, 146 (1995). 
 87 See, e.g., Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507, 
2520 (2015) (“The [1988] amendments [to the Fair Housing Act] included three exemptions from liability 
that assume the existence of disparate-impact claims. The most logical conclusion is that the three 
amendments were deemed necessary because Congress presupposed disparate impact under the [Fair 
Housing Act] as it had been enacted in 1968.”). 
 88 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
 89 Id. at 174; see also United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 405 (2012) (“The text of the Fourth 
Amendment reflects its close connection to property, since otherwise it would have referred simply to 
‘the right of the people to be secure against unreasonable searches and seizures’; the phrase ‘in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects’ would have been superfluous.”). 
 90 Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 384 (1992). 
 91 See Samuel Issacharoff, Polarized Voting and the Political Process: The Transformation of Voting 
Rights Jurisprudence, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1833, 1845 (1992) (commenting that “[t]he Court recast voting 
rights claims in the mold of Washington v. Davis”). 
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VRA’s coverage formula and could also threaten the constitutionality of 
Sections 2 and 3(c) of the VRA.92 
This failure to recognize the independent constitutional significance of 
the Fifteenth Amendment is increasingly untenable.93 Given that Shaw 
portends a clash between the Equal Protection Clause and the VRA and that 
the Court has repeatedly questioned discriminatory-effects standards, the 
relevant distinctions between these two Amendments becomes more 
important. So, too, does Congress’s enforcement authority under each 
Amendment, to which this Article now turns. 
B. Congress’s Reconstruction Amendment Enforcement Authority 
Another salient reason to avoid conflating the Reconstruction 
Amendments is that the governing standard for Congress’s enforcement 
authority is more forgiving under the Fifteenth Amendment. This is no small 
point. Much like strict scrutiny is “strict in theory, but fatal in fact,”94 the 
relevant standard for Congress’s enforcement authority is often outcome 
determinative.95 The level of deference given to Congress—whether framed 
as a question of interpretive or remedial authority—will likely determine 
whether Section 2 of the VRA’s discriminatory-effects standard survives the 
inevitable constitutional attack.96 
To provide context for this argument and helpful background for the 
Article V debate, this Section provides an overview of the Court’s decisions 
on Congress’s Reconstruction Amendment enforcement authority. The 
Reconstruction Amendments contain “virtually identical”97 enforcement 
clauses. Pursuant to Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment and Section 
Two of the Fifteenth Amendment, Congress has the “power to enforce” “by 
appropriate legislation” the rights guaranteed by that Amendment.98 As such, 
 
 92 See Gerken, supra note 35, at 1696–98 (discussing Section 2); Crum, The Voting Rights Act’s 
Secret Weapon, supra note 22, at 2027 (discussing Section 3(c)). 
 93 For how to resolve this problem, see infra Part IV. 
 94 Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 519 (1980) (Marshall, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 95 See, e.g., Richard L. Hasen, Congressional Power to Renew the Preclearance Provisions of the 
Voting Rights Act After Tennessee v. Lane, 66 OHIO ST. L.J. 177, 196–202 (2005) (predicting that the 
Boerne standard for Congress’s enforcement authority may be dispositive in litigation over Section 5’s 
constitutionality). 
 96 See Gerken, Undiluted Vote, supra note 35, at 1696–98. 
 97 Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 373 n.8 (2001). 
 98 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5 (“The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate 
legislation, the provisions of this article.”); id. amend. XV, § 2 (“The Congress shall have power to 
enforce this article by appropriate legislation.”). The Thirteenth Amendment’s Enforcement Clause is 
also similar. Id. amend. XIII, § 2 (“Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate 
legislation.”). 
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courts and commentators frequently treat Congress’s enforcement 
authorities under the Reconstruction Amendments as coextensive, even if 
they acknowledge that there might be arguments for differentiating between 
the two.99 
From Reconstruction through the civil rights movement, the Court 
applied a rationality standard to Congress’s Fourteenth and Fifteenth 
Amendment enforcement authority.100 But since the federalism revolution in 
the 1990s, the Court has applied a congruence and proportionality test to 
Congress’s Fourteenth Amendment enforcement authority. The Court has 
never applied that standard in a case involving the Fifteenth Amendment—
or any case involving race or voting rights—and thus the deferential 
rationality standard for Congress’s Fifteenth Amendment enforcement 
authority remains good law. This Article argues that, even though Congress’s 
enforcement authorities under the Reconstruction Amendments were 
 
 99 See, e.g., City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 207 n.1 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) 
(“[T]he nature of the enforcement powers conferred by the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments has 
always been treated as coextensive.”); Karlan, Two Section Twos, supra note 66, at 725 n.5 (explaining 
that “because the two amendments are rough contemporaries and their enforcement power provisions are 
articulated in similar terms, the [Boerne] analysis surely carries over”); Leah M. Litman, Inventing Equal 
Sovereignty, 114 MICH. L. REV. 1207, 1258 n.329 (2016) (discussing “the Reconstruction Amendments 
collectively” but recognizing that “[t]here may be reasons why Boerne’s congruence-and-proportionality 
requirement would not apply to the Fifteenth Amendment”); Michael T. Morley, Prophylactic 
Redistricting? Congress’s Section 5 Power and the New Equal Protection Right to Vote, 59 WM. & MARY 
L. REV. 2053, 2078 (2018) [hereinafter Morley, Prophylactic] (“Boerne’s congruence-and-
proportionality test likely applies with equal force to Section 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment.”); 
Stephanopoulos, supra note 74, at 1592–93, 1593 n.146 (discussing Boerne as the standard under the 
Reconstruction Amendments but acknowledging that, “[s]trictly speaking, City of Boerne dealt only with 
the Fourteenth Amendment, leaving the Fifteenth Amendment standard undetermined”). To be sure, some 
courts and scholars have concluded that Katzenbach remains the appropriate standard under the Fifteenth 
Amendment. See Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Mukasey, 573 F. Supp. 2d 221, 241–46 (D.D.C. 
2008), rev’d on statutory grounds, Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193, 211 
(2009); Akhil Reed Amar, The Lawfulness of Section 5—And Thus of Section 5, 126 HARV. L. REV. F. 
109, 119–20 (2013) (arguing that a more expansive interpretation of Congress’s enforcement power under 
the Fifteenth Amendment is preferable because that Amendment, unlike the Fourteenth, is limited to the 
realm of voting); Evan H. Caminker, “Appropriate” Means-Ends Constraints on Section 5 Powers, 
53 STAN. L. REV. 1127, 1190–91 (2001) (“Section 2 [of the Fifteenth Amendment] could not possibly 
give rise to a legitimate fear that, if construed to require only McCulloch-style means-ends tailoring, it 
would functionally award Congress a virtually plenary police power.”); Jeremy Amar-Dolan, Note, The 
Voting Rights Act and the Fifteenth Amendment Standard of Review, 16 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1477, 1497–
1501 (2014) (“[T]he Court should maintain separate standards for Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendment 
enforcement legislation.”); cf. Richard L. Hasen & Leah M. Litman, Thin and Thick Conceptions of the 
Nineteenth Amendment Right to Vote and Congress’s Power to Enforce It, 108 GEO. L.J. (forthcoming 
2020) (manuscript at 39), https://papers.ssrn.com/a=3501114 [https://perma.cc/68CC-SBQ4] 
(distinguishing between Congress’s Fourteenth and Nineteenth Amendment enforcement authority). 
 100 See Christopher W. Schmidt, Section 5’s Forgotten Years: Congressional Power to Enforce the 
Fourteenth Amendment Before Katzenbach v. Morgan, 113 NW. U. L. REV. 47, 82–83 (2018). 
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originally intended to be coextensive, the Court has driven a doctrinal wedge 
between them. 
1. Katzenbach’s Rationality Standard 
In two landmark 1966 decisions, the Court upheld key provisions of the 
VRA and adopted a deferential standard for Congress’s enforcement 
authority under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments.101 
In South Carolina v. Katzenbach, the Court upheld the VRA’s coverage 
formula and preclearance provision as permissible exercises of Congress’s 
Fifteenth Amendment enforcement authority.102 The Court concluded that 
the standard for Congress’s Fifteenth Amendment enforcement authority 
was the same as the McCulloch standard.103 In upholding the constitutionality 
of the Second Bank of the United States in McCulloch,104 Chief Justice John 
Marshall famously established the test for Congress’s power under the 
Necessary and Proper Clause: “Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the 
scope of the constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are 
plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consist with the 
letter and spirit of the constitution, are constitutional.”105 According to the 
Katzenbach Court, Congress’s use of the term “appropriate” in Section Two 
of the Fifteenth Amendment was a clear adoption of the McCulloch 
standard.106 
In endorsing the McCulloch standard, the Court gave Congress 
significant leeway in crafting enforcement legislation. The Court found 
Congress acted appropriately in “shift[ing] the advantage of time and inertia 
from the perpetrators of the evil to its victims”107 and putting election laws 
on hold before their implementation. The Court also upheld the VRA’s 
coverage formula, which confined the statute’s most stringent provisions to 
those jurisdictions with egregious records of racial discrimination in 
voting.108 And in doing so, the Court expressly rejected South Carolina’s 
invocation of “[t]he doctrine of the equality of States” on the grounds that 
 
 101 The Court subsequently endorsed the McCulloch standard for Congress’s Thirteenth Amendment 
enforcement authority. See Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 443–44 (1968). 
 102 383 U.S. 301, 329, 334–37 (1966). For an overview of the VRA’s coverage formula and 
preclearance provision, see supra note 21. 
 103 See Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 326. 
 104 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). 
 105 Id. at 421 (emphasis added). 
 106 See Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 325–26. 
 107 Id. at 328. 
 108 See id. 
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the doctrine “applies only to the terms upon which States are admitted to the 
Union.”109 
In addition to the VRA’s provisions targeting racial discrimination in 
the South, Congress enacted Section 4(e), which provides that individuals 
who have completed the sixth grade at an “American-flag school[]” cannot 
be denied the right to vote based on their inability to understand English.110 
This provision was enacted to protect the voting rights of Puerto Ricans 
living in New York City, many of whom were disenfranchised by English 
language requirements.111 Unlike the VRA’s preclearance provisions, 
Congress enacted Section 4(e) under its Fourteenth Amendment 
enforcement authority because it protected a language minority rather than a 
racial group per se.112 
In Katzenbach v. Morgan, the Court upheld Section 4(e) under 
Congress’s Fourteenth Amendment enforcement authority.113 By 1966, the 
Court had already crossed the constitutional Rubicon of interpreting the 
Fourteenth Amendment to encompass voting rights, so Congress’s reliance 
on it was not unprecedented.114 As in South Carolina v. Katzenbach, the 
Morgan Court defined the McCulloch standard as synonymous with the 
phrase “appropriate legislation.”115 
But whereas Katzenbach focuses on Congress’s enforcement authority 
vis-à-vis the states, Morgan more directly addresses Congress’s authority to 
interpret the Constitution. That is because New York argued that Section 4(e) 
could not be “appropriate legislation to enforce the Equal Protection Clause 
unless the judiciary decides . . . that the application of the English literacy 
requirement . . . is forbidden by the Equal Protection Clause itself.”116 The 
Court rejected this claim because it would “confine the legislative power . . . 
to the insignificant role of abrogating only those state laws that the judicial 
branch was prepared to adjudge unconstitutional.”117 The Court explained 
 
 109 Id. at 328–29. The equal sovereignty principle would rear its head again in the early twenty-first 
century. See infra Section I.B.3. 
 110 52 U.S.C. § 10303(e) (2012). 
 111 See Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 645 n.3 (1966).  
 112 See 52 U.S.C. § 10303(e)(1); infra note 533 (discussing Section 4(e)’s legislative history). 
 113 384 U.S. at 646. 
 114 See id. at 647 & n.6 (collecting cases). 
 115 See id. at 650–51. 
 116 Id. at 648. 
 117 Id. at 648–49. The Court had previously upheld the facial constitutionality of literacy tests. See 
Lassiter v. Northampton Cty. Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45, 53–54 (1959); see also Guy-Uriel E. Charles 
& Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, The Voting Rights Act in Winter: The Death of a Superstatute, 100 IOWA L. 
REV. 1389, 1401 (2015) (discussing Morgan’s relationship to Lassiter). In a companion case to Morgan, 
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that it would defer to Congress’s interpretation not only of the rights 
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment but also the means adopted to 
remedy and prevent those violations.118 
In response to Justice Harlan’s criticism that the Court “read[] § 5 of 
the Fourteenth Amendment as giving Congress the power to define the 
substantive scope of the Amendment[,]”119 the Court famously articulated 
the one-way ratchet theory: although Congress is free to expand on rights 
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, it cannot “restrict, abrogate, or 
dilute these guarantees.”120 In other words, the Court’s interpretation of the 
Fourteenth Amendment sets a floor, which Congress may raise if it so 
chooses. 
The standard announced in Katzenbach and Morgan is a ringing 
endorsement of McCulloch and a broad statement of congressional authority 
in relation to both the powers of the states121 and the Court.122 To be sure, the 
Katzenbach Court refined McCulloch to the issue at hand. The Court 
explained that “[a]s against the reserved powers of the States, Congress may 
use any rational means to effectuate the constitutional prohibition of racial 
discrimination in voting.”123 And the Court upheld “the coverage formula 
[a]s rational in both practice and theory.”124 
For decades, the Court appropriately adhered to this doctrinal 
framework and recognized Congress’s broad Reconstruction Amendment 
enforcement authority. Indeed, the Court subsequently upheld numerous 
 
the Court declined to decide whether New York’s English language requirement violated the Constitution 
on the grounds that the plaintiff’s complaint failed to allege whether she completed the sixth grade and 
therefore might be rendered moot by Morgan. See Cardona v. Power, 384 U.S. 672, 674 (1966). 
 118 See Morgan, 384 U.S. at 648 (“A construction of § 5 that would require a judicial determination 
that the enforcement of the state law precluded by Congress violated the Amendment . . . would 
depreciate both congressional resourcefulness and congressional responsibility for implementing the 
Amendment.”). 
 119 Id. at 668 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
 120 Id. at 651 n.10 (majority opinion); see also Jeffrey L. Yablon, Congressional Power Under 
Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment, 25 STAN. L. REV. 885, 894 (1973) (“[T]he section five powers 
of Congress operate like a ratchet: once the Court has found that an enactment or practice is violative of 
the fourteenth amendment, Congress is powerless to turn the wheel backwards.”). 
 121 See South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 325 (1966) (“The gist of the matter is that the 
Fifteenth Amendment supersedes contrary exertions of state power.”). 
 122 See Morgan, 384 U.S. at 653 (“It was for Congress . . . to assess and weigh the various conflicting 
considerations . . . . It is enough that we be able to perceive a basis upon which the Congress might resolve 
the conflict as it did.”). 
 123 Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 324 (emphasis added). 
 124 Id. at 330 (emphasis added). The Katzenbach standard is often referred to as a “rationality” or 
“rational means” standard even though those terms do not appear in McCulloch’s oft-quoted formulation. 
See, e.g., Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 568–69 (2013) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
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reauthorizations of the VRA under the Fifteenth Amendment and 
Katzenbach’s rationality standard.125 But the Court went rogue in 1997. 
2. Boerne’s Congruence and Proportionality Test 
The curtailment of Congress’s Fourteenth Amendment enforcement 
authority began not with a decision involving racial discrimination but rather 
with a First Amendment case. In Employment Division v. Smith, the Court 
held that neutral, generally applicable laws do not violate the Free Exercise 
Clause.126 The Smith Court abandoned the so-called Sherbert test that applied 
strict scrutiny to laws infringing free exercise rights.127 Congress responded 
by passing the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA),128 which 
purported to overturn Smith by forcing courts to apply strict scrutiny in 
adjudicating free exercise challenges to state and federal laws.129 
In City of Boerne v. Flores, the Court held that Congress could not 
impose RFRA on the states.130 The Boerne Court established a new standard 
for determining Congress’s Fourteenth Amendment enforcement authority. 
Under Boerne’s three-part congruence and proportionality test, the Court 
begins by “identify[ing] with some precision the scope of the constitutional 
right at issue.”131 The Court next “examine[s] whether Congress identified a 
history and pattern of unconstitutional [conduct] by the States.”132 The Court 
concludes by determining whether there is “a congruence and proportionality 
between the injury to be prevented or remedied and the means adopted to 
 
 125 See Lopez v. Monterey County, 525 U.S. 266, 283–85 (1999) (upholding the 1982 
reauthorization); City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 182–83 (1980) (upholding the 1975 
reauthorization); Georgia v. United States, 411 U.S. 526, 535 (1973) (upholding the 1970 
reauthorization); see also Shelby County, 570 U.S. at 539 (“We upheld each of these reauthorizations 
against constitutional challenge.”). When Congress reauthorized the VRA in 1975, it added protections 
for language minorities to the coverage formula and relied on its Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendment 
enforcement authorities—a reliance that continued in the 1982 and 2006 reauthorizations. See Act of 
Aug. 6, 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-73, § 203, 89 Stat. 400, 401; Nathaniel Persily, The Promise and Pitfalls of 
the New Voting Rights Act, 117 YALE L.J. 174, 195–96 (2007) (discussing the coverage formula’s 
evolution). The Court did not dwell on this point in affirming the VRA’s constitutionality under the 
Fifteenth Amendment in Lopez and City of Rome. See Lopez, 525 U.S. at 284–85 (discussing only the 
Fifteenth Amendment); City of Rome, 446 U.S. at 179–83 (discussing Fourteenth and Fifteenth 
Amendment precedents interchangeably but upholding the VRA under the Fifteenth Amendment). 
 126 See 494 U.S. 872, 881 (1990). 
 127 See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 693 (2014) (discussing Smith’s analysis 
as it relates to Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963), and Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972)). 
 128 Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488 (1993) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (2012)).  
 129 See Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. at 694–95. 
 130 See 521 U.S. 507, 511 (1997). RFRA still applies to the federal government because that 
application does not raise federalism concerns. See Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. at 695. 
 131 Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 365 (2001). 
 132 Id. at 368. 
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that end.”133 Although the Court purported to follow precedent,134 Boerne’s 
congruence and proportionality test represents a decisive break with 
McCulloch and Katzenbach.135 
The Boerne Court restricted both Congress’s interpretive and remedial 
authorities. On the interpretive front, the Boerne Court arrogated to itself the 
sole authority to interpret the Constitution. As the Court explained: 
The design of the [Fourteenth] Amendment and the text of § 5 are inconsistent 
with the suggestion that Congress has the power to decree the substance of the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s restrictions on the States. Legislation which alters the 
meaning of the Free Exercise Clause cannot be said to be enforcing the Clause. 
Congress does not enforce a constitutional right by changing what the right is.136 
This language is facially inconsistent with Katzenbach’s rationality 
standard, which treats Congress as a coequal interpreter of the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s protections. Instead of following precedent and deferring to 
Congress’s interpretation, the Boerne Court viewed RFRA as improperly 
“alter[ing] the meaning of the Free Exercise Clause.”137 
To be sure, the Boerne Court was confronted with a direct challenge to 
its interpretive authority. But under Morgan’s one-way ratchet,138 Congress 
would have been well within its Fourteenth Amendment enforcement 
authority to enact RFRA. Congress disagreed with the floor set in Smith—
namely, that neutral, generally applicable laws do not violate the Free 
Exercise Clause—and responded by raising the relevant standard of review 
to strict scrutiny. 
Recognizing this doctrinal inconsistency, the Boerne Court 
reconceptualized—and arguably, implicitly overruled—Morgan’s one-way 
ratchet.139 According to the Boerne Court, Morgan contains language that 
“could be interpreted as acknowledging a power in Congress to enact 
legislation that expands the rights contained in § 1 of the Fourteenth 
 
 133 Boerne, 521 U.S. at 520. 
 134 See id. at 532–33 (contrasting RFRA unfavorably to the VRA); Ellen D. Katz, Reinforcing 
Representation: Congressional Power to Enforce the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments in the 
Rehnquist and Waite Courts, 101 MICH. L. REV. 2341, 2345 (2003) (“All the Boerne cases . . . self-
consciously preserve precedent upholding provisions of the Voting Rights Act . . . against constitutional 
challenge.”). 
 135 See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin, The Reconstruction Power, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1801, 1815 (2010); Katz, 
supra note 134, at 2395. 
 136 Boerne, 521 U.S. at 519; see also id. at 527 (“Any suggestion that Congress has a substantive, 
non-remedial power under the Fourteenth Amendment is not supported by our case law.”). 
 137 Id. at 519 (emphasis added). 
 138 See Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 651 n.10 (1966). 
 139 See, e.g., Katz, supra note 134, at 2395. 
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Amendment.”140 This interpretation, as the Boerne Court saw it, was neither 
“necessary . . . [n]or even the best one.”141 The Boerne Court then reimagined 
Morgan as a case where Congress was solely remedying unconstitutional 
conduct,142 even though Morgan was agnostic on the underlying 
constitutional question.143 In rejecting the one-way ratchet, the Boerne Court 
worried that granting Congress any interpretive authority lacked a limiting 
principle and would risk the Constitution’s status as “superior, paramount 
law.”144 
The Boerne Court not only restricted Congress’s interpretive authority 
but also significantly hindered Congress’s ability to craft remedial 
legislation. The Boerne Court’s requirement of a lengthy legislative record 
of unconstitutional conduct treats Congress more like an administrative 
agency than a coequal branch of government.145 At the final step of the 
analysis, the Boerne Court remarked that “termination dates, geographic 
restrictions, [and] egregious predicates”146 are hallmarks of congruent and 
proportional legislation. Boerne thus requires a closer fit between the 
constitutional wrong and the legislative remedy than the Katzenbach 
standard demanded.147 
Boerne has been roundly criticized from both sides of the aisle.148 
Nevertheless, the Court has applied the congruence and proportionality test 
in several cases concerning Congress’s Fourteenth Amendment enforcement 
 
 140 Boerne, 521 U.S. at 527–28. 
 141 Id. at 528 
 142 See id. (“Both rationales for upholding § 4(e) rested on unconstitutional discrimination by New 
York and Congress’ reasonable attempt to combat it.”). 
 143 See supra note 117 (discussing Morgan and Cardona). 
 144 521 U.S. at 529 (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803)). 
 145 See Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 376 (2001) (Breyer, J., dissenting) 
(criticizing the Court for “[r]eviewing the congressional record as if it were an administrative agency 
record”). 
 146 521 U.S. at 533. 
 147 See Katz, supra note 134, at 2362–68. To be clear, even under Boerne, “Congress [has] even 
greater latitude to craft remedial legislation in areas of traditional equal protection strict scrutiny.” Samuel 
Issacharoff, Is Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act a Victim of Its Own Success?, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1710, 
1715 (2004). 
 148 See, e.g., Balkin, supra note 135, at 1815 (“Nothing in the text of the Fourteenth Amendment 
justifies the Boerne standard or its departure from the test of appropriateness announced in McCulloch v. 
Maryland . . . . [T]he language of McCulloch is actually embedded in the text of Section 5 . . . .”); Michael 
W. McConnell, Institutions and Interpretation: A Critique of City of Boerne v. Flores, 111 HARV. L. REV. 
153, 194 (1997) [hereinafter McConnell, Institutions] (“The historical record shows that the framers of 
the [Fourteenth] Amendment expected Congress, not the Court, to be the primary agent of its 
enforcement, and that Congress would not necessarily consider itself bound by Court precedents in 
executing that function.”). Indeed, Justice Scalia renounced the congruence and proportionality test in a 
2004 dissent. Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 556–58 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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authority.149 Nearly all of these cases implicated Congress’s power to 
abrogate state sovereign immunity.150 None involved race, voting, the 
Fifteenth Amendment, or Congress’s authority to remedy racial 
discrimination in voting. 
3. Shelby County’s Equal Sovereignty Principle 
The foregoing overview of Katzenbach and Boerne frames the 
discussion about the Article V debate and its modern doctrinal significance. 
The Court’s decision in Shelby County v. Holder, which invalidated the 2006 
reauthorization of the VRA’s coverage formula,151 adds another wrinkle to 
this analysis. Although some scholars have accused the Court of changing 
the standard of review for Congress’s Reconstruction Amendment 
enforcement authority,152 I argue that Shelby County’s equal sovereignty 
principle is an example of “freestanding federalism”153 and is thus limited to 
 
 149 See Coleman v. Court of Appeals of Md., 566 U.S. 30, 43–44 (2012) (plurality opinion) (holding 
that Congress did not validly abrogate state sovereign immunity in enacting the FMLA’s self-care 
provisions); Lane, 541 U.S. at 533–34 (upholding Title II of the ADA’s abrogation of state sovereign 
immunity for “the class of cases implicating the fundamental right of access to the courts”); Nev. Dep’t 
of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 734–35 (2003) (upholding the FMLA’s family-care provision’s 
abrogation of state sovereign immunity); Garrett, 531 U.S. at 374 (invalidating Title I of the ADA’s 
abrogation of state sovereign immunity); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 91 (2000) (striking 
down the ADEA’s abrogation of state sovereign immunity); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 
627 (2000) (holding that Congress’s Fourteenth Amendment enforcement authority “does not extend” to 
VAWA’s civil remedies provision); Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 
527 U.S. 627, 647 (1999) (holding that Congress did not validly abrogate state sovereign immunity in the 
Patent and Plant Variety Protection Act). 
 150 See Coleman, 566 U.S. at 43–44; Lane, 541 U.S. at 533–34; Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 734–35; Kimel, 
528 U.S. at 91; Fla. Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 647. 
 151 See 570 U.S. 529, 557 (2013). 
 152 See Reva B. Siegel, Equality Divided, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1, 70 (2013) (accusing the Shelby 
County Court of “chang[ing] both the framework of review and the principle on which it is exercised”); 
cf. Richard L. Hasen, Shelby County and the Illusion of Minimalism, 22 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 713, 
730–31 (2014) [hereinafter Hasen, Minimalism] (expressing concern that the Court will use Shelby 
County to “bootstrap[]” Boerne to the Fifteenth Amendment). 
 153 John F. Manning, Federalism and the Generality Problem in Constitutional Interpretation, 
122 HARV. L. REV. 2003, 2029 (2009). According to Professor Manning, the Court’s freestanding 
federalism cases have “restricted or displaced Acts of Congress without purporting to ground [those] 
decisions in any particular provision of the constitutional text.” Id. at 2005. Put simply, freestanding 
federalism is a structural argument that the Constitution “as a whole . . . preserve[s] a significant element 
of state sovereignty.” Id. at 2006. 
 Published the same month as Northwest Austin, Professor Manning’s article does not mention the 
equal sovereignty principle, though he identifies the clear statement rule and the anticommandeering 
doctrine as examples of freestanding federalism. See id. at 2029. Other scholars, however, have argued 
that the equal sovereignty principle is an example of freestanding federalism. See Thomas B. Colby, In 
Defense of the Equal Sovereignty Principle, 65 DUKE L.J. 1087, 1132–33 (2016) (“It is true that there is 
no clause in the Constitution that explicitly articulates an equal sovereignty principle . . . . When it comes 
to fundamental principles of constitutional federalism, a lack of specific textual support is actually par 
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laws that differentiate between the states. In other words, Shelby County is 
inapplicable to nationwide statutes like Sections 2 and 3(c) of the VRA. 
Although Shelby County had a dramatic real-world impact,154 its future 
doctrinal importance is likely minimal.155 That is because the Court did not 
decide whether Katzenbach or Boerne supplied the relevant standard of 
review. Instead, the Court relied on its decision in Northwest Austin 
Municipal Utility District Number One v. Holder,156 which resolved a 
previous constitutional challenge to the VRA on constitutional avoidance 
grounds.157 
The Shelby County Court looked to two “basic principles” from 
Northwest Austin for guidance.158 The first principle was the Court’s 
statement that “the [VRA] imposes current burdens and must be justified by 
current needs.”159 The second principle was Northwest Austin’s 
“conclu[sion] that ‘a departure from the fundamental principle of equal 
sovereignty requires a showing that a statute’s disparate geographic coverage 
is sufficiently related to the problem that it targets.’”160 In a key passage, the 
Court melded these two principles into one standard: “Congress—if it is to 
divide the States—must identify those jurisdictions to be singled out on a 
basis that makes sense in light of current conditions.”161 Indeed, the opinion 
proceeds by first discussing how the coverage formula differentiates between 
 
for the course.”); Litman, supra note 99, at 1259 (“Shelby County described equal sovereignty as a 
freestanding and fundamental principle not specifically tied to any particular congressional power.”). 
 154 See generally THE THURGOOD MARSHALL INST., NAACP LEGAL DEF. & EDUC. FUND, INC., 
DEMOCRACY DIMINISHED: STATE AND LOCAL THREATS TO VOTING POST-SHELBY COUNTY, ALABAMA V. 
HOLDER (2016), https://www.naacpldf.org/wp-content/uploads/Democracy-Diminished-State-and-
Local-Threats-to-Voting-Post-Shelby-County-Alabama-v.-Holder.pdf [https://perma.cc/3NJW-MVAY] 
(cataloging racially discriminatory election laws passed after Shelby County). 
 155 Shelby County would apply to any future coverage formula that Congress enacts. See 570 U.S. at 
557 (“Congress may draft another formula based on current conditions.”); see also Voting Rights 
Advancement Act of 2019, H.R. 4, 116th Cong. (2019) (proposed coverage formula). Shelby County also 
applies to Section 203 of the VRA, a less-famous coverage formula that requires covered jurisdictions to 
provide bilingual election materials. 52 U.S.C. § 10503 (2012); see also Matthew Higgins, Note, 
Language Accommodations and Section 203 of the Voting Rights Act: Reporting Requirements as a 
Potential Solution to the Compliance Gap, 67 STAN. L. REV. 917, 920–21 (2015) (providing an overview 
of Section 203). 
 156 557 U.S. 193 (2009); see also Shelby County, 570 U.S. at 536. 
 157 See 557 U.S. at 211. For persuasive critiques of Northwest Austin’s constitutional avoidance 
holding, see Eric S. Fish, Constitutional Avoidance as Interpretation and as Remedy, 114 MICH. L. REV. 
1275, 1277 (2016), and Neal Kumar Katyal & Thomas P. Schmidt, Active Avoidance: The Modern 
Supreme Court and Legal Change, 128 HARV. L. REV. 2109, 2129–33 (2015). 
 158 Shelby County, 570 U.S. at 542. 
 159 Id. (quoting Northwest Austin, 557 U.S. at 203). 
 160 Id. (quoting Northwest Austin, 557 U.S. at 203). 
 161 Id. at 553. 
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the states, and then analyzes whether its burdens are justified in light of 
current conditions.162 The Shelby County Court thus interpreted Northwest 
Austin’s current burden requirement as contingent on a violation of the equal 
sovereignty principle. 
To be clear, the Shelby County Court still relied on Katzenbach. The 
Court harkened back to McCulloch’s famous passage163 and Katzenbach’s 
conclusion that the original coverage formula was “rational in both practice 
and theory.”164 And in responding to the dissent, the Court stated that: 
If Congress had started from scratch in 2006, it plainly could not have enacted 
the present coverage formula. It would have been irrational for Congress to 
distinguish between States in such a fundamental way based on 40-year-old 
data, when today’s statistics tell an entirely different story. And it would have 
been irrational to base coverage on the use of voting tests 40 years ago, when 
such tests have been illegal since that time. But that is exactly what Congress 
has done.165 
This language gestures toward the Katzenbach standard. Justice 
Ginsburg’s dissenting opinion—which expressly relied on Katzenbach’s 
rationality standard—picked up on this point. She noted that the Court “d[id] 
not purport to alter settled precedent establishing that the dispositive question 
is whether Congress has employed rational means.”166 
By contrast, the Court’s majority opinion in Shelby County does not 
even cite Boerne—not for the standard of review, not for its application, and 
not for its praise of previous versions of the VRA.167 The words “congruent” 
and “proportional” do not appear either.168 Thus, Shelby County lacks 
language holding that Boerne applies to the Fifteenth Amendment. 
To be sure, the Court commented in a footnote that “[b]oth the 
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments were at issue in Northwest Austin” 
 
 162 See id. at 550 (“The provisions of § 5 apply only to those jurisdictions singled out by § 4. We 
now consider whether that coverage formula is constitutional in light of current conditions.”). 
 163 See id. at 555 (discussing McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819)). 
 164 Id. at 550 (quoting South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 330 (1966)). 
 165 Id. at 556 (emphasis added). 
 166 Id. at 569 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 167 Others have noticed this glaring omission. See Hasen, Minimalism, supra note 152, at 723; 
Litman, supra note 99, at 1259. 
 168 One explanation for Boerne’s absence is Justice Scalia. He renounced Boerne in a 2004 dissent, 
see supra note 148 for a discussion of Lane, and he adhered to that position in a separate concurrence in 
2012. See Coleman v. Court of Appeals of Md., 566 U.S. 30, 44–45 (2012) (Scalia, J., concurring in the 
judgment). Indeed, Scalia’s refusal to join an opinion relying on Boerne resulted in a plurality opinion in 
Coleman. Id. at 33 (plurality opinion). 
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and that decision “guides our review under both Amendments in this case.”169 
Although there is certainly some risk that a future Court could cite this 
language to “bootstrap[]” Boerne into the Fifteenth Amendment,170 that 
result is not required. The Shelby County Court focused on the coverage 
formula’s differentiation between the states, i.e., the issue “in th[e] case.”171 
If the equal sovereignty principle is an example of freestanding federalism, 
then it would apply to statutes enacted under “both Amendments,”172 just as 
it would apply to statutes enacted under any other constitutional provision. 
The Court’s self-imposed limits on its holding elucidate this point. The 
Court made clear that its holding applied “only [to] the coverage formula[,]” 
not to “§ 5 itself.”173 The Court also stated that its “decision in no way affects 
the permanent, nationwide ban on racial discrimination in voting found in 
§ 2.”174 If Shelby County changed the standard of review for all statutes 
enacted under the Reconstruction Amendments, then these statements cannot 
be taken at face value. A more stringent constitutional standard obviously 
“affects” a neighboring statutory provision. Moreover, the Court’s 
description of Section 2 as both permanent and nationwide strongly indicates 
that these are distinguishing criteria and, therefore, Shelby County’s current 
burden requirement applies only to statutes that differentiate between the 
states.175 
 
 169 Shelby County, 570 U.S. at 542 n.* (emphasis added). 
 170 Hasen, Minimalism, supra note 152, at 730–31. 
 171 570 U.S. at 542 n.*. 
 172 Id. 
 173 Id. at 557. This aspect of the Court’s decision was underscored by Justice Thomas’s concurring 
opinion, which argued that the Court should have also invalidated Section 5. See id. (Thomas, J., 
concurring). 
 174 Id. (majority opinion) (emphasis added). 
 175 Other scholars have thoroughly critiqued the equal sovereignty principle. See Litman, supra note 
99, at 1211 (“Shelby County broadened the equal sovereignty principle beyond how it had been used in 
prior cases.”); Zachary S. Price, NAMUDNO’s Non-Existent Principle of State Equality, 88 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. ONLINE 24, 30–39 (2013) (criticizing Northwest Austin’s invocation of the equal sovereignty 
principle). But see Colby, supra note 153, at 1168 (defending the equal sovereignty principle but arguing 
that Congress should be given more leeway to enact statutes under the Reconstruction Amendments). 
 As this Article went to print, the Supreme Court issued its first post-Shelby County decision 
interpreting Congress’s Reconstruction Amendment enforcement authority. See Allen v. Cooper, 140 S. 
Ct. 994 (2020). In striking down a nationwide statute that abrogated state sovereign immunity, the Court 
relied exclusively on Boerne’s congruence and proportionality test and did not even cite Shelby County. 
See id. at 1004–05. This glaring omission further reinforces the point that the equal sovereignty principle 
is an example of freestanding federalism. See Travis Crum, The Curious Disappearance of Shelby 
County, ELECTION L. BLOG (Mar. 27, 2020, 7:03 AM), https://electionlawblog.org/?p=110263 
[https://perma.cc/P2ZZ-M33Z]. 
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II. THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND VOTING  
RIGHTS DURING RECONSTRUCTION 
This Part focuses on two distinct questions concerning the Fourteenth 
Amendment: one of substantive scope and one of enforcement authority. 
Regarding substantive scope, this Part addresses whether the Fourteenth 
Amendment was understood during Reconstruction to encompass political 
rights. As this Part will show, the Fourteenth Amendment was originally 
understood not to mandate suffrage for the freedmen. Regarding Congress’s 
enforcement authority, this Part will demonstrate that the Fourteenth 
Amendment was originally understood to endorse McCulloch’s deferential 
standard. 
A. The Reconstruction-Era Hierarchy of Rights 
To understand how the Reconstruction generation viewed the 
Fourteenth Amendment, one must first examine the language employed 
during that period. The Reconstruction generation conceptualized rights as 
distinct spheres, and the Reconstruction debates were “based on a tripartite 
division of rights . . . between civil rights, political rights, and social 
rights.”176 This nuance is especially important to flag for the contemporary 
reader, as the twentieth century civil rights movement collapsed the 
rhetorical and intellectual distinctions employed during Reconstruction.177 
Indeed, the Reconstruction Framers’ “categorization of rights plays no part 
in current interpretations of the Fourteenth Amendment.”178 
In the 1860s, “civil rights” represented a far narrower category than that 
term connotes today.179 The Civil Rights Act of 1866, for example, identified 
“the rights to make and enforce contracts; to buy, lease, inherit, hold and 
convey property; to sue and be sued and to give evidence in court; to legal 
protections for the security of person and property; and to equal treatment 
 
 176 Michael W. McConnell, Originalism and the Desegregation Decisions, 81 VA. L. REV. 947, 1016 
(1995) [hereinafter McConnell, Desegregation]; see also PAMELA BRANDWEIN, RETHINKING THE 
JUDICIAL SETTLEMENT OF RECONSTRUCTION 70–71 (2011) (discussing this framework); FONER, supra 
note 8, at 230–31 (same). To be sure, even at the dawn of Reconstruction, some Radicals believed that 
Blacks were entitled to civil and political rights. See WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE FOURTEENTH 
AMENDMENT: FROM POLITICAL PRINCIPLE TO JUDICIAL DOCTRINE 127 (1988) (explaining that some 
Radicals refused to distinguish between civil and political rights); see also infra Section III.D. 
 177 See AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION, supra note 16, at 445 n.*. 
 178 McConnell, Desegregation, supra note 176, at 1025; cf. BRANDWEIN, supra note 176, at 71 
(“After the passage of the Fifteenth Amendment, the right to vote began a slow and uneven migration 
into the category of civil rights.”). 
 179 See HAROLD M. HYMAN & WILLIAM M. WIECEK, EQUAL JUSTICE UNDER LAW: 
CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT, 1835–1875, at 395 (1982). 
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under the criminal law.”180 Other civil rights included the rights to freedom 
of movement and to be free from private violence.181 During Reconstruction, 
the concept of civil rights was employed to demand equal treatment by 
government in civil and criminal matters. 
By contrast, political rights were defined as the rights to vote, to hold 
office, and to sit on juries.182 The Reconstruction vision of citizenship 
intersected with this hierarchy of rights. Although civil rights were inherent 
in citizenship, the right to vote “lay outside the domain of mere 
citizenship.”183 Suffrage was often labeled a privilege, reinforcing the 
distinction between citizenship and political rights.184 Throughout 
Reconstruction, white women were often cited—by both sides of the 
debate—as the quintessential example of second-class citizens who were 
entitled to own property but could not vote.185 White women were thus 
permitted to exercise civil rights but not political rights. 
By far the most nebulous category, social rights concerned 
“participation in social life.”186 This broad category included not only rights 
to use public transportation, accommodations, and education, but also the 
right to choose one’s personal associations.187 Given its conceptual breadth, 
social rights are oftentimes divided into “public” and “private” 
subcategories.188 
But even with the public/private distinction in mind, the definition of 
social rights is still blurry for—at least—two reasons. First, “public 
conveyances, inns, and the like were viewed as a kind of hybrid—privately 
owned but possessing public attributes.”189 Second, and relatedly, public 
social rights were sometimes categorized as civil rights because they 
 
 180 McConnell, Desegregation, supra note 176, at 1027 (discussing the Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 
31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27). 
 181 See HYMAN & WIECEK, supra note 179, at 395–96. 
 182 See AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 48 (1998) 
[hereinafter AMAR, BILL OF RIGHTS]. 
 183 AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION, supra note 16, at 382 (emphasis added). 
 184 See HYMAN & WIECEK, supra note 179, at 394–95. 
 185 See AMAR, BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 182, at 260 & n.*. 
 186 Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Unrelenting Libertarian Challenge to Public Accommodations Law, 
66 STAN. L. REV. 1205, 1210 (2014). 
 187 See HYMAN & WIECEK, supra note 179, at 396; Bagenstos, supra note 186, at 1210. 
 188 See McConnell, Desegregation, supra note 176, at 1022 (“The individual’s social rights included 
his own choice of associates, but did not include a right to expect that other persons whom he found 
undesirable . . . would be denied access to common carriers or public accommodations . . . .”). 
 189 MALTZ, supra note 12, at 71. 
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involved the provision of government services or licenses.190 Construed as 
such, social rights were merely a claim for social equality.191 Under this view, 
the government must issue a marriage license to an interracial couple (a civil 
right) but cannot mandate that interracial couples be perceived as societal 
equals (a social right).192 
Further complicating matters, the boundaries between civil, political, 
and social rights were malleable and shifted over time.193 So, too, were public 
views on these rights. Over the course of Reconstruction, the political center 
of the Republican Party shifted to support black suffrage and the 
enforcement of social rights, as evidenced by the Fifteenth Amendment and 
the Civil Rights Act of 1875, respectively.194 But at the beginning of 
Reconstruction, “only ‘radicals’ merged civil and political rights.”195 For 
purposes of this Article, the category that matters is political rights—and the 
right to vote was not considered a civil or social right, nor was it viewed as 
inherent in citizenship. 
B. Constitutional Two-Steps 
During the Civil War and Reconstruction, Radical Republicans pushed 
an abolitionist agenda, which culminated in the enfranchisement of the 
freedmen. Along the way, the Radicals’ victories followed a two-step 
pattern: an initial subconstitutional rule would later be expanded upon and 
entrenched via a constitutional amendment. 
The initial constitutional two-step was the abolition of slavery. The first 
move was President Lincoln’s Emancipation Proclamation in January 1863. 
 
 190 See Bagenstos, supra note 186, at 1211 (discussing the Civil Rights Act of 1875, which relied on 
a broad understanding of civil rights in prohibiting racial discrimination in public accommodations); 
McConnell, Desegregation, supra note 176, at 1022–23 (“The effect of the Fourteenth Amendment was 
not to alter the boundary between civil and social rights, but to make race an unreasonable basis for 
discrimination within the civil sphere.”). 
 191 See Rebecca J. Scott, Public Rights, Social Equality, and the Conceptual Roots of the Plessy 
Challenge, 106 MICH. L. REV. 777, 786–87 (2008). 
 192 See McConnell, Desegregation, supra note 176, at 1018–20; see also MALTZ, supra note 12, at 
72 (“Given the special nature of public accommodations, the drafters [of the Fourteenth Amendment] 
might well have envisioned a regime in which racial discrimination in such facilities was 
prohibited . . . .”). 
 193 See AMAR, BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 182, at 258–59 (discussing the transformation of the right 
to keep and bear arms from a political right to a civil right). 
 194 See HYMAN & WIECEK, supra note 179, at 397–98. 
 195 Id. at 394. For example, Senator Charles Sumner, one of the most Radical Republicans, 
“introduced a series of resolutions calling for civil and political equality” during the Thirty-Ninth 
Congress. FONER, supra note 8, at 240; see also infra Section III.B.2 (discussing Sumner’s proposals in 
the Fortieth Congress). 
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But that decree applied only to the Confederate States.196 The second step 
occurred in December 1865—nearly eight months after Appomattox—when 
the Thirteenth Amendment abolished slavery in two of the loyal Border 
States and ensured that it would not return in the former Confederacy.197 The 
Thirteenth Amendment thus expanded the states covered by the 
Emancipation Proclamation’s abolition of slavery and entrenched that 
decision against any post-war backsliding. 
Unfortunately, emancipation did not result in freedom in the South. The 
ex-Confederate States quickly enacted the notorious Black Codes, which 
severely curtailed the liberty of the newly freed slaves by limiting their right 
to contract and their freedom of movement.198 Moreover, “violence against 
blacks reached staggering proportions in the immediate aftermath of the 
war.”199 It soon became apparent that the Southern States sought to 
reestablish a de facto system of slavery. 
In order to eradicate the Black Codes,200 Congress enacted the Civil 
Rights Act of 1866 pursuant to its Thirteenth Amendment enforcement 
authority.201 True to its name, the Civil Rights Act protected civil rights—
such as the rights to own property and sign a contract—but not political 
rights.202 Indeed, Republicans disclaimed that political rights were implicated 
by the Civil Rights Act.203 The goal was to protect the civil rights of the 
freedmen, not extend the franchise. 
As the first major legislation passed over a presidential veto,204 the 
constitutionality of the Civil Rights Act was contested at the time. Although 
the Emancipation Proclamation had been justified as an exercise of the 
 
 196 See David A. Strauss, The Irrelevance of Constitutional Amendments, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1457, 
1480 (2001). 
 197 See AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION, supra note 16, at 359 (noting that Delaware and Kentucky 
“were the Union’s only remaining slave states”). 
 198 See FONER, supra note 8, at 198–201. 
 199 Id. at 119. 
 200 See id. at 244. 
 201 See AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION, supra note 16, at 362 (“Reconstructors insisted that the 
Abolition Amendment’s ‘appropriate’ clause allowed Congress to legislate not merely against slavery 
itself, but against all the ‘badges’ and relics of a slave system.”); Steven A. Engel, Note, The McCulloch 
Theory of the Fourteenth Amendment: City of Boerne v. Flores and the Original Understanding of Section 
5, 109 YALE L.J. 115, 119 (1999) (“The substance of the [Thirteenth A]mendment prohibited slavery, yet 
under the Enforcement Clause the Republicans claimed the authority to enact the Civil Rights Act, which 
protected against state infringement a range of civil liberties, such as the rights of contract and property 
and the right to sue in court.”). 
 202 See RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE FOURTEENTH 
AMENDMENT 30–31 (2d ed. 1997); McConnell, Desegregation, supra note 176, at 1027. 
 203 See David P. Currie, The Reconstruction Congress, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 383, 398 & n.95 (2008). 
 204 See FONER, supra note 8, at 250–51. 
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President’s war powers, the same font of authority was more questionable 
over a year after hostilities had ceased. Accordingly, leading Republicans 
recommended waiting until the Thirteenth Amendment’s ratification to enact 
the Civil Rights Act.205 Even then, a handful of Republicans—perhaps most 
prominently Representative John Bingham of Ohio—expressed reservations 
about the Act’s constitutionality.206 And, of course, Democrats and President 
Johnson repeatedly questioned the Act’s constitutionality.207 
The Thirty-Ninth Congress ultimately chose the Article V route to 
“provide an incontrovertible constitutional foundation for the act.”208 The 
Civil Rights Act of 1866 thus served as a basis for and was constitutionalized 
by the Fourteenth Amendment. Given this relationship, the Civil Rights Act 
provides strong initial evidence that the Fourteenth Amendment 
encompasses civil rights.209 
C. The Substantive Scope of the Fourteenth Amendment 
Throughout the Fourteenth Amendment debates, Republicans in 
Congress distinguished between civil and political rights.210 While 
introducing the Fourteenth Amendment, Senator Jacob Howard (R-MI) 
remarked that the Privileges or Immunities Clause protected “the personal 
rights guarant[eed] and secured by the first eight amendments of the 
Constitution.”211 Senator Howard made clear that the Radical Republicans’ 
 
 205 See Currie, supra note 203, at 394–95. 
 206 See GERARD N. MAGLIOCCA, AMERICAN FOUNDING SON: JOHN BINGHAM AND THE INVENTION 
OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 120 (2013); Engel, supra note 201, at 133. Some scholars concur with 
Bingham’s assessment. See Currie, supra note 203, at 396 (“The Thirteenth Amendment forbade slavery, 
not racial discrimination; it did not authorize Congress to legislate equal civil rights.”); Jonathan F. 
Mitchell, Textualism and the Fourteenth Amendment, 69 STAN. L. REV. 1237, 1260 (2017) 
(“Congressional supporters claimed that the Thirteenth Amendment authorized [the Civil Rights Act of 
1866], but the Thirteenth Amendment gets them only part of the way there.” (footnote omitted)). 
 207 See AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION, supra note 16, at 362. 
 208 Id. 
 209 See, e.g., McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 775 (2010) (“Today, it is generally 
accepted that the Fourteenth Amendment was understood to provide a constitutional basis for protecting 
the rights set out in the Civil Rights Act of 1866.”); BERGER, supra note 202, at 23 (“[T]he [Fourteenth] 
Amendment was designed to ‘constitutionalize’ the [Civil Rights] Act . . . so as to remove doubt as to its 
constitutionality and to place it beyond the power of a later Congress to repeal.”). Congress reenacted the 
Civil Rights Act of 1866 after the Fourteenth Amendment’s ratification to resolve any doubt about its 
constitutionality. See Civil Rights Act of 1870, ch. 114, § 18, 16 Stat. 140, 144; see also Jennifer Mason 
McAward, The Scope of Congress’s Thirteenth Amendment Enforcement Power After City of Boerne v. 
Flores, 88 WASH. U. L. REV. 77, 115–16 (2010) (discussing this history and its relationship to Congress’s 
Thirteenth Amendment enforcement authority). 
 210 See AMAR, BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 182, at 216–18, 217 n.* (citing dozens of statements by 
members of Congress). 
 211 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2765 (1866) (statement of Sen. Howard). 
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goal was to overturn Barron v. Baltimore212 and incorporate the Bill of Rights 
against the states.213 Of course, those rights did not include the ballot. As 
Senator Howard explained: 
[T]he first section of the proposed amendment does not give to either of these 
classes [Whites or Blacks] the right of voting. The right of suffrage is not, in 
law, one of the privileges or immunities thus secured by the Constitution. It is 
merely the creature of law. It has always been regarded in this country as the 
result of positive local law, not regarded as one of those fundamental rights 
lying at the basis of all society and without which a people cannot exist except 
as slaves, subject to a despotism.214 
Representative John Bingham—the “Madison”215 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment—agreed with this interpretation, stating that the Joint 
Committee on Reconstruction believed that “the exercise of the elective 
franchise . . . is exclusively under the control of the States.”216 Other 
Republicans concurred in this construction of the Fourteenth Amendment.217 
Furthermore, moderate Republicans were not “enthusiastic about the 
prospect of black suffrage, either in the North, where it represented a political 
liability, or the South, where it seemed less likely to provide a stable basis 
for a new Republican party than a political alliance with forward-looking 
white Southerners.”218 And throughout the 1866 campaign and the 
ratification battle, Republicans emphasized that the Fourteenth Amendment 
did not encompass voting rights.219 This limitation was no minor point: 
Democrats attempted to exploit fears of black suffrage in arguing against the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s ratification, thus forcing Republicans to reject 
those claims.220 
 
 212 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833). 
 213 See AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION, supra note 16, at 386–87. 
 214 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2766 (1866) (statement of Sen. Howard). 
 215 Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 74 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting). 
 216 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2542 (1866) (statement of Rep. Bingham); see also id. at 
431 (“[W]hy not go for a constitutional amendment which will declare, once for all, that no State . . . shall 
make any distinction in the right of voting between male citizens of the United States . . . ? I will answer 
with all my heart that I am ready to go for that. But a majority of those with whom I am associated think 
that this is all that is needed at present . . . . I am content with that.”). 
 217 See, e.g., id. at 1159 (statement of Rep. Windom (R-MN)) (commenting that the Fourteenth 
Amendment “does not . . . confer the privilege of voting, for that is a political right”). 
 218 FONER, supra note 8, at 241. 
 219 See id. at 260. 
 220 See, e.g., MALTZ, supra note 12, at 118 (“Both in and out of Congress, opponents of the [the 
Fourteenth Amendment] charged again and again that it was meant to allow Congress to mandate black 
suffrage. Supporters, however, emphatically denied the allegation.” (footnote omitted)); George C. 
Thomas III, Newspapers and the Fourteenth Amendment: What Did the American Public Know About 
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Both the Republicans’ and Democrats’ strategies are unsurprising given 
the continued unpopularity of black suffrage in the North and the defeat of 
five suffrage referenda in 1865.221 Indeed, it is difficult to overstate the 
vehemence of Northern racism.222 As recently as 1853, Illinois adopted a 
criminal statute prohibiting Blacks from residing in the state.223 The desire to 
avoid the black suffrage issue was so strong that “no speaker during the 
debates on the Fourteenth Amendment pursued the contention that § 1 would 
be construed to include the franchise.”224 
Even Radical Republican supporters of black suffrage openly lamented 
that the Fourteenth Amendment lacked protections for political rights,225 and 
Republican newspapers commented that the Radicals failed to secure black 
suffrage.226 Perhaps most telling, Radical Republicans pledged to continue 
fighting for black suffrage on the 1866 campaign trial.227 Representative 
George Boutwell (R-MA) and Senator Charles Sumner (R-MA)—who 
would later lead the Radicals in their attempt to pass a nationwide black 
suffrage statute pursuant to Congress’s Fourteenth Amendment enforcement 
authority228—admitted in 1866 that the Amendment did not mandate black 
suffrage. Congressman Boutwell, who was also a member of the Joint 
Committee on Reconstruction,229 conceded that “[t]he proposition in the 
matter of suffrage falls short of what I desire, but so far as it goes it tends to 
 
Section 1?, 18 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 323, 347 (2009) (discussing Democratic newspapers’ assertion 
that the Fourteenth Amendment granted nationwide black suffrage). 
 221 See GILLETTE, supra note 11, at 25–26; see also infra Section III.A (discussing suffrage 
referenda). 
 222 See LAURA F. EDWARDS, A LEGAL HISTORY OF THE CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION 83 
(2015) (listing restrictions on the civil and political rights of Blacks in several Northern and Midwestern 
States). 
 223 See MALTZ, supra note 12, at 2. That statute was repealed near the end of the Civil War. See id. 
at 6. 
 224 Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 163 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part); see also GARRETT EPPS, DEMOCRACY REBORN: THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE FIGHT 
FOR EQUAL RIGHTS IN POST-CIVIL WAR AMERICA 104 (2006) (“[T]he majority of Republicans . . . were 
still mired in the old view of the vote as a political privilege granted to a few citizens rather than as a right 
belonging to all.”); JOHN MABRY MATHEWS, LEGISLATIVE AND JUDICIAL HISTORY OF THE FIFTEENTH 
AMENDMENT 12 (1909) (“There was a feeling too widespread to be safely antagonized that the regulation 
of the suffrage was a matter properly belonging to the state governments.”). 
 225 See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2469 (1866) (statement of Rep. Kelley (R-PA)) (stating 
that the Fourteenth Amendment “d[id] not go far enough[,] and propos[ing] to at once enfranchise every 
loyal man in the country”); MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME 
COURT AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY 28 (2004). 
 226 See FONER, supra note 8, at 256. 
 227 See JOSEPH B. JAMES, THE FRAMING OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 178 (1956). 
 228 See infra Section III.D. 
 229 See MAGLIOCCA, supra note 206, at 111. 
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the equalization of the inequality at present existing.”230 And in 1866 
campaign speeches, Senator Sumner “openly declared that the [Fourteenth 
A]mendment was not enough, that impartial suffrage must come.”231 
1. Section One 
In addition to the Reconstruction Framers’ intent and the original public 
understanding of the Amendment at the time, Section One of the Fourteenth 
Amendment provides further textual evidence of the exclusion of political 
rights. Indeed, Section One’s capacious language does not expressly 
reference political rights at all. Nor does the language employed indicate that 
it would have been understood to encompass the right to vote. 
Section One’s first sentence—the Citizenship Clause—overturned 
Dred Scott and conferred citizenship on the freedmen.232 But as 
conceptualized in the eighteenth century, citizenship was not coextensive 
with the right to vote. As noted previously, women were the paradigmatic 
example of nonvoting citizens during Reconstruction.233 
Moving on to the Privileges or Immunities Clause,234 the 
Reconstruction Framers borrowed from Article IV’s protections for out-of-
state citizens. Article IV, however, had never been read to compel New 
Hampshire to grant a Virginian the right to vote. Article IV therefore 
protected civil rights, not political rights.235 Whatever the metes and bounds 
of “privileges or immunities,” those terms did not encompass political rights 
during Reconstruction.236 Indeed, toward the end of Reconstruction, the 
Court held that women were not entitled to the right to vote under the 
Privileges or Immunities Clause.237 
 
 230 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2508 (1866) (statement of Rep. Boutwell); see also id. (“I 
demand and shall continue to demand the franchise for all loyal male citizens of this country . . . .”). 
 231 JAMES, supra note 227, at 173. Although these comments occurred after the Fourteenth 
Amendment passed Congress, they were made during the ratification debate. 
 232 See AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION, supra note 16, at 380–81. 
 233 See supra Section II.A. 
 234 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the 
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States . . . .”). 
 235 See AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION, supra note 16, at 391–92. 
 236 See BERGER, supra note 202, at 31–32. 
 237 Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. 162, 178 (1875). The Minor Court noted that the Fifteenth 
Amendment provided a compelling reason not to confer suffrage rights via the Fourteenth Amendment, 
pointing out that “[i]f suffrage was one of the[] [Fourteenth Amendment’s] privileges or immunities, why 
amend the Constitution to prevent its being denied on account of race?” Id. at 175. 
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The Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses further reinforce the 
civil–political rights dichotomy.238 Because both clauses apply to 
“person[s]”239—not merely citizens—they cover a broader class of 
individuals than the Privileges or Immunities Clause or the Fifteenth 
Amendment. This distinction is best illustrated by the fact that the 
Constitution permits the disenfranchisement of aliens.240 The Due Process 
and Equal Protection Clauses’ use of the word “person” cuts against the 
Court’s voting rights jurisprudence.241 
2. The Apportionment Clause 
Given the close relationship between the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and 
the Fourteenth Amendment, Section One “inspired relatively little 
discussion.”242 By contrast, Section Two’s Apportionment Clause sparked 
real debate.243 “[L]ess familiar”244 than its sectional sibling, Section Two 
provides for a reduction in House seats if a state “denied” or “abridged” the 
“right to vote” of its adult “male” “citizens.”245 
Section Two was crafted as a response to an unintended consequence 
of the Thirteenth Amendment: the Southern States that had previously 
received three-fifths representation in the House for every slave would now 
be entitled to five-fifths for every disenfranchised freedmen.246 At the time, 
 
 238 See John Harrison, Reconstructing the Privileges or Immunities Clause, 101 YALE L.J. 1385, 
1438–40 (1992) (observing that several of the Reconstruction Framers believed that the Equal Protection 
Clause did not apply to voting rights). 
 239 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 240 See Vikram David Amar, Jury Service as Political Participation Akin to Voting, 80 CORNELL L. 
REV. 203, 227 (1995). But see Jamin B. Raskin, Legal Aliens, Local Citizens: The Historical, 
Constitutional and Theoretical Meanings of Alien Suffrage, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 1391, 1397 (1993) (noting 
that white male aliens “exercised the right to vote in at least twenty-two states or territories during the 
nineteenth century”). 
 241 As noted above, the Court has applied the Fourteenth Amendment to non-race voting rights claims 
in a series of equal protection decisions as well as cases treating the right to vote as a fundamental right. 
See supra Section I.A.4. 
 242 FONER, supra note 8, at 257. 
 243 See id. 
 244 Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 42 (1974). 
 245 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2. Section Two’s apportionment penalty has never been enforced. 
See, e.g., Gerard N. Magliocca, Our Unconstitutional Reapportionment Process, 86 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
774, 783 (2018). 
 246 See Pamela S. Karlan, Reapportionment, Nonapportionment, and Recovering Some Lost History 
of One Person, One Vote, 59 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1921, 1931–32 (2018); Franita Tolson, The 
Constitutional Structure of Voting Rights Enforcement, 89 WASH. L. REV. 379, 405 (2014) [hereinafter 
Tolson, Structure]. 
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it was estimated that this would give the South an additional fifteen House 
seats.247 
Even though the Reconstruction Framers attempted to rectify the 
malapportionment wrought by the disenfranchisement of the freedmen, 
Section Two addressed the five-fifths problem without enfranchising Blacks 
nationwide. As a compromise provision, Section Two evidenced a political 
calculation: “[I]t protected the North against an increase in Southern white 
political power and punished the South for withholding suffrage from Blacks 
but allowed Northern states to do so with impunity, since their black 
population was too small to make a difference in representation.”248 The 
solution to the five-fifths problem did not require the extension of voting 
rights to black men but merely provided a “strong inducement”249 to do so. 
Indeed, Section Two’s specific remedy—a reduction in House seats—
undermines the argument that Section One banned racial discrimination in 
voting.250 
Despite the inclusion of the Apportionment Clause, the congressional 
consensus was uniform in viewing the entire Fourteenth Amendment as a 
civil rights provision. Representative Bingham stated that “[t]he amendment 
does not give, as the second section shows, the power to Congress of 
regulating suffrage in the several states. The second section excludes the 
 
 247 See GILLETTE, supra note 11, at 25; see also Michael T. Morley, Remedial Equilibration and the 
Right to Vote Under Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment, 2015 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 279, 306 [hereinafter 
Morley, Equilibration] (“[I]f Representatives were allocated based on total population, then 127,000 
white people in New York would be entitled to a single representative, while an equal number of whites 
in Mississippi would have three representatives, due to the large number of disenfranchised blacks 
there.”). For context, the Thirty-Ninth Congress had 193 representatives. See Congress Profiles, U.S. 
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES: HISTORY, ART & ARCHIVES, https://history.house.gov/Congressional-
Overview/Profiles/39th/ [https://perma.cc/3298-KEP5]. 
 248 Xi Wang, Black Suffrage and the Redefinition of American Freedom, 1860–1870, 17 CARDOZO 
L. REV. 2153, 2194–95 (1996). 
 249 KLARMAN, supra note 225, at 28; see also 2 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: 
TRANSFORMATIONS 107 (1998) [hereinafter ACKERMAN, TRANSFORMATIONS] (describing the 
Apportionment Clause as providing “a serious penalty” but also “transparently presuppos[ing] the 
continued constitutional legitimacy of such exclusionary practices”). 
 250 See Morley, Prophylactic, supra note 99, at 2093 (“It would have made little sense for Congress 
to leave states discretion under Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment to refuse to extend voting rights 
to former slaves or other minorities if Section 1 of that same Amendment compelled them to do so . . . .”); 
Strauss, Constitution, supra note 29, at 39 (“Section 2 refers explicitly to voting, and it provides both a 
detailed right . . . and a specific remedy. Section 1 does not refer to voting at all . . . . Read naturally, the 
amendment does not seem to provide dual remedies.” (footnotes omitted)). But see Tolson, Abridgment, 
supra note 84, at 458 (arguing that, when combined with Section Five, the Apportionment Clause “was 
the Reconstruction Congress’s attempt to constitutionalize a mechanism that would allow Congress to all 
but legislate universal suffrage”). See infra notes 479–481 and accompanying text for an argument against 
Professor Tolson’s position. 
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conclusion that by the first section suffrage is subjected to congressional 
law . . . .”251 Similarly, Senator Jacob Howard commented that “[t]he second 
section leaves the right to regulate the elective franchise still with the States, 
and does not meddle with that right.”252 
Furthermore, the Thirty-Ninth Congress specifically rejected attempts 
to include a right to vote in Section Two. Activist Robert Dale Owen 
submitted a proposal that would have established black suffrage on July 4, 
1876.253 Even though this proposal would have delayed black suffrage for a 
decade, it was deemed too radical and created a stalemate in the Joint 
Committee on Reconstruction that was only broken when Congressman 
Thaddeus Stevens (R-PA) abandoned his support for including black 
suffrage in the Amendment’s scope.254 Other proposals endorsing black 
suffrage were also voted down.255 The Reconstruction Framers, therefore, did 
not view Section Two as transforming the substance of Section One. 
Section Two’s treatment of gender further demonstrates the 
Reconstruction-era distinction between citizenship and political rights. 
Section Two introduced a new word to the Constitution: male.256 The 
rationale for this inclusion is deceptively straightforward given 
contemporary demographics. Due to Western migration, the Eastern States 
had far greater proportions of women—none of whom could vote.257 If 
Section Two had penalized states for disenfranchising all citizens, the burden 
would have fallen on the Eastern States. A gender-neutral Section Two 
would have thereby created incentives for enfranchising women,258 adding 
further controversy to the ratification battle.259 A provision thus designed to 
 
 251 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2542 (1866) (statement of Rep. Bingham); see also id. at 
431 (describing an early draft of Section Two as “nothing but a penalty”). 
 252 Id. at 2766 (statement of Sen. Jacob Howard); see also Tolson, Structure, supra note 246, at 406 
(“But there is little doubt that few in the thirty-ninth Congress intended to explicitly grant the right to vote 
through the Fourteenth Amendment’s provisions . . . .”). 
 253 See Wang, supra note 248, at 2192 & n.156. 
 254 See GILLETTE, supra note 11, at 24. 
 255 See ALLAN J. LICHTMAN, THE EMBATTLED VOTE IN AMERICA: FROM THE FOUNDING TO THE 
PRESENT 77 (2018) (“By a wide margin, the Joint Committee on Reconstruction rejected drafts of section 
1 designed to assure political equality for citizens of color.”); MATHEWS, supra note 224, at 12 (noting 
that Senator Henderson’s black suffrage proposal lost by a vote of 10–37); Morley, Equilibration, supra 
note 247, at 300–04 (surveying various drafts of Section Two). 
 256 See AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION, supra note 16, at 393–94. 
 257 See id. at 393. 
 258 See id. 
 259 See Siegel, supra note 27, at 968–76 (describing the women’s suffrage movement’s battles over 
Section Two). 
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address racial discrimination expressly injected gender into the Constitution 
in order to retain the distinction between citizenship and political rights. 
Overall, the Thirty-Ninth Congress deliberately structured the 
Fourteenth Amendment to protect civil and political rights in distinct 
sections. Section One protects civil rights whereas Section Two provides a 
penalty for disenfranchisement. This sectional separation provides strong 
evidence that Section One was not a general grant of suffrage.260 
D. Congress’s Fourteenth Amendment Enforcement Authority 
Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that “Congress 
shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this 
article.”261 The key term here is “appropriate,” which the Reconstruction 
Framers first included in the Thirteenth Amendment’s Enforcement Clause 
and used again in the Fifteenth Amendment’s Enforcement Clause.262 
During Reconstruction, the term “appropriate” was understood to 
embody the deferential approach to congressional authority articulated in 
McCulloch v. Maryland.263 It is well established that the Reconstruction 
Framers’ selection of the term “appropriate” was a deliberate adoption of 
 
 260 See AMAR, BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 182, at 217–18 (commenting that the “overall architecture 
of the Fourteenth Amendment . . . [has] civil rights at the core of section 1 and political rights featured 
separately in section 2”). 
 Section Two is not the only provision of the Fourteenth Amendment that implicates political rights. 
Section Three prohibited rebels who had previously sworn an oath to defend the Constitution from 
holding federal or state office—a paradigmatic political right—absent a two-thirds congressional 
amnesty. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 3. The impact was intentionally decapitating: “[T]he Amendment 
made virtually the entire political leadership of the South ineligible for office.” FONER, supra note 8, at 
259. 
 In many ways, the disqualification of ex-rebels by Section Three is an early example of “militant 
democracy.” As Professor Karl Loewenstein argued while fascist and communist governments gained 
power in Europe in the l930s, liberal democracies must sometimes take steps to protect themselves from 
antidemocratic forces that participate in the political process. See Karl Loewenstein, Militant Democracy 
and Fundamental Rights, I, 31 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 417, 422–23 (1937); Karl Loewenstein, Militant 
Democracy and Fundamental Rights, II, 31 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 638, 656–58 (1937); see also Gregory H. 
Fox & Georg Nolte, Intolerant Democracies, 36 HARV. INT’L L.J. 1, 59 (1995) (arguing that a democracy 
“may defend itself against anti-democratic actors”); Samuel Issacharoff, Fragile Democracies, 
120 HARV. L. REV. 1405, 1467 (2007) (“Virtually all democratic societies define some extremist elements 
as beyond the bounds of democratic tolerance.”). Indeed, the United States would use similar tactics in 
its de-Nazification and de-Baathification campaigns in Germany and Iraq. See, e.g., FREDERICK TAYLOR, 
EXORCISING HITLER: THE OCCUPATION AND DENAZIFICATION OF GERMANY 253–54 (2011); Shane 
Harris, The Re-Baathification of Iraq, FOREIGN POL’Y (Aug. 21, 2014, 11:51 PM), 
https://foreignpolicy.com/2014/08/21/the-re-baathification-of-iraq/ [https://perma.cc/X7JJ-BBTM]. 
 261 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5 (emphasis added). 
 262 Id. amend. XIII, § 2; id. amend. XV, § 2. 
 263 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). 
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McCulloch’s broad conception of congressional authority.264 The 
Reconstruction Framers’ borrowing of the McCulloch standard may be the 
most significant example of the old adage that “if a word is obviously 
transplanted from another legal source . . . it brings the old soil with it.”265 
In addition to the acknowledged legal significance of the word 
“appropriate,” the Reconstruction Framers’ selection of the term “enforce” 
signals a broad delegation of power to Congress. “To ‘enforce’ a provision 
meant the same thing in 1868 as it does today: to ensure compliance with the 
provision and make it effective.”266 Enforcement entails both a remedy for 
prior bad acts and a prophylaxis for preventing and deterring future 
unconstitutional conduct.267 
The Reconstruction Framers’ choice of words reveals Section Five’s 
underlying purpose: to empower Congress vis-à-vis the states and the 
Supreme Court. In passing the Fourteenth Amendment, the Reconstruction 
Framers sought to upend the Founding’s federalism balance. The 
Reconstruction Framers were concerned that the ex-Confederate States were 
trampling on the rights of the newly freed slaves by enacting the notorious 
Black Codes.268 Under antebellum jurisprudence, states were not bound by 
the Bill of Rights.269 By granting citizenship to newly freed slaves and 
protecting their civil rights, the Fourteenth Amendment imposed substantial 
 
 264 See, e.g., Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 650 (1966) (“By including § 5 the draftsmen 
sought to grant to Congress, by a specific provision applicable to the Fourteenth Amendment, the same 
broad powers expressed in the Necessary and Proper Clause. The classic formulation of the reach of those 
powers was established by Chief Justice Marshall in McCulloch v. Maryland . . . .” (footnote omitted)); 
AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION, supra note 16, at 362 (“McCulloch was read in the nineteenth century 
as providing a generous understanding of congressional power.”); Balkin, supra note 135, at 1810 (“The 
framers of the Reconstruction Amendments assumed that the McCulloch test would apply to Congress’s 
new Reconstruction Powers, and the use of the term ‘appropriate’ in the text of all three enforcement 
clauses reflects this assumption.”); McConnell, Institutions, supra note 148, at 188 (noting that the term 
“appropriate” “has its origins in the latitudinarian construction of congressional power in McCulloch”); 
Engel, supra note 201, at 118 (“In drafting Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Republicans 
borrowed explicitly from McCulloch in granting Congress the power to enforce the provisions of the 
amendment by appropriate legislation.”). 
 265 Felix Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 527, 537 
(1947). 
 266 Balkin, supra note 135, at 1815. 
 267 See Akhil Reed Amar, Intratextualism, 112 HARV. L. REV. 747, 823 (1999) (arguing that the 
Reconstruction Congress believed that its enforcement authority went beyond “mere remedial 
legislation”); Balkin, supra note 135, at 1815 (defining enforcement to mean that Congress can “remedy 
past violations and prevent future ones”). 
 268 See supra Section II.B. 
 269 Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 249–51 (1833). 
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new obligations on the states.270 And Section Five ensured that these 
obligations would not only be imposed by the Constitution but also enforced 
by federal statutes. 
The Reconstruction Framers were also deeply skeptical of the Supreme 
Court, which had accelerated the nation’s descent into civil war with its 
decision in Dred Scott v. Sanford. Section Five responded to the legitimate 
and prevailing “fear that the judiciary would frustrate Reconstruction by a 
narrow interpretation of congressional power.”271 Given this, Section Five 
embodies the Reconstruction Framers’ desire to give Congress—not the 
Supreme Court—primary authority in enforcing the Fourteenth 
Amendment.272 
III. THE PATH TO THE FIFTEENTH AMENDMENT 
In this Part, I chart the advancement of black suffrage at the state level 
and through congressional action, culminating in the Fifteenth Amendment. 
In the early years of Reconstruction, black suffrage expanded from New 
England to the District of Columbia, the federal territories, the Reconstructed 
South, and parts of the Midwest. As with the abolition of slavery and the 
protection of civil rights,273 progress on black suffrage was incremental. It 
was not until after the 1868 election that nationwide black suffrage became 
a realistic possibility. Although moderate Republicans ultimately agreed 
with their Radical colleagues that Blacks should be enfranchised nationwide, 
the Republican Party was split as to the best means of achieving that goal. 
This Part concludes by excavating the Article V debate and the 
Reconstruction Framers’ reasons for rejecting a black suffrage statute and 
opting only for a constitutional amendment. Because the Article V debate 
was the first sustained post-ratification discussion of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, this history sheds new light on the original understanding of 
both the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. 
 
 270 See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 524 (1997) (“As enacted, the Fourteenth Amendment 
confers substantive rights against the States which . . . are self-executing.”). 
 271 McConnell, Institutions, supra note 148, at 182. Congress’s concern about the Court also proved 
prescient. See Balkin, supra note 135, at 1850 & n.186 (discussing Reconstruction-era legislation 
invalidated or narrowed by the Supreme Court). 
 272 See Balkin, supra note 135, at 1805 (“Congress gave itself these powers because it believed it 
could not trust the Supreme Court to protect the rights of the freedmen . . . .” (emphasis added)). 
 273 See supra Section II.B. 
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A. Limited Progress at the Northern Polls 
At the end of the Civil War, only five New England states—Maine, 
Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, and Vermont—enfranchised 
black voters.274 New York technically permitted Blacks to vote, but it 
imposed racially discriminatory property and residency qualifications that 
left virtually all Blacks disenfranchised.275 Around that time, “blacks 
comprised less than 2 percent of the North’s population,”276 but in Border 
States like Maryland and Delaware, they were approximately one-fifth of the 
population.277 Thus, the potential political power of Blacks varied across the 
Northern and Border States. 
Republican attempts to enfranchise Blacks in statewide referenda met 
with limited success in the North and Midwest. First held in 1865, black 
suffrage referenda were defeated by substantial majorities in five 
jurisdictions: Colorado, Connecticut, Wisconsin, Minnesota, and 
Washington, D.C.278 In 1866, Nebraska voters rejected black suffrage.279 And 
in 1867, black suffrage referenda met the same fate in Ohio, Kansas, and 
Minnesota.280 It was not until 1868 that the Radical Republican 
enfranchisement agenda won at the polls, when Iowa and Minnesota 
endorsed black suffrage.281 That same year, however, Missouri voters 
rejected black suffrage in a referendum.282 
Racism toward Blacks, therefore, remained a pervasive feature of 
Northern politics. Indeed, “[b]y the end of 1868, . . . no northern state with a 
relatively large Negro population had voluntarily accepted full Negro 
suffrage.”283 Minnesota’s experience underscores the persistence of Northern 
racism: in 1870, the state had a miniscule black population—759 out of 
 
 274 See AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION, supra note 16, at 393, 610 n.88. 
 275 See id.; CHRISTOPHER MALONE, BETWEEN FREEDOM AND BONDAGE: RACE, PARTY, AND 
VOTING RIGHTS IN THE ANTEBELLUM NORTH 54–55 (2008). 
 276 FONER, supra note 8, at 25. 
 277 See GILLETTE, supra note 11, at 82 tbl.1. 
 278 See id. at 25–26; see also infra note 294 and accompanying text (discussing Washington, D.C. 
suffrage legislation passed in 1867). 
 279 GILLETTE, supra note 11, at 26. 
 280 Id. 
 281 Id. 
 282 Id. In addition, Michigan voters rejected a new state constitution that would have enfranchised 
Blacks. Id. 
 283 Id. at 27. In 1866, the Wisconsin Supreme Court issued a decision enfranchising Blacks under 
state law. See id.; see also Gillespie v. Palmer, 20 Wis. 544 (1866). 
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446,056 people—but only adopted black suffrage in its third referendum.284 
One explanation for this reluctance is the bigoted fear among Northern voters 
that enfranchising Blacks would “induce a massive influx of new blacks into 
the state.”285 This collective action problem militated in favor of a nationwide 
solution to Northern racism. 
B. Expanding Black Suffrage Through Federal Legislation 
Before the 1866 midterm election, the push for black suffrage in 
Congress was met with no success. In 1865, a bill to enfranchise Blacks in 
Washington, D.C. passed the House but languished in the Senate.286 A similar 
bill to enfranchise Blacks in the territories failed in early 1866.287 The 
situation, however, changed dramatically after the 1866 election. 
Running on a platform to ratify the Fourteenth Amendment,288 
Republicans won the 1866 election in a landslide.289 The resounding victory 
“strengthened the position of the radical wing of the party,”290 and the 
Fourteenth Amendment was ratified in July 1868.291 But in the interim, the 
lame-duck Thirty-Ninth Congress pushed through several black suffrage 
laws in early 1867.292 However, subsequent efforts to expand black suffrage 
nationwide stalled in the first and second sessions of the Fortieth Congress. 
1. Victories in the Thirty-Ninth Congress 
Energized by their recent electoral success, the Radicals in the lame-
duck Thirty-Ninth Congress first turned to federal domains, where 
 
 284 FRANCIS A. WALKER, A COMPENDIUM OF THE NINTH CENSUS (JUNE 1, 1870): COMPILED 
PURSUANT TO A CONCURRENT RESOLUTION OF CONGRESS, AND UNDER THE DIRECTION OF THE 
SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR 20 (1872). 
 285 AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION, supra note 16, at 399; see also ALEXANDER KEYSSAR, THE 
RIGHT TO VOTE: THE CONTESTED HISTORY OF DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES 89 (2000) 
(attributing the referenda defeats to the deeply rooted Northern fear of black migration).  
 286 FONER, supra note 8, at 240. Around the same time, a Washington, D.C. suffrage referendum lost 
by a margin of 35 to 6951. Id. 
 287 See GILLETTE, supra note 11, at 30. 
 288 See, e.g., Balkin, supra note 135, at 1847. 
 289 See, e.g., ACKERMAN, TRANSFORMATIONS, supra note 249, at 178–82. 
 290 MALTZ, supra note 12, at 123. 
 291 See ACKERMAN, TRANSFORMATIONS, supra note 249, at 211; see also id. at 182 (noting that 
Republicans controlled every state legislature in the North after the 1866 election). 
 292 Prior to the ratification of the Twentieth Amendment, presidents and Congresses ended their 
terms in March, as opposed to January. See U.S. CONST. amend. XX, § 1; BRUCE ACKERMAN, THE 
FAILURE OF THE FOUNDING FATHERS: JEFFERSON, MARSHALL, AND THE RISE OF PRESIDENTIAL 
DEMOCRACY 116–19 (2005). 
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Congress’s power was at its zenith.293 In January 1867, Congress overcame 
President Johnson’s veto and mandated black suffrage in Washington, 
D.C.294 That same month, Congress also enfranchised Blacks in the 
territories.295 In addition, Congress overrode President Johnson’s veto when 
it required Nebraska to abolish its racially discriminatory suffrage 
requirements as a condition of statehood.296 This tactic was the first of the 
so-called “fundamental conditions” that Congress would impose related to 
black suffrage and the admission—and readmission—of states to the 
Union.297 The constitutionality of these fundamental conditions, however, 
was controversial, including within the Republican Party.298 
Congress then turned its attention to the South.299 The First 
Reconstruction Act of 1867 imposed black suffrage on the ex-Confederate 
States, with the exception of Tennessee.300 Congress also compelled the 
Southern States to ratify the Fourteenth Amendment as a fundamental 
 
 293 Congress may “exercise exclusive Legislation in all Cases whatsoever” in the “Seat of the 
Government of the United States.” U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 17. And under the Territory Clause, Congress 
has the “Power to . . . make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territor[ies] . . . [of] the 
United States.” Id. art. IV, § 3. 
 294 See An Act to Regulate the Elective Franchise in the District of Columbia, ch. 6, 14 Stat. 375 
(1867); Wang, supra note 248, at 2200. 
 295 See An Act to Regulate the Elective Franchise in the Territories of the United States, ch. 15, 
14 Stat. 379 (1867). Compliance with this statute varied depending on which party controlled the 
territorial government. Republican-controlled Colorado and Dakota allowed Blacks to vote, but 
Democratic-controlled Washington continued to discriminate based on race. See GILLETTE, supra note 
11, at 30 n.13. 
 296 See An Act for the Admission of the State of Nebraska into the Union, ch. 36, § 3, 14 Stat. 391, 
392 (1867); Wang, supra note 248, at 2204–05 (discussing veto override). A companion bill would have 
imposed the same condition on the Colorado territory, but the Senate failed to overcome President 
Johnson’s veto. See id. at 2205. 
 297 See MALTZ, supra note 12, at 127 (discussing Nebraska); id. at 140 (noting the use of 
“fundamental conditions” on the readmission of seven ex-Confederate States in 1868). 
 298 For example, Senator Jacob Howard—who introduced the Fourteenth Amendment in the 
Senate—“was also one of the most persistent critics of the idea that Congress could set suffrage-related 
conditions for admission to statehood that would bind erstwhile territories after the admission process 
was completed.” Id. at 127; see also Colby, supra note 153, at 1162–64 (discussing doubts about the 
validity of these fundamental conditions to statehood and their role in the passage of the Fifteenth 
Amendment). 
 299 For a discussion of Congress’s motives in passing the Reconstruction Acts, see Gabriel J. Chin, 
The “Voting Rights Act of 1867”: The Constitutionality of Federal Regulation of Suffrage During 
Reconstruction, 82 N.C. L. REV. 1581, 1589–90 (2004). 
 300 See First Reconstruction Act, ch. 153, § 5, 14 Stat. 428, 429 (1867). Tennessee enacted legislation 
enfranchising Blacks in February 1867 after its readmission to the Union. See W.E. BURGHARDT DUBOIS, 
BLACK RECONSTRUCTION IN AMERICA: AN ESSAY TOWARD A HISTORY OF THE PART WHICH BLACK 
FOLK PLAYED IN THE ATTEMPT TO RECONSTRUCT DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA, 1860–1880, at 575 (2d ed. 
1962). 
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condition for readmission.301 The Republicans’ logic was straightforward: 
enfranchising Blacks would provide a new voter base to govern and 
transform the South.302 Reforming the South would prove difficult, and 
Congress needed help getting the Fourteenth Amendment ratified.303 
In passing these black suffrage statutes, the Thirty-Ninth Congress 
differentiated between its sources of authority. Congress relied on the 
District of Columbia’s and the territories’ status as federal domains to justify 
its first extension of suffrage.304 And when acting in the former Confederacy, 
the Radicals invoked the Guarantee Clause305—the “sleeping giant in the 
Constitution”306—as their font of authority on the grounds that those states’ 
substantial black populations mandated black suffrage.307 Congress, 
however, declined to apply its Guarantee Clause authority to the loyal states, 
all of which had smaller black populations.308 The Thirty-Ninth Congress 
adhered to this limiting principle as it extended suffrage in 1867, setting a 
precedent that would remain relevant in the Fortieth Congress even after the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s ratification. 
2. The First and Second Sessions of the Fortieth Congress 
When the Fortieth Congress convened in March 1867, Republicans 
outnumbered Democrats three-to-one in the House and were well above the 
two-thirds veto threshold in the Senate.309 The Fortieth Congress would 
eventually pass the Fifteenth Amendment during its lame-duck session in 
February 1869. But before that—and even prior to the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s ratification in July 1868—there were repeated calls by 
 
 301 See First Reconstruction Act § 5; see also FONER, supra note 8, at 276 (“A precedent existed for 
requiring a state to ratify an amendment to gain representation in Congress, for Johnson had done 
precisely the same thing with regard to the Thirteenth.”); supra notes 296–298 and accompanying text. 
 302 See Vikram David Amar & Alan Brownstein, The Hybrid Nature of Political Rights, 50 STAN. L. 
REV. 915, 919 (1998). 
 303 See ACKERMAN, TRANSFORMATIONS, supra note 249, at 196–98. 
 304 See Wang, supra note 248, at 2201–02; see also supra notes 293–295 and accompanying text 
(discussing Congress’s power in federal domains). 
 305 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4. The Guarantee Clause is also referred to as the Republican Form of 
Government Clause. 
 306 CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 1st Sess. 614 (1867) (statement of Sen. Sumner). 
 307 See Akhil Reed Amar, The Central Meaning of Republican Government: Popular Sovereignty, 
Majority Rule, and the Denominator Problem, 65 U. COLO. L. REV. 749, 780–81 (1994) [hereinafter 
Amar, Central Meaning]. 
 308 See AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION, supra note 16, at 373–76; Amar, Central Meaning, supra 
note 307, at 780–81. 
 309 See ACKERMAN, TRANSFORMATIONS, supra note 249, at 182 (House); FONER, supra note 8, at 
267 (Senate). 
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Radical Republicans to pass a nationwide black suffrage statute.310 None of 
these attempts were met with any success, nor was the debate on these 
proposals as sophisticated or lengthy as the Article V debate in the lame-
duck Fortieth Congress.311 
In March 1867, Senator Henry Wilson (R-MA) introduced a bill that, 
upon the Fourteenth Amendment’s ratification, would have prohibited the 
“denial of the elective franchise to any male citizen of the United States by 
any State on account of color or race or previous condition.”312 Senator 
Sumner was another vocal advocate for nationwide black suffrage both in 
and out of Congress.313 Sumner also introduced a nationwide black suffrage 
bill in March 1867, though his proposal relied on Congress’s authority under 
the Guarantee Clause, the Thirteenth Amendment, and the not-yet-ratified 
Fourteenth Amendment.314 Sumner waited until July 1867 to attempt to bring 
his bill to the floor, but he lost a procedural vote 12–22, with fifteen 
Republicans joining the Democrats in defeating the motion.315 That same 
month, Representative John Broomall (R-PA) also introduced a nationwide 
black suffrage bill premised solely on the Guarantee Clause.316 Broomall 
later gave a speech in March 1868 expounding on the Radicals’ theory 
concerning that clause,317 but the bill never came to a vote.318 
C. Embracing Nationwide Black Suffrage 
Several factors coalesced in 1869 to convince the Reconstruction 
Framers to support nationwide black suffrage. These factors can be grouped 
into three broad categories: ideological, partisan, and pragmatic.319 
On the ideological front, Radicals had long advocated for black 
suffrage, viewing the right to vote “as a triumphant conclusion to four 
 
 310 See MALTZ, supra note 12, at 131–36. 
 311 See infra Section III.D. 
 312 S. 111, 40th Cong. (1867); see also CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 1st Sess. 292 (1867) (statement 
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 317 See CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2d Sess. 1955–60 (1868) (statement of Rep. Broomall). 
 318 MALTZ, supra note 12, at 136. 
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supra note 302, at 955 & n.104, but this Article need not pick sides in that debate. 
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decades of agitation on behalf of the slave.”320 After all, numerous 
Radicals—including Boutwell and Sumner—had tried to extend the 
franchise to Blacks during the Fourteenth Amendment’s drafting process.321 
Radical Republican ideology, therefore, was a powerful influence in the push 
for nationwide black suffrage. 
The role of black soldiers in fighting the Civil War was also a major 
motivating factor. Black soldiers accounted for 10% of the Union army,322 
and their bravery and sacrifice eventually convinced many moderate 
Republicans to support their right to vote.323 In a related vein, the safety of 
southern black voters was another significant concern. Throughout 
Reconstruction, terrorism against black voters was rampant and severe, 
particularly during the 1868 election.324 And this violence occurred despite 
the Union Army’s role in registering voters and overseeing elections.325 The 
army, moreover, was a temporary solution; it was politically impossible for 
it to remain in the South for a generation—or more—to advance racial 
equality. As the means to securing political power, black suffrage was seen 
as the best non-military means of achieving racial equality and preventing 
violence in the South.326 
Turning to partisan self-interest, the 1868 election results provided a 
strong impetus for enfranchising Blacks in the Northern and Border States. 
Although President Grant decisively defeated Democratic candidate Horatio 
Seymour in the Electoral College,327 his popular-vote victory was slim: only 
300,000 out of 5.7 million votes.328 This narrow margin proved particularly 
worrisome for future Republican success: “Since more than a half-million 
black Americans voted under the terms of the Reconstruction Acts, this 
meant that most whites voted for Democrats Horatio Seymour and Frank 
 
 320 FONER, supra note 8, at 448. 
 321 See supra Section II.C. 
 322 See MICHAEL WALDMAN, THE FIGHT TO VOTE 61 (2016). 
 323 See Amar & Brownstein, supra note 302, at 933 & n.50. 
 324 See RON CHERNOW, GRANT 623 (2017) (discussing violence in Georgia and Louisiana); Grant, 
Reconstruction and the KKK, PBS: AM. EXPERIENCE, https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/ 
americanexperience/features/grant-kkk/ [https://perma.cc/SR5M-6CHF] (“In Arkansas, over 2,000 
murders were committed in connection with the election. In Georgia, the number of threats and beatings 
was even higher. And in Louisiana, 1000 blacks were killed as the election neared. In those three states, 
Democrats won decisive victories at the polls.”). 
 325 See ACKERMAN, TRANSFORMATIONS, supra note 249, at 202. 
 326 See RICHARD M. VALELLY, THE TWO RECONSTRUCTIONS: THE STRUGGLE FOR BLACK 
ENFRANCHISEMENT 32 (2004). 
 327 See CHERNOW, supra note 324, at 623 (noting that Grant won “all but eight states and trounced 
Seymour in an electoral landslide of 214 to 80”). 
 328 See Wang, supra note 248, at 2214–15. 
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Blair.”329 The results in Congress were also concerning: Republicans lost 
eleven seats in the House but gained two Senators.330 
Radical Republicans recognized that unlocking the black vote 
nationwide could swing future elections.331 Indeed, the black electorate voted 
almost uniformly for the Republican Party and helped Grant win every 
readmitted, ex-Confederate State except “Georgia and Louisiana, where 
Klan violence was rife.”332 During the Article V debate, Boutwell estimated 
that 150,000 Blacks would be enfranchised by a nationwide suffrage 
statute.333 Republicans believed that enfranchisement of Blacks in the Border 
States in particular would provide a new voter base and potentially forestall 
the gains made by the Democrats in the 1868 election.334 
In the South, the goal was entrenching the tremendous impact of the 
First Reconstruction Act of 1867. In December 1866, only 0.5% of the 
nation’s black male population could vote. A year later, 80.5% of black 
males were eligible to vote.335 With the assistance of the Union army, black 
voter registration in 1867 was over 85% in nine of the eleven ex-Confederate 
States and over 95% in Alabama, Louisiana, Texas, and Virginia.336 Black 
turnout was also exceptionally high in several Southern States 
notwithstanding violence aimed at suppressing the vote.337 
Because Blacks represented majorities or sizable minorities in the 
South, they quickly became a formidable electorate. Three Southern States 
had black majorities: Louisiana, Mississippi, and South Carolina. Blacks 
were just shy of a majority in three others—Alabama, Florida, and 
Georgia—and about 40% of the population in North Carolina and Virginia. 
And Blacks were approximately one-quarter of the population in Arkansas, 
Tennessee, and Texas.338 Across the South as a whole, black registration 
outpaced white registration.339 Given these demographic realities, the 
 
 329 ACKERMAN, TRANSFORMATIONS, supra note 249, at 236. 
 330 See Wang, supra note 248, at 2214. 
 331 See id. at 2215. 
 332 CHERNOW, supra note 324, at 623; see also Amar & Brownstein, supra note 302, at 943–46. 
 333 See CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 3d Sess. 561 (1869) (statement of Rep. Boutwell). 
 334 See id. (providing specific numbers of black voters in Border States); Amar & Brownstein, supra 
note 302, at 943–46. 
 335 VALELLY, supra note 326, at 24. 
 336 Id. at 33 & tbl.2.1. 
 337 See CHERNOW, supra note 324, at 601 (noting that in 1867, black turnout was 70% in Georgia 
and nearly 90% in Virginia and that black voters outnumbered white voters in Alabama). 
 338 See FONER, supra note 8, at 294. 
 339 See, e.g., Wang, supra note 248, at 2213 (estimating a black-to-white registration gap of 735,000 
to 635,000). 
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Southern black voting bloc elected just over 250 black legislators in 1868,340 
and Blacks held statewide offices in Florida, Louisiana, and South 
Carolina.341 Republicans thus viewed Southern Blacks as a “loyal 
counterweight to the potential political power of the rebellious whites.”342 
Notwithstanding the impact of the First Reconstruction Act, Congress 
did not “trust the existing [or] future legislatures of Southern States.”343 
Indeed, as the price of readmission to the Union, Congress had imposed the 
fundamental condition that the constitutions of the Southern States not be 
amended to deny Blacks the right to vote.344 But as Congress’s constitutional 
power over the Southern States waned, Republicans worried—and 
Democrats asserted—that these fundamental conditions violated the equality 
of the states and would become practically and constitutionally 
unenforceable.345 
Moreover, the Republican Party’s double standard on the suffrage issue 
appeared “ideologically inconsistent, politically expedient, and 
constitutionally awkward.”346 The 1868 Republican Convention produced a 
party platform that compromised on the issue of black suffrage.347 Although 
the platform praised the new Southern constitutions for “securing equal civil 
and political rights,”348 the convention declined to extend both bundles of 
rights to Northern Blacks. Drafted behind closed doors, the compromise 
provision read: “The guaranty by Congress of equal suffrage to all loyal men 
at the South was demanded by every consideration of public safety, of 
gratitude, and of justice, and must be maintained; while the question of 
 
 340 KOUSSER, supra note 76, at 19 fig.1.1. 
 341 FONER, supra note 8, at 353 & tbl. 
 342 MALTZ, supra note 12, at 132. 
 343 JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 33 (1980). 
 344 See, e.g., MATHEWS, supra note 224, at 18. 
 345 See id.; Colby, supra note 153, at 1162–64; see also infra note 347 and accompanying text 
(discussing the Democratic Party platform). 
 346 Wang, supra note 248, at 2214. 
 347 Unsurprisingly, the 1868 Democratic Party platform rejected black suffrage. The Democratic 
platform demanded “the regulation of the elective franchise in the States, by their citizens.” Gerhard 
Peters & John T. Woolley, 1868 Democratic Party Platform, AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT (July 4, 1868), 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=29579 [https://perma.cc/83MB-U4RK]. 
Foreshadowing the Article V debate over the Fifteenth Amendment, the Democratic platform declared 
that “any attempt by congress, on any pretext whatever, to deprive any State of this right, or to interfere 
with its exercise, is a flagrant usurpation of power, which can find no warrant in the Constitution.” Id. 
The Democratic platform also called for an end to Reconstruction. See id. 
 348 Gerhard Peters & John T. Woolley, Republican Party Platform of 1868, AM. PRESIDENCY 
PROJECT (May 20, 1868) (emphasis added), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=29622 
[https://perma.cc/XW3D-CNAT]. 
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suffrage in all the loyal States properly belongs to the people of those 
States.”349 
Some Radicals—such as Thaddeus Stevens—were angered by the 
Northern concession.350 But the platform’s double standard mirrored the 
Guarantee Clause argument employed throughout Reconstruction: the ex-
Confederate States with their large black populations must guarantee 
suffrage whereas the Northern States would be left to their own devices.351 
For their part, Democrats argued that disenfranchising Blacks in the 
Northern and Border States while simultaneously requiring black suffrage in 
the ex-Confederate States was evidence that the Republicans did not 
genuinely care about Blacks’ rights but rather sought to exploit their loyalty 
to the party for political gain.352 By enfranchising Blacks in the Northern and 
Border States, Republicans could finally harmonize their position and defuse 
this Democratic talking point. Some moderate Republicans even viewed 
nationwide black suffrage as the best means of putting the debate over 
Reconstruction to rest and turning the Party’s attention to economic issues.353 
Turning to pragmatic reasons for moderate Republican support for 
nationwide black suffrage, Congress’s failure to enforce Section Two was a 
key factor. Ironically, by 1869, the states at risk of losing seats due to Section 
Two were in the North.354 If the Republican Congress sought to enforce the 
Apportionment Clause, consistency demanded that the Border States face the 
same fate as any other state. In fact, some Border States were 
disenfranchising approximately one-fifth of their populations.355 Even if 
Republicans had decided to risk being labeled hypocrites and selectively 
strip states of House seats, members of Congress from the Border States may 
 
 349 Id.; see also GILLETTE, supra note 11, at 37 (discussing the drafting process). 
 350 See GILLETTE, supra note 11, at 38; see also MALTZ, supra note 12, at 138 (describing the party 
platform as “deliberately evad[ing] th[e] key issue” of black suffrage in the North). 
 351 See supra notes 305–308 and accompanying text (discussing the Guarantee Clause). 
 352 See MALTZ, supra note 12, at 132. 
 353 See MICHAEL LES BENEDICT, Reform Republicans and the Retreat from Reconstruction, in 
PRESERVING THE CONSTITUTION: ESSAYS ON POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION IN THE 
RECONSTRUCTION ERA 168, 182 (2006). 
 354 Cf. AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION, supra note 16, at 397 (noting that Blacks could vote in 
the former Confederacy but not in many Northern States). 
 355 The percentage of the black voters in Kentucky, Delaware, and Maryland was 16.8%, 18.2%, and 
22.5%, respectively. These states were well above the national average of 12.7%. GILLETTE, supra note 
11, at 82 tbl.1. 
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have hesitated to go along with the plan out of fear of setting a precedent that 
would one day be used against them.356 
Furthermore, Republicans recognized that many Northern Whites still 
harbored racist beliefs and feared that black suffrage would encourage 
Blacks to move to their states. Thus, some Republicans supported a 
nationwide solution that could eliminate the collective action problems 
facing the ad hoc statewide referenda.357 
Finally, when it met for a third session in January 1869, the lame-duck 
Fortieth Congress had only two months remaining in its term,358 and 
“seventeen Republican state legislatures were still in session in March, and 
these legislatures could act on [any] Amendment before elections.”359 By 
acting quickly, Republicans could maximize the constitutionally determined 
time before the next federal elections and delay any potential electoral 
backlash.360 Thus, the Radicals were in a “race against the constitutional 
clock”361 to enfranchise Blacks before the next election. 
D. The Article V Debate 
Contrary to what current doctrine would dictate, the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s ratification in July 1868 did not enfranchise any black voters 
at the time. When the lame-duck Fortieth Congress convened in January 
1869, the country was evenly divided: seventeen states permitted black 
suffrage whereas seventeen did not. Racially discriminatory laws remained 
on the books in the Border States, the Mid-Atlantic, parts of the Midwest, 
and the West.362 By contrast, black suffrage had expanded from New England 
to states in the Midwest and the former Confederacy.363 Black suffrage also 
 
 356 Section Two was also a half-measure: it applied only to the House and would not have impacted 
Senate representation even if senators were selected by a state legislature elected solely by white male 
voters. See U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 2. 
 357 See supra note 285 and accompanying text (discussing failed black suffrage referenda). 
 358 See supra note 292 and accompanying text. 
 359 GILLETTE, supra note 11, at 79. 
 360 See AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION, supra note 16, at 398. 
 361 ACKERMAN, TRANSFORMATIONS, supra note 249, at 235. Professor Ackerman uses this phrase 
to describe the Fourteenth Amendment, not the Fifteenth. Id. 
 362 To be specific, the following states had racially discriminatory suffrage laws: California, 
Connecticut, Delaware, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Maryland, Michigan, Missouri, Nevada, 
New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, and West Virginia. See supra Sections III.A–III.B.  
 363 The right to vote free of racial discrimination existed in the following states: Alabama, Arkansas, 
Florida, Georgia, Iowa, Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Nebraska, New Hampshire, North 
Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Rhode Island, Vermont, and Wisconsin. In addition, the ex-
Confederate States that had not been readmitted—Mississippi, Texas, and Virginia—had black suffrage. 
See supra Sections III.A–III.B. 
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existed in the District of Columbia and the federal territories.364 The map 
below depicts the status of black suffrage laws in January 1869. 
 
FIGURE 1: STATUS OF BLACK SUFFRAGE LAWS IN JANUARY 1869 
Note: Figure created with mapchart.net.  
But even this categorization of states obscures the precarious position 
of black suffrage. Of the former Confederate States, only Tennessee had 
voluntarily enfranchised Blacks.365 The remaining ten states had black 
suffrage imposed via the First Reconstruction Act.366 Mississippi, Texas, and 
Virginia remained under congressional supervision, as they had not yet been 
readmitted to the Union.367 But by January 1869, Arkansas, Louisiana, 
 
 364 At the time, the federal territories were Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, Montana, New Mexico, 
Oklahoma, Utah, Washington, Wyoming, and (the unified) Dakota. In 1869, Alaska had recently been 
purchased from Russia and was treated as a military district. See ERIC SANDBERG, ALASKA DEP’T OF 
LABOR & WORKFORCE DEV., A HISTORY OF ALASKA POPULATION SETTLEMENT 7–8 (2013), 
http://live.laborstats.alaska.gov/pop/estimates/pub/pophistory.pdf [https://perma.cc/993X-D3JT]. 
Hawaii was not annexed until 1898. Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495, 505 (2000) (“In 1898, President 
McKinley signed a Joint Resolution, sometimes called the Newlands Resolution, to annex the Hawaiian 
Islands as territory of the United States.”). 
 365 See DUBOIS, supra note 300, at 575. 
 366 First Reconstruction Act, ch. 153, § 6, 14 Stat. 428, 429 (1867). 
 367 See FONER, supra note 8, at 452. 
 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
1604 
Alabama, Georgia, Florida, South Carolina, and North Carolina had been 
readmitted to the Union.368 Although Congress had imposed pro-black-
suffrage fundamental conditions in those states’ constitutions,369 the legal 
validity and practical longevity of those provisions remained in doubt. And 
outside the South, Nebraska’s black suffrage law was also a fundamental 
condition,370 and Wisconsin’s black suffrage law was attributable to a judicial 
decision.371 
By 1869, the Republican Party supported the once-radical idea of 
nationwide black suffrage. The choice of means, however, was still 
undecided. It is often assumed that once the Southern States were readmitted 
to the Union, “Congress did not clearly possess alternative, constitutionally 
permissible means of mandating black suffrage by statute.”372 But many 
Radicals contested this point, and the issue was hotly debated during the 
lame-duck Fortieth Congress. In fact, the first nationwide black suffrage 
proposal considered by the lame-duck Fortieth Congress was a “double-
barreled approach,”373 favoring both a statute and an amendment. The 
principal debate occurred over a bill introduced in the House by 
Representative George Boutwell, while a speech by Senator Charles Sumner 
provoked a brief discussion of the issue in the Senate.374 The Fortieth 
Congress ultimately selected the Article V route, but the reasons for that 
choice uncover important evidence about the original meanings of the 
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. 
1. The House Debate 
The Article V debate in the House was led by Congressman George 
Boutwell of Massachusetts, a Radical who “had been an early backer of the 
Republican Party and a stout supporter of Reconstruction.”375 On January 11, 
 
 368 See MALTZ, supra note 12, at 140. 
 369 See id. (discussing how “universal suffrage became a fundamental condition for . . . readmission” 
to the Union). 
 370 See id. at 126–27. 
 371 Gillespie v. Palmer, 20 Wis. 544 (1866). 
 372 KLARMAN, supra note 225, at 29; see also MATHEWS, supra note 224, at 21 (“This condition of 
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Constitution . . . .”). 
 373 GILLETTE, supra note 11, at 51. 
 374 Id. 
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1869, Boutwell introduced both a suffrage bill and an amendment.376 
Boutwell’s proposed amendment was nearly identical to what would 
eventually become the Fifteenth Amendment.377 Boutwell’s bill, H.R. 1667, 
was intended “[t]o secure equal privileges and immunities to citizens of the 
United States, and to enforce the provisions of article fourteen of the 
amendments to the Constitution.”378 The first section of Boutwell’s bill 
provided: 
That no State shall abridge or deny the right of any citizen of the United States 
to vote for electors of President and Vice President of the United States, or for 
Representatives in Congress, or for members of the legislature of the State in 
which he may reside, by reason of race, color, or previous condition of slavery; 
and any provisions in the laws or constitution of any State inconsistent with this 
section are hereby declared to be null and void.379 
A few differences between the bill and the proposed amendment are 
noteworthy.380 First, the bill applied solely to the states, whereas the 
amendment prohibited racial discrimination in voting at both the state and 
federal level. Second, and relatedly, the bill protected the right to vote only 
in certain elections—namely, federal elections and state legislative races. 
Under Boutwell’s bill, Blacks could still be barred from voting for state 
executive branch officials, state judges, and local officials. The proposed 
 
 376 CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 3d Sess. 285 (1869) (statement of Rep. Boutwell). The bill was 
originally introduced as H.R. 1463, but the number was changed to H.R. 1667 on January 23, 1869. See 
id. at 285, 555. 
 377 The substantive provisions of Boutwell’s proposed amendment and the Fifteenth Amendment are 
largely coextensive. Compare id. at 286 (“The right of any citizen of the United States to vote shall not 
be denied or abridged by the United States or any State by reason of the race, color, or previous condition 
of slavery of any citizen or class of citizens of the United States.” (emphasis added)), with U.S. CONST. 
amend. XV, § 1 (“The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the 
United States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.”). The 
enforcement provisions of the proposed and final amendments are also substantially similar. Compare 
CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 3d Sess. 286 (1869) (statement of Rep. Boutwell) (“The Congress shall have 
power to enforce by proper legislation the provisions of this article.”), with U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 2 
(“The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.”). 
 378 H.R. 1667, 40th Cong. (1869); see also CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 3d Sess. 555 (1869) (statement 
of Speaker Colfax) (introducing the suffrage statute). 
 379 H.R. 1667, 40th Cong. (1869). Section 2 required voter registrars to comply with the bill’s 
substantive provision. Section 3 criminalized private interference with the right to vote on the basis of 
race, color, or previous condition of servitude. Section 4 enforced Section Three of the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s ban on office-holding for ex-Confederates. Section 5 conferred exclusive jurisdiction on 
federal courts to hear claims arising under the statute. Id. 
 380 Given the similarities between Boutwell’s proposed amendment and the actual Fifteenth 
Amendment, the salient distinctions apply to both. 
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amendment, by contrast, was not limited to elections to specific offices.381 
Boutwell specifically addressed this point, stating that “there must be power 
in the national Government to provide whatever is necessary for its own 
preservation.”382 According to Boutwell, the federal government could 
regulate its own elections and also the elections of state legislatures given 
their role in selecting United States senators.383 
Debate over Boutwell’s bill would occur several days after its 
introduction. On January 23, 1869, Boutwell defended his statute–
amendment two-step and specifically addressed those “who are of opinion 
that the subject is not within the proper scope of legislative power, and that 
the only way to secure equality of suffrage . . . without distinction of race or 
color[] is by an amendment.”384 Boutwell’s argument hinged on four sources 
of congressional authority, each of which he viewed as independently 
sufficient.385 
First, as hinted at above, Boutwell argued that the federal government 
was authorized to regulate its own elections.386 He claimed that this “general 
principle[]” was supported by the “friends of the Constitution” during its 
ratification.387 Boutwell speculated that without such a power, the states 
could refuse to hold elections for the House or decline to choose senators or 
presidential electors.388 Congress, according to Boutwell, could step in to 
ensure that elections occurred with the electorate it so desired. 
Second, Boutwell looked to Article I. He argued that Section Two, 
Clause One—which requires that voters for the House of Representatives 
“shall have the Qualifications requisite for Electors of the most numerous 
Branch of the State Legislature”389—does not confer exclusive power over 
suffrage to the states. Rather, Boutwell read the clause as ambiguous about 
whether the states or the federal government could set suffrage 
 
 381 Cf. Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495, 523 (2000) (“The [Fifteenth] Amendment applies to ‘any 
election in which public issues are decided or public officials selected.’” (quoting Terry v. Adams, 
345 U.S. 461, 468 (1953))). 
 382 CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 3d Sess. 556 (1869) (statement of Rep. Boutwell). 
 383 See id. 
 384 Id. at 555. 
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 386 See id. at 556. 
 387 Id. 
 388 See id. 
 389 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 1. 
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qualifications.390 To resolve that ambiguity, Boutwell turned to the Elections 
Clause. Under that clause, states may prescribe the “Times, Places, and 
Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives” unless 
Congress “make[s] or alter[s] such Regulations.”391 Boutwell claimed that 
the federal government was authorized to regulate suffrage in the states 
because of the scope of the word “manner.”392 Citing a debate between James 
Madison and Patrick Henry, Boutwell relied on Henry’s expansive view of 
federal authority under the Elections Clause—a view that he claimed was not 
expressly denied by Madison.393 
Third, Boutwell invoked the Guarantee Clause—the Radicals’ favorite 
font of authority against the Reconstructed South.394 Boutwell stated that the 
purpose of the Guarantee Clause was to empower the federal government to 
prevent the establishment of an aristocracy in a state. Boutwell claimed that 
“[t]he essence of an aristocracy is in this, that the Government is in certain 
families made hereditary to the exclusion of others.”395 Under this definition, 
Boutwell argued that any state that disenfranchised any class of men was an 
aristocracy and specifically named Delaware, Kentucky, Maryland, Ohio, 
and Pennsylvania as examples of states that disenfranchised Blacks and 
therefore violated the Guarantee Clause.396 When pressed whether his theory 
would require the enfranchisement of women or universal suffrage, Boutwell 
dodged the question.397 
 
 390 See CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 3d Sess. 556 (1869) (statement of Rep. Boutwell) (“But there is 
no declaration in this section that either [the States or the federal government] has the power, and certainly 
not that either has the power to the exclusion of the other.”). 
 391 U.S. CONST. art I, § 4, cl. 1. 
 392 See CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 3d Sess. 556 (1869) (statement of Rep. Boutwell) (“[C]an 
anything be more clear than that the Congress of the United States has all the power which the States 
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everything relating to an election, from the qualifications of the elector to the deposit of his ballot in the 
box.”). 
 393 See id. at 556–57. Contrary to Boutwell’s argument, the Court has subsequently held that the 
power to “[p]rescrib[e] voting qualifications” falls outside the Elections Clause. Arizona v. Inter-Tribal 
Council of Ariz., Inc., 570 U.S. 1, 17 (2013). The Court has also held that Congress’s authority under the 
Elections Clause is not subject to the presumption against preemption. See id. at 13–14. 
 394 See supra notes 305–307 and accompanying text. But see Ryan C. Williams, The “Guarantee” 
Clause, 132 HARV. L. REV. 602, 610–11 (2018) (looking to eighteenth-century treaties to argue that the 
Guarantee Clause confers no authority on the federal government to intervene in state affairs). 
 395 CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 3d Sess. 557 (1869) (statement of Rep. Boutwell). 
 396 See id. at 558. 
 397 See id. at 557 (statement of Rep. Niblack (D-IN)) (asking about female suffrage); id. at 557–58 
(statement of Rep. Boutwell) (“I will listen most attentively to any argument . . . in favor of the right of 
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Finally, and most importantly for this Article, Boutwell relied on the 
recently ratified Fourteenth Amendment.398 Boutwell’s first textual hook was 
the Privileges or Immunities Clause, which he claimed encompassed the 
right to vote. In support of this assertion, he produced a Kentucky Supreme 
Court case about a Pennsylvania slave living in Kentucky when 
Pennsylvania abolished slavery. Boutwell read aloud a lengthy portion of the 
opinion, which mentioned once in dicta that “civil, political, and religious” 
rights were among the “rights and privileges” of citizenship.399 In addition, 
Boutwell emphasized that the enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment 
allowed Blacks to exercise some political rights, such as the right to hold 
office. Boutwell specifically cited the qualifications for President, arguing 
that the office could be held by a disenfranchised, thirty-five-year-old, 
native-born, black citizen.400 For Boutwell, this “anomaly” militated in favor 
of viewing suffrage as a privilege or immunity of citizenship.401 
Boutwell also relied on Section Two. He characterized the 
Apportionment Clause as a “political penalty for doing that which in the first 
section it is declared the State has no right to do.”402 Boutwell claimed that 
the Thirty-Ninth Congress was well aware that the Border States were 
disenfranchising Blacks and that the Fourteenth Amendment was intended 
to rectify that problem.403 Boutwell failed to explain, however, why he 
advocated nationwide black suffrage instead of Section Two’s explicit 
punishment of the loss of House seats.404 
Boutwell’s argument about the Fourteenth Amendment ultimately 
hinged on Section Five, which he characterized as a broad grant of authority. 
Congress could invoke Section Five to enforce Section One and expand upon 
 
 398 In contrast to current doctrine, which views the Equal Protection Clause as the principal source 
of voting rights protections in the Fourteenth Amendment, see supra Section I.A, Boutwell did not rely 
on the Equal Protection Clause for his argument. See Harrison, supra note 238, at 1440. 
 399 CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 3d Sess. 558–59 (1869) (statement of Rep. Boutwell). Although 
Boutwell did not provide a citation, the decision is Amy v. Smith, 11 Ky. (1 Litt.) 326, 332 (1822). The 
case did not involve the right to vote. Rather, it was an action for trespass, assault and battery, and false 
imprisonment, and the question presented concerned whether the plaintiff was a slave at the time of the 
torts. See id. at 327. 
 400 See CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 3d Sess. 559 (1869) (statement of Rep. Boutwell). 
 401 Id. 
 402 Id. 
 403 See id. (“We knew that Kentucky, Maryland, and Delaware were doing what they were inhibited 
from doing by the first section of the article, and we said that they should suffer in representation for so 
doing.”). 
 404 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2 (“But when the right to vote at any election . . . is denied to any of 
the male inhabitants of such State . . . the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion 
which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of male citizens twenty-one years 
of age in such State.”). 
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Section Two’s remedy: “Power was given to Congress to remedy this evil, 
and that power Congress is now called upon to exercise.”405 Boutwell 
rationalized Section Two as an interim penalty because “[i]t was uncertain 
when Congress would exercise the power conferred by the fifth section of 
the fourteenth amendment, and in order that the States should not take 
advantage of their own wrong during the period while Congress might be 
inactive a penalty [Section Two] was provided.”406 Put simply, Boutwell’s 
vision of congressional enforcement authority mirrored—and even 
surpassed—the McCulloch standard: 
[B]y the fifth section of the fourteenth article, Congress has power to enforce 
by appropriate legislation the provisions of the article. Does anybody doubt—
in the presence of this provision of the Constitution, in view of the unlimited 
power under the fourteenth article to legislate so as to secure to citizens of the 
United States the privileges and immunities of citizens of any one of the 
States—does anybody doubt our duty?407 
Boutwell concluded his speech by expressly defending his statute–
amendment two-step. Boutwell stated that the Fourteenth Amendment’s text 
did not prohibit the federal government from limiting the franchise along 
racial lines and that an amendment was therefore needed to prevent future 
federal abuses.408 And while maintaining that Congress possessed authority 
under Section Five to ban racial discrimination in voting in all state elections, 
he believed that the proposed Fifteenth Amendment would remove any doubt 
about this power and would go beyond the offices specified in his bill.409 
To be clear, Boutwell was distorting some of the facts. When asked 
about his own prior statements that the Fourteenth Amendment did not 
encompass political rights, Boutwell either dodged or lied: “I have no 
recollection of anything of that sort, though it may be that some persons did 
make such a concession . . . . [A]nd I cannot say but that some members on 
this side of the House may have disavowed that construction; but I was not 
 
 405 CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 3d Sess. 559 (1869) (statement of Rep. Boutwell). 
 406 Id. 
 407 Id. (emphasis added). 
 408 See id. at 560 (“Why, then, not submit a bill alone? Because there is no provision in the 
Constitution by which the United States is denied the power of abridging the right of citizens to vote.”). 
 409 See id. (“[A]lthough I am myself persuaded of the existence of the power, and that it covers all 
State officers, still a different argument may be made against the proposition to legislate in reference to 
State officers from that which can be made against the proposition contained in this bill.”); id. at 555 
(acknowledging that the bill did not cover all state and local offices but asserting that “the powers of 
Congress are probably broader than those set forth” in the bill). 
 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
1610 
one of them.”410 Notwithstanding this change of position, Boutwell was not 
alone. Several Radical Republicans spoke in favor of Boutwell’s bill.411 
The Democrats’ response to Boutwell’s bill was predictably negative. 
Even setting aside the universal Democratic opposition to black suffrage in 
general,412 Democrats cried foul over the suffrage statute in particular. 
Democrats repeatedly attacked Boutwell’s bill on the grounds that it was a 
blatant violation of the Republican Party’s platform.413 Representative James 
Beck (D-KY), for example, asserted that the platform was “intended to 
delude and deceive the people” and that Boutwell’s bill “cannot be supported 
by any man who did not publicly disavow the published principles of his 
party.”414 Democrats even tried to scuttle the bill by proposing a poison pill 
that would have added protections for “sex, nativity, or age when over twelve 
years.”415 
 
 410 Id. at 559. But see CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2508 (1866) (statement of Rep. Boutwell) 
(conceding that “[t]he proposition in the matter of suffrage falls short of what I desire, but so far as it goes 
it tends to the equalization of the inequality at present existing”); id. (“I demand and shall continue to 
demand the franchise for all loyal male citizens of this country . . . .”). 
 411 See CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 3d Sess. 692 (1869) (statement of Rep. Shanks (R-IN)) (“I will 
vote for the bill and proposed amendment of the gentleman from Massachusetts . . . .”); id. at 694 
(statement of Rep. McKee (R-KY)) (“Without a law to enforce that constitutional amendment it stands 
upon your statute-book to-day as a simple declaration.”); id. at 696 (“[W]hen this fourteenth amendment 
was adopted, which made all these people citizens, and declared that they should be entitled to all the 
rights and privileges of citizens, and declared that they should be entitled to all the rights and privileges 
of citizens, I had no longer any doubt as to the constitutional right of the Congress of the United States to 
declare that these men shall be voters in any and every State on the same footing with white men.”); id. 
at 721 (statement of Rep. Kelley) (“[T]he Constitution vests in Congress the right to regulate the 
suffrage . . . .”); id. at app. 94 (statement of Rep. Corley (R-SC)) (citing the Privileges or Immunities 
Clause and stating that a “citizen of the United States is the political equal of every other citizen, and 
cannot be constitutionally denied the right to the ballot in any State except for rebellion or crime”); id. at 
app. 102 (statement of Rep. Broomall (R-PA)) (“[T]he bill is intended to produce immediately the same 
result which it may require the amendment several years to accomplish . . . . I shall therefore support the 
bill . . . .”). 
 412 See GILLETTE, supra note 11, at 73 n.111, 75 (showing that no Democrats voted for the Fifteenth 
Amendment). 
 413 This criticism applied not only to the statute, but also the proposed amendment. See KLARMAN, 
supra note 225, at 29. 
 414 CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 3d Sess. 691 (1869) (statement of Rep. Beck (D-KY)); see also id. at 
645 (statement of Rep. Eldredge (D-WI)) (“How many States would the party have carried upon the 
measure now being urged?”); id. at 658 (statement of Rep. Kerr (D-IN)) (“[T]his bill is justly subject to 
the same charge of bad faith . . . .”); id. at 697 (statement of Rep. Burr (D-IL)) (criticizing the Boutwell 
bill as violating the 1868 platform). 
 415 Id. at 561 (statement of Rep. Brooks (D-NY)) (emphasis added). 
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Democrats also argued that Boutwell’s bill was unconstitutional.416 On 
January 27, 1869, Representatives Charles Eldredge (D-WI)417 and Michael 
Kerr (D-IN)418 gave lengthy speeches during which they offered detailed 
critiques of Boutwell’s bill’s constitutionality.419 In response to Boutwell’s 
assertion that the federal government had an inherent authority to impose 
suffrage qualifications in federal and certain state elections,420 Eldredge 
argued that the states’ authority over suffrage qualifications was “almost 
unquestioned ever since and before the adoption of the Constitution” and that 
any supposed federal authority on the subject was “long-conceded.”421 
Regarding Article I, Eldredge claimed that the Qualifications Clause 
unambiguously gave states exclusive authority to establish suffrage 
qualifications.422 Indeed, as Eldredge pointed out, Boutwell’s interpretation 
of the Qualifications Clause reversed the typical presumption that the federal 
government is one of enumerated powers and all other powers are reserved 
to the states.423 Regarding the Elections Clause, Eldredge produced his own 
lengthy list of Founding-era quotes and noted that Boutwell relied on 
Henry’s formulation of the clause even though Henry opposed the 
Constitution’s ratification.424 For his part, Kerr stated that the word “manner” 
in the Elections Clause gave Congress authority to decide whether to use 
 
 416 See id. at 687–92 (statement of Rep. Beck) (criticizing Boutwell’s bill); id. at 697 (statement of 
Rep. Burr) (stating that the Elections Clause gives Congress power over “the time and manner of electing 
members of Congress—nothing more”); id. at 699 (claiming that the Fourteenth Amendment’s supporters 
“held that the whole article affirmed the right of a State to act on suffrage, and that because they would 
not all act alike it was necessary to equalize representation”). 
 417 Eldredge was a member of the House Judiciary Committee. See id. at 555. The Congressional 
Globe misspelled Eldredge’s name as “Eldridge.” See Currie, supra note 203, at 453 & n.403. 
 418 Kerr would go on to become the first post-Civil War Democratic Speaker of the House in 1875. 
See List of Speakers of the House, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES: HISTORY, ART & ARCHIVES, 
https://history.house.gov/People/Office/Speakers-List/ [https://perma.cc/BLE6-B99J]. 
 419 See CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 3d Sess. 642–45 (1869) (statement of Rep. Eldredge); id. at 553–
62 (statement of Rep. Kerr). 
 420 See supra notes 389–393 and accompanying text. 
 421 CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 3d Sess. 642 (1869) (statement of Rep. Eldredge); see also id. 
(arguing that the federal government had “acquiesced” to the states setting suffrage qualifications). 
 422 See id. at 643 (“This right of the State to determine the qualification of the electors of the members 
of its Legislature is older than the Constitution . . . . There is nothing in the Constitution . . . granting the 
power to the Federal Government or prohibiting it to the State.”). 
 423 Eldredge made this point during Boutwell’s speech. See id. at 556 (asking Boutwell whether “the 
States possess no powers except those which are granted to them in and by the Constitution” and 
remarking that he “supposed the rule to be entirely the other way”). 
 424 See id. at 642–44 (statement of Rep. Eldredge). Boutwell interjected and effectively conceded 
this point. See id. at 644 (statement of Rep. Boutwell). 
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single-member districts or to require a secret ballot—but not over suffrage 
qualifications.425 
As to the Guarantee Clause, Eldredge claimed that Boutwell’s argument 
lacked any limiting principle. He explained that, when taken to its logical 
conclusion, there were “no republican States, because no[t] one of the States 
does allow all its citizens to exercise this privilege.”426 On this point, 
Eldredge remarked that the franchise was denied “to our citizens’ wives and 
daughters”427 without raising concerns under the Guarantee Clause. 
And most importantly for this Article, the Democrats argued that the 
Fourteenth Amendment did not protect political rights. Kerr explained why 
suffrage was not a privilege or immunity of citizenship under Section One. 
According to Kerr, “American citizenship does not depend upon or coexist 
with the legal capacity to hold office and the right of suffrage.”428 Kerr 
pointed out that women were denied the right to vote whereas several states 
had enfranchised aliens.429 In addition, Eldredge emphasized that the Thirty-
Ninth Congress’s Republican caucus interpreted the Fourteenth Amendment 
to exclude political rights.430 Eldredge further remarked that Section Two 
was conclusive proof that suffrage regulations remained a state 
prerogative.431 Eldredge also accused the Republicans of hypocrisy and 
changing their position for political gain.432 Neither Eldredge nor Kerr 
contested that McCulloch provided the governing standard under Section 
Five.433 This omission is telling because Eldredge and Kerr responded to 
every other argument marshalled by Boutwell. 
 
 425 See id. at 657 (statement of Rep. Kerr). 
 426 Id. at 644 (statement of Rep. Eldredge). 
 427 Id. 
 428 Id. at 654 (statement of Rep. Kerr). 
 429 See id. (discussing alien suffrage); id. at 658 (noting that women were disenfranchised and 
conceding that “[s]ex is no disqualification” for office). 
 430 See id. at 645 (statement of Rep. Eldredge) (“The power of the States to regulate and determine 
the qualification of voters was not questioned . . . and no gentleman can truthfully deny the fact.”); see 
also supra Section II.C. 
 431 See CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 3d Sess. 645 (1869) (statement of Rep. Eldredge) (“It was 
understood to be optional with the State to grant this right of suffrage to its negroes or have its 
representation in Congress proportionately diminished. Hon. Thaddeus Stevens, the late leader of the 
Republican party in this House, urged this view of the matter with peculiar emphasis.”). 
 432 See id. at 645 (arguing that the Republican Party platform “let the loyal States alone”); id. (“How 
many States would the party have carried upon the measure now being urged?”); id. (criticizing Boutwell 
for claiming that “this bill will add one hundred and fifty thousand voters to his party”). 
 433 In fact, Kerr appears to concede that McCulloch applies. See id. at 654 (statement of Rep. Kerr) 
(“The language of the fourteenth amendment seems to have been intended to give Congress the power to 
enforce [its] provisions.”); see also McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). Kerr, 
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As they were outnumbered three-to-one,434 Democrats could not stop 
Boutwell’s bill. Rather, moderate Republicans held the balance of power and 
blocked it. The Ohio House Republican delegation—led by future President 
James Garfield—declared its opposition to the suffrage statute on 
constitutional grounds and backed an amendment instead.435 President Grant 
voiced “doubt about the power of Congress to regulate suffrage by law, but 
said that there could be no sound objection to submitting a constitutional 
amendment to the people.”436 Republican newspapers also expressed concern 
that Boutwell’s bill was unconstitutional while endorsing the Fifteenth 
Amendment.437 Within Congress, Bingham reminded the chamber that he 
believed suffrage was outside the Fourteenth Amendment,438 and 
Representative Samuel Shellabarger (R-OH) contested Boutwell’s view of 
the Qualifications Clause and Guarantee Clause.439 And on the pragmatic 
front, even Radical Republicans worried about the prospect of Boutwell’s 
bill passing and the amendment failing, meaning that a future Congress could 
simply repeal nationwide black suffrage.440 
On January 28, 1869, Representative Boutwell announced that he 
“underst[oo]d there has been a general agreement that some amendment to 
the Constitution should be proposed.”441 Boutwell conceded defeat and asked 
that the amendment be voted on before the bill.442 The next day, after 
continued discussion of the statute by other representatives, Boutwell again 
recognized the political reality that “there is a very general agreement that it 
 
however, did not dwell on the question and turned his attention to his narrower interpretation of the 
Privileges or Immunities Clause. CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 3d Sess. 654 (1869). 
 434 See ACKERMAN, TRANSFORMATIONS, supra note 249, at 182. 
 435 See GILLETTE, supra note 11, at 51. Boutwell’s bill had been printed in full or discussed in-depth 
in newspapers around the country. See Congress, LOWELL DAILY CITIZEN & NEWS, Jan. 25, 1869; 
Impartial Suffrage, MILWAUKEE DAILY SENTINEL, Jan. 25, 1869; The Suffrage Question, DAILY 
CLEVELAND HERALD, Jan. 18, 1869; see also Reconstruction and Suffrage in the House, DAILY 
CLEVELAND HERALD, Jan. 25, 1869 (discussing Boutwell’s position). 
 436 Editorial, From Washington, LOWELL DAILY CITIZEN & NEWS, Feb. 3, 1869 (noting that the 
interview occurred with Boston’s Advertiser newspaper). Grant later endorsed the Fifteenth Amendment 
in his Inauguration Address. See CHERNOW, supra note 324, at 631–32. 
 437 See, e.g., The Suffrage Question in the House, MILWAUKEE DAILY SENTINEL, Jan. 26, 1869. 
 438 See CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 3d Sess. 727 (1869) (statement of Rep. Bingham) (describing his 
position on the Fourteenth Amendment and stating that a new amendment was needed to “establish 
impartial suffrage”); supra note 216 and accompanying text (discussing Bingham’s prior statements). 
 439 CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 3d Sess. 560 (1869) (statement of Rep. Shellabarger). 
 440 See GILLETTE, supra note 11, at 51–52 (“If the bill succeeded but the amendment failed, it was 
argued, then a mere bill could repeal what the Boutwell bill extended—namely, Negro suffrage.”). 
 441 CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 3d Sess. 686 (1869) (statement of Rep. Boutwell). 
 442 See id. 
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is desirable to submit an amendment.”443 After this announcement, the House 
turned its attention to passing nationwide black suffrage via an amendment. 
2. The Senate Debate 
Senator Charles Sumner, a prominent abolitionist advocate and 
martyr,444 had long argued that Congress had the authority to impose black 
suffrage on the states via statute.445 On December 7, 1868, Sumner 
introduced Senate Resolution 650, a bill “to enforce the several provisions 
of the Constitution abolishing slavery, declaring the immunities of citizens, 
and guarantying a republican form of government, by securing the elective 
franchise to citizens deprived of it by reason of race, color, or previous 
condition.”446 Sumner’s statute resembled Boutwell’s bill, though it was 
broader in scope. Its core provision provided that: 
[N]o citizen of the United States shall be deprived of the elective franchise by 
reason of race, color, or previous condition, but all citizens, without regard to 
race, color, or previous condition, shall have the right, if not otherwise 
disqualified, to be registered, and to vote at all elections for members of 
Congress, presidential electors, representatives, and senators to State or 
territorial legislatures, for all State, county, city, town, and other officers of 
every kind, upon equal terms and conditions, and every provision of any 
constitution, statute, and ordinance, and every custom in any State or Territory 
inconsistent herewith, are declared null and void.447 
Sumner’s statute was short-lived. It was indefinitely postponed on 
January 15, 1869—a few days before Boutwell’s bill met the same fate.448 
Compared to the House, there was not as lengthy a debate about whether 
Congress could and should adopt both a statute and an amendment.449 
 
 443 Id. at 725. 
 444 Sumner was an acclaimed orator and Congress’s “leading proponent” of black rights. DAVID 
DONALD, CHARLES SUMNER AND THE RIGHTS OF MAN 7–9 (1970). After giving an 1856 speech 
denouncing slavery, Sumner was brutally caned on the floor of the U.S. Senate by South Carolina 
Representative Preston Brooks. See id. at 7–8. 
 445 See supra Section III.C (discussing previous bills introduced by Sumner). 
 446 CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 3d Sess. 5 (1868) (statement of Sen. Sumner). 
 447 S. 650, 40th Cong. (1868). Like Boutwell’s bill, Sumner’s statute prohibited disenfranchisement 
based on race, color, or previous condition of servitude; imposed obligations on voter registrars; 
criminalized private interference with the right to vote; and created a cause of action to sue in federal 
court. See id. Sumner’s statute, however, applied to a broader set of state and local elections. See id.; 
supra Section III.D.1 (discussing Boutwell’s bill). 
 448 See CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 3d Sess. 378 (1869). 
 449 Boutwell introduced both a statute and an amendment and served as floor manager of both. See 
supra Section III.D.1. 
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Nevertheless, Sumner and other Radical Republicans voiced their belief that 
Congress could enact nationwide black suffrage via statute.450 
On February 5, 1869, a week after Boutwell’s bill died in the House, 
Sumner gave a speech endorsing federal power to regulate suffrage in the 
states. His arguments echoed Boutwell’s and addressed many of the same 
points.451 But Sumner’s vision of congressional power was arguably even 
broader than Boutwell’s, and his views on the Reconstruction Amendments 
merit attention. Sumner collapsed the political versus civil rights divide into 
the general concept of human rights.452 He declared that, under the 
Reconstruction Amendments, “anything for Human Rights is constitutional. 
Yes, sir; against the old rule, anything for slavery, I put the new rule, 
anything for Human Rights.”453 Sumner’s conception of congressional power 
was holistic, combining the Guarantee Clause and the Thirteenth and 
Fourteenth Amendments into a robust enforcement authority.454 
Sumner expressly compared his suffrage statute to the Civil Rights Act 
of 1866, which had been authorized under Congress’s Thirteenth 
Amendment enforcement authority and subsequently constitutionalized as 
Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment. Sumner extolled congressional 
power under the Thirteenth Amendment: “[a]lready Congress, in the exercise 
of this power, has passed a civil rights act. It only remains, that it should now 
pass a political rights act, which, like the former, shall help consummate the 
abolition of slavery.”455 In support of this interpretation, Sumner invoked “a 
familiar rule of interpretation, expounded by Chief Justice Marshall in his 
most masterly judgment,”456 which can only be a reference to McCulloch.457 
 
 450 Indeed, Sumner went so far as to argue that an amendment was unnecessary because Congress’s 
power under the Guarantee Clause, Thirteenth Amendment, and Fourteenth Amendment was “too clear 
[to] question” and because a suffrage statute would “never be repealed” and would “be as lasting as the 
National Constitution itself.” CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 3d Sess. 903 (1869) (statement of Sen. Sumner). 
Despite these assurances, Sumner questioned whether there were enough “States whose votes can be 
counted on to assure its ratification within any reasonable time.” Id. at 904. 
 451 Regarding the Qualifications Clause, Sumner asserted that “[c]olor cannot be a ‘qualification’” 
because it is “derived from nature,” whereas a qualification is attained. Id. at 902. In addition, Sumner 
invoked the Guarantee Clause as a source of authority. Sumner defined “[a] Republic [a]s where taxation 
and representation go hand in hand.” Id. at 903. Based on this definition, Sumner believed that denying 
suffrage based on race created a “Caste or Oligarchy” in violation of the Guarantee Clause. Id. 
 452 See id. at 902 (“[A] State transcends its proper function, when it interferes with those equal rights, 
whether civil or political, which . . . are under the safeguard of the nation.”); id. (“Whatever you enact for 
Human Rights is constitutional. There can be no State Rights against Human Rights.”). 
 453 Id. 
 454 See id. at 903. 
 455 Id. 
 456 Id. (emphasis added). 
 457 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). 
 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
1616 
According to Sumner, “The Civil Rights act came under the head of ‘means’ 
selected by Congress, and a Political Rights act will have the same 
authority.”458 Turning briefly to the Fourteenth Amendment’s text, Sumner 
claimed that suffrage was covered by the Privileges or Immunities Clause.459 
Given “the plenary powers of Congress to enforce the guarantee of a 
republican government, the abolition of slavery, and that final clause 
guarding the rights of citizens,” Sumner believed that his suffrage statute was 
constitutional.460 Sumner thus conceptualized Congress’s authority to 
enforce the Reconstruction Amendments as broader than the McCulloch 
standard. 
Sumner’s statute made a brief reappearance on February 9, 1869, when 
Sumner proposed that the Fifteenth Amendment’s language be replaced with 
the text of his original bill.461 Because Sumner’s statute included several 
specific provisions—including criminal punishments and a federal cause of 
action462—it was immediately pointed out that “the matter under 
consideration is an amendment to the Constitution, and this is a bill.”463 
Although some Radical Republicans shared Sumner’s interpretation of the 
Fourteenth Amendment,464 this support did not run deep. Sumner’s proposal 
was defeated 9–47.465 
3. The Fifteenth Amendment’s Drafting and Ratification 
Following the Article V debate, the Fortieth Congress passed the 
Fifteenth Amendment. Although other proposals were considered,466 the 
Reconstruction Framers eventually settled on language that was remarkably 
similar to Boutwell’s initial proposal.467 As ratified, the Fifteenth 
Amendment prohibits the denial or abridgment of the right to vote on the 
 
 458 CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 3d Sess. 903 (1869) (statement of Sen. Sumner). 
 459 See id. (“Colored persons are citizens . . . and no State can abridge their privileges and 
immunities.”). 
 460 Id. (emphasis added). 
 461 See id. at 1041. 
 462 See S. 650, 40th Cong. (1868). 
 463 CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 3d Sess. 1041 (1869) (statement of Sen. Morrill (R-VT)). 
 464 See id. at 982 (statement of Sen. Ross (R-KS)) (arguing that Congress had Fourteenth Amendment 
enforcement authority to enfranchise Blacks); id. at 1000 (statement of Sen. Edmunds (R-VT)) (asserting 
that the right to vote was a privilege or immunity of citizenship). 
 465 Id. at 1041. 
 466 For example, one proposal rejected by the House would have expressly protected the right to hold 
political office and prohibited discrimination based on “race, color, nativity, property, education, or 
creed.” Id. at 1224–26. 
 467 See supra notes 377–383 and accompanying text (comparing Boutwell’s proposal to the Fifteenth 
Amendment). 
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basis of race, color, or previous condition of servitude and empowers 
Congress to enforce its provisions by “appropriate legislation.”468 Once 
again, the Reconstruction Framers adopted the McCulloch standard. 
IV. THE CONTEMPORARY SIGNIFICANCE OF THE ARTICLE V DEBATE 
The Article V debate has been largely overlooked in the historical 
literature469 and has no doctrinal relevance to how the Court interprets the 
Fifteenth Amendment—in stark contrast to the prominent role of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1866.470 This Part identifies the historical and normative 
takeaways from the Article V debate. It then addresses how these insights 
relate to modern doctrine on the Reconstruction Amendments’ substantive 
scopes and enforcement authorities. Finally, this Part addresses how a more 
expansive view of Congress’s Fifteenth Amendment enforcement authority 
would help insulate numerous provisions of the VRA from constitutional 
challenge. Even though the Article V debate occurred 150 years ago, it still 
has relevance today. 
A. The Article V Debate’s Historical and Normative Significance 
The Article V debate illuminates several key points. The first is further 
confirmation that the Reconstruction generation understood that the 
Fourteenth Amendment did not protect political rights.471 The Article V 
debate is particularly persuasive evidence because it was Congress’s first 
 
 468 U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 2. 
 469 To take a few examples from the literature: Professor William Gillette’s seminal work on the 
Fifteenth Amendment devotes only a few pages to the Article V debate and draws no doctrinal 
conclusions. See GILLETTE, supra note 11, at 50–53. Professor John Mabry Mathews’s book on the 
Fifteenth Amendment ignores the Article V debate and assumes that a constitutional amendment was the 
starting point of the analysis. See MATHEWS, supra note 224, at 20–21. Professor Eric Foner’s canonical 
account of Reconstruction largely ignores the Article V debate. See FONER, supra note 8, at 445–50; see 
also ERIC FONER, THE SECOND FOUNDING: HOW THE CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION REMADE THE 
CONSTITUTION 97, 100 (2019) (discussing only briefly Sumner’s and Boutwell’s belief that Congress 
could impose nationwide black suffrage via statute). Professor Kurt Lash’s forthcoming documentary 
history of the Reconstruction Amendments sheds some additional light on the Article V debate. See 
1 KURT T. LASH, THE RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENTS (13TH, 14TH & 15TH): ESSENTIAL DOCUMENTS 
60–62 (forthcoming June 2020). Finally, Professor Earl Maltz highlights the Article V debate in his 
forthcoming paper on the Fifteenth Amendment. See Earl M. Maltz, The Coming of the Fifteenth 
Amendment: The Republican Party and the Right to Vote in the Early Reconstruction Era, 69 CATH. U. 
L. REV. (forthcoming 2020) (manuscript at 29–30), https://papers.ssrn.com/a=3317813 
[https://perma.cc/Y45L-DF3K]. 
 470 See, e.g., McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 775 (2010). 
 471 The Article V debate also sheds light on how the Reconstruction Framers interpreted other 
constitutional provisions, such as the Guarantee Clause. Because the Fortieth Congress’s views on the 
original Constitution’s provisions are entitled to less interpretive weight than its views on the Fourteenth 
Amendment, see infra note 472, this Article does not dwell on those provisions. 
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sustained post-ratification deliberation on the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
substantive scope and enforcement authority.472 To be sure, the Article V 
debate shows that the Fourteenth Amendment’s application to political rights 
was contested at the time. But the Radicals lost that fight twice. The Radicals 
failed to expressly expand the franchise when the Fourteenth Amendment 
passed Congress—a fact that they conceded at the time.473 And the Radicals 
failed again when they could not convince moderate Republicans to pass a 
nationwide black suffrage statute during the lame-duck Fortieth Congress.474 
The lines drawn by the Thirty-Ninth Congress when it passed the Fourteenth 
Amendment and enfranchised Blacks in areas under federal control were not 
crossed by the Fortieth Congress. 
This new historical evidence concerning the Article V debate also 
undercuts recent scholarly attempts to transform Section Two of the 
Fourteenth Amendment into an affirmative right to vote or—when combined 
with Section Five—a source of authority for Congress to enact laws targeting 
racial discrimination in voting.475 Most prominently, Professor Franita 
Tolson has argued that “Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment was the 
Reconstruction Congress’s attempt to constitutionalize a mechanism that 
would allow Congress to all but legislate universal suffrage.”476 According 
 
 472 See Balkin, supra note 135, at 1850 (looking at enforcement acts passed by the Reconstruction 
Congresses to “give us a sense of how a Congress using the McCulloch standard believed it could draft 
enforcement legislation”); McConnell, Desegregation, supra note 176, at 984 (“The actions taken by 
Congress from 1868 through 1875 to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment and the congressional 
deliberations over those measures thus present the best available evidence of the original understanding 
of the meaning of the Amendment . . . .”); cf. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. 
EEOC, 565 U.S. 171, 184–85 (2012) (looking to events in the early 1800s in interpreting the Religion 
Clauses); District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 605–10 (2008) (discussing post-ratification 
commentary in interpreting the Second Amendment). 
 473 See supra Section II.C; cf. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 586 (1952) 
(concluding that the President lacked authority to seize steel mills because, inter alia, “[w]hen the Taft-
Hartley Act was under consideration in 1947, Congress rejected an amendment which would have 
authorized such governmental seizures in cases of emergency”). 
 474 See supra Section III.D. 
 475 Recall that Section Two—also known as the Apportionment Clause—penalizes states that 
disenfranchise their male citizens by reducing their number of seats in the House. See supra Section 
II.C.2. 
 476 Tolson, Abridgment, supra note 84, at 458; see also AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S UNWRITTEN 
CONSTITUTION: THE PRECEDENTS AND PRINCIPLES WE LIVE BY 188 (2012) (arguing that Section Two 
“provides the missing foundation for the general ‘right to vote’ championed by the Warren majority”); 
Mitchell, supra note 206, at 1267–68 (arguing that the text of the Fourteenth Amendment does not 
differentiate based on civil or political rights and therefore Congress may legislate to protect voting rights 
of citizens). Other scholars have read Section Two narrowly. See, e.g., Morley, Equilibration, supra note 
247, at 331 (“Section 2 does not, and was not intended to, permit Congress to compel states to expand 
their electorates.”); Strauss, Constitution, supra note 29, at 39 (arguing that Section Two provides a 
“specific remedy” of decreased representation). 
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to Professor Tolson, Section Two is an all-purpose suffrage provision—not 
limited to race-based concerns. She claims that it covers not only 
intentionally discriminatory laws but also laws that have a disparate impact. 
She further claims that Section Two is concerned not only with vote denial 
but also vote dilution.477 And because Section Two authorizes the “extreme 
penalty” of reducing a state’s representation in the House, Professor Tolson 
contends that Section Five authorizes Congress to impose “lesser penalties” 
below Section Two’s “ceiling.”478 
But if these theories were an accurate account of the Reconstruction-
era public understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment, then the Article V 
debate would probably have come out differently because moderate 
Republicans would have agreed with the Radicals’ statutory proposal on 
constitutional grounds and because the political climate would have been 
much different if the Fourteenth Amendment were presumed to encompass 
political rights.479 Indeed, these theories mirror Boutwell’s view of Section 
Two during the Article V debate,480 an opinion that not only failed to 
convince his fellow Republicans but was also at odds with his own prior 
statements about the Fourteenth Amendment during that ratification 
debate.481 
The second takeaway is that the Fortieth Congress assumed that 
McCulloch provided the standard for Congress’s Fourteenth Amendment 
enforcement authority during the Article V debate. In arguing that Congress 
could pass a nationwide black suffrage statute, Boutwell and Sumner 
invoked Congress’s McCulloch power, albeit a plenary conception of that 
authority.482 Significantly, neither moderate Republicans nor Democrats 
contested that McCulloch was the touchstone. Rather, their criticism focused 
on the exclusion of political rights from the Fourteenth Amendment’s scope. 
 
 477 See Tolson, Abridgment, supra note 84, at 457–58. 
 478 Tolson, Structure, supra note 246, at 401; see also id. at 404 (“[C]ourts can use [the 
Apportionment Clause] as the reference point for determining whether Congress has exceeded the scope 
of its enforcement authority in enacting voting rights legislation.”). 
 479 See supra Section III.D. In addition, these theories fail to adequately grapple with the 
compromises underlying Section Two in particular and the Fourteenth Amendment in general. See supra 
Section II.C.2. These theories also cannot avoid the doctrinal wrinkle that Boerne supplies the governing 
standard for Congress’s Fourteenth Amendment enforcement authority, see supra Section I.B.2, a strict 
standard that may prove problematic for such an expansive interpretation of Section Two’s never-
enforced penalty provision. 
 480 See supra notes 402–403 and accompanying text. 
 481 See supra notes 230 & 410 and accompanying text. Two decades after the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s ratification, Boutwell claimed that the Fifteenth Amendment repealed Section Two of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. See Tolson, Structure, supra note 246, at 418–19. 
 482 See supra Section III.D. 
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Of course, moderate Republicans had partisan reasons for sticking to their 
prior position that the Fourteenth Amendment did not protect political rights. 
Democrats, for their part, opposed any extension of black suffrage. However, 
the central debate was not whether McCulloch was applicable but rather what 
rights were protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.483 In framing the debate 
in such a way, the Fortieth Congress implicitly rejected Boutwell’s and 
Sumner’s contention that the McCulloch power was plenary, since such 
authority would not be bound by the distinction between civil and political 
rights. In other words, McCulloch applies, but has limits. 
By conceptualizing civil and political rights as distinct spheres, 
Congress placed a self-imposed limit on its enforcement authority. It could 
not enforce the Fourteenth Amendment by mandating political equality. 
Boutwell and Sumner’s attempt to collapse the civil versus political rights 
distinction was resoundingly defeated. The Article V debate reveals that the 
Fortieth Congress still believed in bundles of rights and that citizenship was 
not synonymous with suffrage.484 
The third, and related, point is that the Fifteenth Amendment was a new 
font of federal authority. During Reconstruction, the political branches 
engaged in a two-step process for eradicating slavery and protecting the 
rights of the newly freed slaves. By abolishing slavery nationwide and 
ensuring that the Emancipation Proclamation’s validity would not be 
challenged in peacetime, the Thirteenth Amendment expanded and 
entrenched federal authority. Moreover, the Civil Rights Act of 1866 was 
constitutionalized by the Fourteenth Amendment—a key decision given the 
 
 483 This is not the only occasion when “opponents of civil rights legislation conceded that the 
enforcement power under Section Five was equivalent to congressional power under the Necessary and 
Proper Clause.” McConnell, Institutions, supra note 148, at 178 n.153. The same was true during the 
passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1875. See id.; McConnell, Desegregation, supra note 176, at 990 & 
n.194 (arguing that the Civil Rights Act of 1875 was “appropriate” enforcement legislation). 
 484 Near the end of Reconstruction, Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 1875, which prohibited 
racial discrimination in public transportation and accommodations. Ch. 114, 18 Stat. 335, 335–37. On the 
one hand, this legislation—which was invalidated by the Supreme Court in the Civil Rights Cases, 
109 U.S. 3 (1883)—could be viewed as the first step of a failed statute–amendment two-step and as a 
cautionary tale of what could have happened if the Radical Republicans had enacted only a suffrage 
statute and had failed in amending the Constitution. On the other hand, Congress’s careful parsing of its 
Fourteenth Amendment enforcement authority during the Article V debate is powerful evidence that 
Congress can be trusted to self-regulate its enforcement authority. That argument is particularly 
compelling because of the closeness in time between the Reconstruction Amendments and the Civil 
Rights Act of 1875. Viewed from this perspective, Congress’s decision to invoke the Fourteenth 
Amendment to pass the Civil Rights Act of 1875 is entitled to substantial deference. See McConnell, 
Institutions, supra note 148, at 175 (“[S]upporters of the [Civil Rights] Act [of 1875] insisted that it 
merely enforced rights already established by the Fourteenth Amendment.”); McConnell, Desegregation, 
supra note 176, at 984 (discussing enforcement acts passed by the Reconstruction Congress). 
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belief among prominent moderate Republicans that the statute’s 
constitutionality was questionable when it was enacted.485 In both situations, 
the Reconstruction Framers entrenched a subconstitutional principle and 
expanded federal and congressional authority through a constitutional 
amendment. 
So too with the Fifteenth Amendment. The Thirty-Ninth Congress went 
to the outer limits of its perceived constitutional authority in enfranchising 
Blacks in the District of Columbia, the federal territories, and the 
Reconstructed South. In so doing, the Reconstruction Framers invoked 
distinct sources of authority. For the District of Columbia and federal 
territories, Congress acted pursuant to its Article I and Article IV authorities, 
respectively. Regarding the conquered South, the Reconstruction Framers 
invoked the Guarantee Clause. Although the Radicals believed that a Voting 
Rights Act of 1869 would have been constitutional, Congress opted against 
the statutory option because neither the original Constitution nor the recently 
ratified Fourteenth Amendment provided sufficient authority. Put simply, 
the Fortieth Congress continued to adhere to the distinction between civil 
and political rights. The Fifteenth Amendment was thus a significant 
expansion of congressional authority to regulate voting rights in the states. 
And as an independent source of authority, the Fifteenth Amendment should 
be treated as such under modern doctrine. 
Furthermore, the Article V debate speaks to an ongoing scholarly 
discussion over the validity of Section Two of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
According to Professor Jack Chin, the Apportionment Clause “was repealed 
upon ratification of the Fifteenth Amendment.”486 Professor Chin forcefully 
argues that the Fifteenth Amendment was passed, in part, because Section 
Two’s “indirect approach” had failed to achieve nationwide black 
suffrage.487 Professor Chin claims that “the Fifteenth Amendment repudiated 
[the Apportionment Clause]’s theoretical and structural approach to African-
American suffrage”488 and that the two constitutional provisions “cannot 
simultaneously regulate voting discrimination.”489 The upshot, as Professor 
Chin argues, is that Section Two’s endorsement of felon disenfranchisement 
is no longer good law.490 
 
 485 See supra notes 205–206 and accompanying text. 
 486 Gabriel J. Chin, Reconstruction, Felon Disenfranchisement, and the Right to Vote: Did the 
Fifteenth Amendment Repeal Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment?, 92 GEO. L.J. 259, 260 (2004). 
 487 See id. at 261. 
 488 Id. at 262. 
 489 Id. at 263. 
 490 See id. at 263–64. 
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The Article V debate supports Professor Chin’s contention that Section 
Two was viewed as an insufficient penalty, but not his conclusion that it has 
been repealed. On this specific point, I agree with Professor Tolson that “the 
Fifteenth Amendment was meant to complement rather than replace [the 
Apportionment Clause] as a source of congressional authority.”491 Indeed, 
the unsuccessful attempts to strip states of their House seats after the 
Fifteenth Amendment’s ratification demonstrate that Section Two was not 
viewed as a dead letter.492 It is also possible to reconcile the two provisions: 
Section Two imposes a severe federal-level penalty—reduction in House 
seats that would otherwise be allocated pursuant to Article I—whereas the 
Fifteenth Amendment mandates black enfranchisement and gives Congress 
additional authority to enact prophylactic legislation. 
Finally, the Reconstruction Framers’ decision to pursue a constitutional 
amendment proved fortuitous. In the 1870s and 1880s, the Supreme Court 
invalidated or severely curtailed laws that enforced the Fourteenth 
Amendment.493 In 1894, Congress repealed several Reconstruction-era laws 
that protected the right to vote.494 It is not difficult to imagine a similar fate 
befalling a Voting Rights Act of 1869 if passage of that statute had backfired 
politically and doomed the Fifteenth Amendment’s ratification. By 
enshrining the right to vote free of racial discrimination in the Constitution, 
the Reconstruction Framers preserved a powerful legal and rhetorical tool 
that proved immensely valuable during the civil rights movement and served 
as Congress’s font of authority when it first enacted Section 5 of the VRA.495 
B. The Article V Debate and Current Doctrine 
By establishing that the Fifteenth Amendment was considered an 
expansion of federal authority during Reconstruction, the Article V debate 
demands that we rethink the erasure496 of the Fifteenth Amendment by the 
Fourteenth Amendment. 
 
 491 Tolson, Structure, supra note 246, at 405. 
 492 See Magliocca, supra note 245, at 786–89 (describing the 1871 attempt to invoke Section Two); 
Tolson, Abridgment, supra note 84, at 474–77 (discussing the 1901 attempt to invoke Section Two). 
 493 See, e.g., The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883) (invalidating the Civil Rights Act of 1875); 
supra note 484 and accompanying text. 
 494 See Tolson, Abridgment, supra note 84, at 467. 
 495 See supra notes 101–109 and accompanying text. 
 496 Here, I borrow the concept of erasure from Bruce Ackerman & Jennifer Nou, Canonizing the 
Civil Rights Revolution: The People and the Poll Tax, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 63, 119–23 (2009). Professors 
Ackerman and Nou use the concept to describe the Court’s invocation of the Fourteenth Amendment—
rather than the VRA and the Twenty-Fourth Amendment—to invalidate the poll tax in Harper v. Virginia 
Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966). 
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1. Rethinking the Substantive Scopes of the Reconstruction 
Amendments 
Imagine a world where we take the Fifteenth Amendment seriously. 
Suppose we looked first to how a voting rights case should be resolved under 
the Fifteenth Amendment before turning to the relevant precedent under the 
Fourteenth Amendment. This doctrinal order of operations accords not only 
with the original public understanding of the two Amendments, but also 
follows the canons against surplusage and that the specific controls over the 
general. 
Treating the Fifteenth Amendment as an independent constitutional 
provision would force a reassessment of Shaw and its hostility to race-
conscious redistricting. Recall that the Shaw line of cases is based solely on 
the Equal Protection Clause.497 Yet, the most adamant defenders of Shaw on 
the Court are originalists,498 even though the Equal Protection Clause was 
originally understood to exclude political rights. The insights gleaned from 
the Article V debate would presumably be particularly relevant to these 
Justices.499 
To be sure, it might be doctrinally feasible to defend Shaw under the 
Fifteenth Amendment. But that presumes the debate over the colorblind and 
anti-subordination theories of the Equal Protection Clause is applicable to 
the Fifteenth Amendment.500 After all, if we are to confront originalist 
Justices on their own terms, then the fact that the Reconstruction generation 
continued to adhere to the civil versus political rights distinction might mean 
that different concerns apply to the franchise than to, say, the right to sign a 
contract. And instead of a well-worn argument over whether equality is best 
achieved through race-neutral or race-conscious means, the Fifteenth 
Amendment may embody a distinctively different framework, such as the 
empowerment of racial minorities through the ballot and their fair 
representation at various levels of government. And after taking into account 
that, during Reconstruction, Blacks were majorities or sizable pluralities of 
 
 497 See Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 649 (1993); supra Section I.A.1. 
 498 See supra note 82 and accompanying text (discussing Justice Thomas’s support for Shaw). 
 499 Notwithstanding the position of originalist Justices on the colorblind Equal Protection Clause, 
see, e.g., Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 136 S. Ct. 2198, 2215 (2016) (Thomas, J., dissenting); id. at 
2220–21 (Alito, J., dissenting), there is substantial evidence that the Reconstruction Framers were 
comfortable with race-conscious laws. See generally Eric Schnapper, Affirmative Action and the 
Legislative History of the Fourteenth Amendment, 71 VA. L. REV. 753 (1985) (collecting examples of 
Reconstruction-era race-conscious laws). 
 500 Cf. Reva B. Siegel, From Colorblindness to Antibalkinization: An Emerging Ground of Decision 
in Race Equality Cases, 120 YALE L.J. 1278, 1286–89 (2011) (discussing the debate between advocates 
of colorblindness and anti-subordination and identifying a middle-ground antibalkanization principle). 
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the Southern and Border States and racially polarized voting was a fact of 
political life, the Article V debate and the Fifteenth Amendment could 
reshape how we think about Shaw.501 
Taking the Fifteenth Amendment seriously would also mean seeking 
answers to questions that the Court has expressly reserved: whether the 
Fifteenth Amendment encompasses a discriminatory-effects standard and 
prohibits racial vote dilution.502 If the answer to either of these questions is 
“yes,” then Section 2 of the VRA is on firmer constitutional ground and 
Congress would have more flexibility to enact voting rights legislation.503 On 
this front, relevant considerations include, inter alia, the meaning of the terms 
“right . . . to vote” and “denied or abridged,”504 the various draft amendments 
considered during the Fortieth Congress, and post-ratification enforcement 
legislation. 
Of course, there are legitimate reasons for not upending the entirety of 
voting rights doctrine based on the distinction between the Fourteenth and 
Fifteenth Amendments. A lot of water has gone under the proverbial 
Fourteenth Amendment bridge, and stare decisis strongly counsels against 
overturning certain doctrines—such as one-person, one-vote for state 
legislative districts—that have proven workable and have engendered 
reliance interests. And even though the distinction between citizenship and 
suffrage still had salience during Reconstruction, it has been substantially 
weakened by the expansion of the franchise via the Nineteenth Amendment 
(women’s suffrage), Twenty-Fourth Amendment (poll taxes), and Twenty-
Sixth Amendment (age).505 Now that citizenship and suffrage are mostly 
coextensive, the civil versus political rights divide may have less force as 
well. Reconciling the living Fourteenth Amendment and the forgotten 
Fifteenth Amendment is no easy interpretive task. Indeed, it is a task left to 
future articles that examine the Fifteenth Amendment’s drafting and 
 
 501 See supra Section III.C. For an answer to this question, see Travis Crum, Reconstructing Racially 
Polarized Voting, 70 DUKE L.J. (forthcoming 2020), https://papers.ssrn.com/a=3541863. 
[https://perma.cc/PZL8-LFPX]. 
 502 To be clear, the Court currently interprets the Fourteenth Amendment to prohibit intentional racial 
vote dilution. See supra Section I.A.1. Accordingly, that question is not as salient as the discriminatory-
effects issue. However, there is the possibility the Court would apply Boerne to Congress’s attempts to 
remedy intentional racial vote dilution under the Fourteenth Amendment. 
 503 There is also an available avenue for civil rights groups to force courts to reach these underlying 
constitutional questions: the VRA’s bail-in provision, which authorizes courts to impose preclearance 
based on a violation of the Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendment. See supra note 22 (discussing Section 
3(c)). 
 504 U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1. 
 505 Id. amend. XIX; id. amend. XXIV; id. amend. XXVI. 
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ratification, as well as the relationship between the Reconstruction 
Amendments. 
2. Rethinking Congress’s Enforcement Authority 
The Article V debate provides additional evidence that Boerne is 
wrongly decided. And even assuming that the Court refuses to overturn 
Boerne, the Article V debate provides a reason for cabining Boerne to the 
Fourteenth Amendment. 
Recall that the Reconstruction Framers’ deliberate and repetitious 
borrowing of the term “appropriate” sent a clear signal that Congress’s 
enforcement authority was broad and uniform across the Reconstruction 
Amendments.506 This Article has uncovered additional evidence to reinforce 
this point: that both sides of the Article V debate believed that McCulloch 
provided the applicable standard for Congress’s Fourteenth Amendment 
enforcement authority and that moderate Republicans declined to enact a 
nationwide black suffrage statute because they believed that Congress could 
not enforce civil rights by expanding political rights. The Reconstruction 
Congress conceptualized the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments’ 
substantive scopes and enforcement provisions as discrete protections and 
grants of authority. The Article V debate thus shows that the McCulloch 
standard—while broad—is not plenary. And therein lies the rub. 
The Article V debate shows that, even under the 
McCulloch/Katzenbach standard, there is a limiting principle for Congress’s 
Fourteenth Amendment enforcement authority. This is significant because 
the Boerne Court fretted that “[i]f Congress could define its own powers by 
altering the Fourteenth Amendment’s meaning, . . . . it is difficult to 
conceive of a principle that would limit congressional power.”507 The Article 
V debate demonstrates that Congress can self-police its Fourteenth 
Amendment enforcement authority. The Fortieth Congress’s decision to 
respect the distinction between civil and political rights undermines Boerne’s 
concern that Congress will improperly “decree the substance of the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s restrictions on the States.”508 Congress, in other 
words, can be trusted with the McCulloch power—an authority that, after all, 
it expressly conferred upon itself.509 
And even if, for reasons of stare decisis, Boerne continues to apply to 
the Fourteenth Amendment, it should not apply to the Fifteenth Amendment. 
 
 506 See supra Section II.D. 
 507 City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 529 (1997). 
 508 Id. at 519. 
 509 See Balkin, supra note 135, at 1805. 
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Notwithstanding the passage of time, the Reconstruction Amendments 
continue to protect distinct bundles of rights, and the Court can easily 
differentiate between civil and political rights. 
The Court has interpreted the Fourteenth Amendment’s broad language 
to protect a panoply of rights. The Court, for example, has incorporated 
nearly all of the protections enumerated in the Bill of Rights.510 In addition, 
the Court has held that “the ‘liberty’ specially protected by the Due Process 
Clause includes the rights to marry; to have children; to direct the education 
and upbringing of one’s children; to marital privacy; to use contraception; to 
bodily integrity; and to abortion.”511 And in a similar vein, under the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause, suspect or quasi-suspect 
classes include not only race512 but also alienage,513 sex,514 and, in some 
circuits, sexual orientation.515 In light of the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
breadth, Boerne’s congruence and proportionality test seeks to ensure that 
“[t]he ultimate interpretation and determination of the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s substantive meaning remain[ed] the province of the Judicial 
Branch.”516 
These separation of powers concerns have little force in the Fifteenth 
Amendment context. Under the Fifteenth Amendment, Congress is solely 
empowered to prohibit racial discrimination in voting—a textually and 
conceptually defined sphere of rights.517 Giving the Fifteenth Amendment 
independent meaning for Congress’s enforcement authority not only avoids 
a superfluity, but also follows the principle that the specific should control 
over the general. Although it is possible to imagine scenarios that would 
likely overstep Congress’s Fifteenth Amendment authority—such as 
mandating, as many countries do, that political parties have a certain 
percentage of minority candidates518—Katzenbach’s rationality standard 
should provide an ample check on Congress. 
 
 510 See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 147–48 (1968) (enumerating provisions of the Bill of 
Rights which have been incorporated). 
 511 Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997) (citations omitted). 
 512 See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995). 
 513 See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971). 
 514 See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 532–33 (1996). 
 515 See SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Abbott Labs., 740 F.3d 471, 484 (9th Cir. 2014). 
 516 Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 81 (2000). 
 517 The Fifteenth Amendment’s targeted language also alleviates the federalism concern that 
Congress could invoke it to exercise “virtually plenary police power.” Caminker, supra note 99, at 1191. 
 518 See Mona Lena Krook & Diana Z. O’Brien, The Politics of Group Representation: Quotas for 
Women and Minorities Worldwide, 42 COMP. POL. 253, 257–58 tbl.2 (2010) (collecting examples of such 
mandates). 
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C. Congress’s Fifteenth Amendment Enforcement Authority and the VRA 
If Katzenbach supplies the governing standard for Congress’s Fifteenth 
Amendment enforcement authority, the VRA would be on firmer 
constitutional ground. That is because Katzenbach’s rationality standard 
gives Congress far greater authority to interpret the Constitution and fashion 
remedial schemes.519 
Under Boerne, the Court is the sole interpreter of “what the law is.”520 
By contrast, under Katzenbach, Congress and the Court share interpretive 
responsibilities, and so long as Congress’s construction of an ambiguous 
constitutional provision is reasonable—that is, appropriate—the Court 
should defer even if it would have interpreted the relevant provision 
differently.521 Moreover, at the first step of the congruence and 
proportionality test, the Court must “identify with some precision the scope 
of the constitutional right at issue.”522 The Katzenbach standard does not 
require the Court to make that precise determination. Recall that the Morgan 
Court declined to decide whether New York’s English language literacy 
requirements violated the Fourteenth Amendment.523 And in upholding the 
1975 reauthorization of the VRA in City of Rome v. United States, the Court 
assumed, without deciding, that the Fifteenth Amendment prohibited only 
intentional racial discrimination in vote-denial cases.524 The Katzenbach 
standard thus accords with judicial minimalism: the Court need not 
definitively expound on the meaning of the Constitution and can defer to a 
coordinate branch. And, significantly for this Article’s breadth, if there is no 
need to fully ascertain the precise metes and bounds of the underlying right, 
then a comprehensive account of the Fifteenth Amendment’s scope is 
unnecessary. 
Katzenbach and Boerne also diverge on Congress’s remedial 
authority.525 Under both lines of cases, Congress may enact prophylactic 
 
 519 See supra Section I.B. 
 520 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803); see also Schmidt, supra note 100, at 
101–03 (discussing Boerne). 
 521 See Balkin, supra note 135, at 1827–28; McConnell, Institutions, supra note 148, at 172, 194–
95. 
 522 Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 365 (2001). 
 523 See supra notes 116–118 and accompanying text. 
 524 See 446 U.S. 156, 173 (1980) (“We hold that, even if § 1 of the [Fifteenth] Amendment prohibits 
only purposeful discrimination, the prior decisions of this Court foreclose any argument that Congress 
may not, pursuant to § 2, outlaw voting practices that are discriminatory in effect.” (footnote omitted)). 
 525 Under a strictly remedial view, Congress’s enforcement authority is limited to actual 
constitutional violations. See Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 559 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(“Nothing in § 5 allows Congress to go beyond the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment to proscribe, 
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legislation that prohibits conduct that is not per se unconstitutional.526 
Katzenbach, however, gives Congress far greater leeway in crafting the 
remedial scheme, as Boerne limits Congress to remedying violations of 
constitutional rights as those rights are defined by the Court and requires a 
far tighter fit between the constitutional wrong and the remedy.527 
Congress has exercised its interpretive and remedial authority in 
enacting, revising, and reauthorizing the VRA. Indeed, Congress has 
repeatedly reaffirmed its commitment to protecting voting rights and has 
responded to Supreme Court decisions that unduly narrowed the Fifteenth 
Amendment’s protections. Perhaps most famously, Congress statutorily 
overrode the Court’s plurality opinion in Bolden. In that decision, four 
Justices concluded that Section 2 of the VRA was coextensive with the 
Fifteenth Amendment, which, in turn, they construed as limited to intentional 
discrimination in vote-denial cases.528 In the 1982 amendments to the VRA, 
Congress revised Section 2 in two significant ways. First, Congress 
established a discriminatory-effects standard.529 Second, Congress expanded 
Section 2 to prohibit racial discrimination in vote-dilution cases.530 Thus, in 
revising Section 2, Congress exercised its Fifteenth Amendment 
enforcement authority to decide when “the right . . . to vote” has been 
“denied or abridged . . . on account of race.”531 Under Katzenbach, the Court 
should defer to Congress’s finding that the right to vote is denied or abridged 
on account of race by laws with a discriminatory effect—or, alternatively 
 
prevent, or ‘remedy’ conduct that does not itself violate any provision of the Fourteenth Amendment. So-
called ‘prophylactic legislation’ is reinforcement rather than enforcement.”); id. at 559–60 (endorsing the 
enactment of federal cause-of-action statutes and disclosure provisions). 
 526 Id. at 520 (majority opinion) (“When Congress seeks to remedy or prevent unconstitutional 
discrimination, § 5 [of the Fourteenth Amendment] authorizes it to enact prophylactic legislation 
proscribing practices that are discriminatory in effect, if not in intent, to carry out the basic objectives of 
the Equal Protection Clause.”). Congress, for example, can ban literacy tests on the grounds that they 
were likely enacted with a discriminatory intent and have a disproportionate impact on racial minorities 
notwithstanding precedent holding that those tests are facially constitutional. Compare Oregon v. 
Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 132 (1970) (opinion of Black, J.) (upholding the VRA’s nationwide ban on 
literacy tests), and South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 333–34 (1966) (upholding the VRA’s 
geographically and temporarily limited ban on literacy tests), with Lassiter v. Northampton Cty. Bd. of 
Elections, 360 U.S. 45, 50–53 (1959) (holding that literacy tests are facially constitutional). 
 527 See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 527 (“Any suggestion that Congress has a substantive, 
non-remedial power under the Fourteenth Amendment is not supported by our case law.”); Katz, supra 
note 134, at 2362–68 (discussing remedial authority). 
 528 See City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 60–61 (1980) (plurality opinion) (interpreting Section 
2 as coextensive with the Fifteenth Amendment); id. at 65 (discussing the Fifteenth Amendment’s scope). 
 529 See Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-205, 96 Stat. 131 (codified at 
52 U.S.C. § 10301 (2012)). 
 530 See id.; see also Stephanopoulos, supra note 74, at 1576 (discussing the 1982 amendments). 
 531 U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1. 
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framed, that a discriminatory-effects standard is appropriate prophylactic 
legislation given the difficulty in ferreting out discriminatory intent. The 
Court should similarly defer to Congress’s determination that vote dilution 
is an abridgment of the right to vote. 
The Katzenbach standard would also help bolster the constitutionality 
of the various VRA provisions that protect language minorities.532 Under 
current doctrine, the voting rights of language minorities are often treated 
under the Fourteenth Amendment, as that is the approach Congress and the 
Court took in Morgan.533 But if Congress is given leeway to define what 
constitutes discrimination “on account of race[] [or] color” under the 
Fifteenth Amendment,534 then it could reasonably find that language is a 
proxy for race. Indeed, the Court made a similar logical inference in Rice v. 
Cayetano,535 where it concluded that “[a]ncestry can be a proxy for race” in 
striking down a Hawaiian constitutional provision that limited suffrage based 
on whether a prospective voter was of Hawaiian descent.536 Congress, for its 
part, could conclude that English language requirements enacted in response 
to a recent increase of minority voters is discrimination on the basis of race 
or color—not just language. And if Congress could make that finding under 
the Fifteenth Amendment, it would be given deference under Katzenbach’s 
rationality standard. 
Finally, the Katzenbach standard would further strengthen Section 
3(c)’s bail-in provision, which authorizes courts to impose preclearance 
based on a violation of the Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendment.537 Since 
Shelby County, numerous lawsuits have been filed seeking to bail-in 
jurisdictions, including high-profile cases against North Carolina and 
 
 532 As discussed above, see supra notes 110–112, Section 4(e) protects language minorities. So does 
Section 2. 52 U.S.C. § 10301. Section 203’s coverage formula for providing bilingual election materials 
also protects language minorities. See id. § 10503. That latter provision, however, would be reviewed 
under Shelby County. See supra note 155 (discussing Shelby County and Section 203). 
 533 Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 646–47 (1966). Because Section 4(e) was added toward 
the end of the drafting process, there is nothing in the legislative history about why Congress chose to 
rely on its Fourteenth Amendment enforcement authority. One potential explanation is that federal courts 
had rejected challenges to New York’s English language requirements on the grounds that the Fifteenth 
Amendment permits language-based discrimination. See JAMES THOMAS TUCKER, THE BATTLE OVER 
BILINGUAL BALLOTS: LANGUAGE MINORITIES AND POLITICAL ACCESS UNDER THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT 
33 (2009); Warren M. Christopher, The Constitutionality of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 18 STAN. L. 
REV. 1, 24–25 (1965). In my view, Congress would have been well within its Fifteenth Amendment 
enforcement authority to enact Section 4(e). 
 534 U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1. 
 535 528 U.S. 495, 514 (2000). 
 536 Id.; see also supra notes 69–73 (discussing Rice). 
 537 52 U.S.C. § 10302(c). 
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Texas.538 And although the Shelby County Court issued no decision on 
preclearance itself,539 it is probable that, at some point, a bailed-in 
jurisdiction will challenge Section 3(c)’s constitutionality.540 By giving 
Congress greater leeway in fashioning a remedial scheme, the Katzenbach 
standard would ensure that preclearance remains a viable remedy in voting 
rights litigation. 
CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court has declared that “[t]he Fifteenth Amendment has 
independent meaning and force.”541 But on the Fifteenth Amendment’s 
sesquicentennial, the Court’s doctrine belies that grand statement. By 
examining why the Fortieth Congress passed the Fifteenth Amendment 
instead of a Voting Rights Act of 1869, this Article has taken the first step 
toward reconceptualizing the Fifteenth Amendment as a truly independent 
constitutional provision. The Article V debate problematizes the Court’s 
current doctrine in numerous ways, perhaps most significantly in the realm 
of enforcement authority. The doctrinal upshot of the Article V debate is that 
Katzenbach’s rationality standard should apply to nationwide statutes—such 
as Sections 2 and 3(c) of the VRA—that are enacted pursuant to Congress’s 
Fifteenth Amendment enforcement authority. 
 
 
 538 See Veasey v. Abbott, 888 F.3d 792, 804 (5th Cir. 2018) (holding that Texas’s revised voter ID 
law meant that “there is no equitable basis for subjecting Texas to ongoing federal election scrutiny under 
Section 3(c)”); N.C. State Conference of the NAACP v. McCrory, 831 F.3d 204, 241 (4th Cir. 2016) 
(declining to bail-in North Carolina notwithstanding a finding of intentional discrimination); Perez v. 
Abbott, 390 F. Supp. 3d 803, 807 (W.D. Tex. 2019) (finding intentional discrimination in the enactment 
of a redistricting plan but declining a request for Section 3(c) relief); see also Crum, Recent Bail-in 
Litigation, supra note 22 (discussing Veasey and McCrory). 
 539 See Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 557 (2013). For why Shelby County’s equal 
sovereignty principle is inapplicable to a nationwide statute like Section 3(c), see supra Section I.B.3. 
 540 In the post-Shelby County cases, no state or jurisdiction has facially challenged Section 3(c). Cf. 
Travis Crum, The Prospect of Bailing-in Texas: The Constitutional Argument for Bail-in, ELECTION L. 
BLOG (Sept. 16, 2018, 9:43 AM), https://electionlawblog.org/?p=101141 [https://perma.cc/4GG7-4R2U] 
(“It’s telling that Texas lacked the chutzpah to argue that Section 3(c) was facially invalid.”).  
 541 Rice, 528 U.S. at 522. 
